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Abstract
This chapter surveys existing approaches to modeling labor supply and identi®es important gaps
inthe literature thatcould be addressed infuture research. The discussionbegins witha lookat recent
policy reforms and labor market facts that motivate the study of labor supply. The analysis then
presents a unifying framework that allows alternative empirical formulations of the labor supply
model to be compared and their resulting elasticities to be interpreted. This is followed by critical
reviews of alternative approaches to labor-supply modeling. The ®rst review assesses the difference-
in-differences approach and its relationship to natural experiments. The second analyzes estimation
with non-linear budget constraints and welfare-program participation. The third appraises develop-
ments offamily labor-supply models including both the standard unitary and collective labor-supply
formulations. The fourth brie¯y explores dynamic extensions of the labor supply model, character-
izing how participation decisions, learning-by-doing, human capital accumulation and habit forma-
tion affect the analysis of the lifecycle model. At the end of each of the four broad reviews, we
summarize a selection of the recent empirical ®ndings. The concluding section asks whether the
developments reviewed in this chapter place us in a better position to answer the policy-reform
questions and to interpret the trends in participation and hours with which we began this review.
q1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL codes: J21; J22; J24; C21; C24
1. Introduction
Consistent with its tradition, research on labor supply during the past decade has been at
the forefront of developments in empirical microeconomics. At the same time, an impor-
tant component of this research has rebuffed sophisticated estimation approaches in favor
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sions. The attention devoted to the study of labor supply arises from intense interests in
assessing the consequences of a wide array of public policies, ranging from tax and
welfare programs to the alteration of institutional features of labor markets. A further
motivation concerns the curiosity of economists in explaining the factors underlying the
dramatic changes in employment patterns that have occurred in recent years, trends that
show no evidence of stabilizing in the near future.
After presenting a brief overview of the phenomena stimulating recent analyses of labor
supply, this chapter pursues its main purpose of reviewing the empirical developments and
®ndings produced by this research. It focuses on work done since the surveys of Pencavel
(1986) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), which ably summarized the labor supply
literature in the previous Handbook of Labor Economics. We draw widely on existing
research in the labor supply literature. Our discussion of methodological developments
presents simpli®ed examples to highlight essential ideas, not attempting to attribute each
development to speci®c authors and, thus, omitting most references in this discussion. We
do not claim originality in this survey, and our discussion of applications refers to many of
the studies that have made the major contributions to this research area since the earlier
Handbook surveys. It is inevitable that we have omitted references and we apologize for
such omissions.
The in¯uence of governmental programs on people's employment and hours of work is
often a critical consideration in the design of policies. Indeed, the primary objective of
many recent reforms in both tax and welfare programs in North America, the UK, Scan-
dinavia and other parts of Europe has been to encourage participants to increase their work
effort. Few decades match the most recent in terms of how much change has occurred in
tax and welfare policies. Understanding labor supply behavior is vital in formulating
proposals that build in work incentives while providing income support.
This chapter begins with a cursory description of how tax and welfare policies have
changed in recent years, considering how these changes enter the picture of labor supply
and its empirical analyses. For this discussion, we focus on reforms in the US and the UK.
This is not simply because of our own local knowledge but also because these two
countries have been at the forefront of introducing welfare and tax reforms designed to
encourage work effort ± in particular, the move toward in-work bene®ts. These ``Welfare
to Work'' proposals form a particularly attractive background against which to motivate
labor supply analysis as they are generally reforms directly aimed at addressing the decline
in participation among certain types of workers. The analysis of participation in work is
key to the evaluation of welfare-to-work reforms and this is the margin over which labor
supply responses may be most responsive. However, to properly evaluate the impact of a
welfare-to-work policy reform, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US, requires a
careful examination of the balance between the labor supply decisions of those individuals
already working who may now face a higher bene®t (or credit) reduction rate and the labor
supply decisions of those individuals who may be induced to enter by such a reform. We
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the shape of the budget constraint facing many workers.
Any analysis of labor supply requires an understanding of the background changes in
wages, participation and hours of work. In Section 3, we provide an analysis of labor
supply facts highlighting the important changes in labor market participation and in the
dispersion of wages. As a comparison with the US and the UK, we document the changes
in these aspects of labor supply for two additional countries: Germany and Sweden. It is
these changes in participation and working hours that labor supply models attempt to
explain. The success of labor supply models will be judged largely in terms of their
ability to explain and enhance our understanding of the changes in participation and
hours.
Having motivated ouranalysis oflaborsupplywith important policy questionsand labor
supply facts, our aim in the remaining sections is to present a comprehensive evaluation of
alternative approaches to modeling labor supply. This seeks to achieve three broad objec-
tives: to make different studies comparable by providing a unifying framework by which
the results of each can be interpreted; to provide a description of the mechanics of imple-
menting each approach and the data and assumptions required; and to identify gaps in our
knowledge which can motivate future research. We have attempted to review the state of
empirical knowledge on labor supply responses, and we end each section with a discussion
of relevant empirical results.
The unifying framework we develop in Section 4 is designed to compare across alter-
native basic labor supply speci®cations. It should be noted at the outset that individual
labor supply responses may be re¯ected in the choice of hours across ®rms rather than
within any establishment. Complexities that arise from non-linear taxation, ®xed costs,
welfare programs, dynamics, etc. are taken up in detail in the following sections. A simple
multi-period framework is used to compare across alternative static formulations, two-
stage budgeting models, the Frisch model and fully-speci®ed lifecycle models. The aim is
not to dictate a single approach to estimation, but rather to evaluate precisely what can be
learned from different datasets and different approaches to estimation. The wage coef®-
cient in each approach is related to alternative elasticity measures and we ask which
measure is appropriate for the evaluation of policy reforms. Even the simplest tax reform
typically involves an unanticipated shift in the pro®le of wages. None of the standard
elasticity measures fully re¯ects responses to such a shift and Section 4 precisely docu-
ments what is required to answer such policy questions.
Sections 5±8 consider alternative aspects and approaches to labor supply that have been
adopted in the literature. We begin with a review of the application of difference in
differences and natural experiments in labor supply estimation. Our aim here is to empha-
size the structural assumptions underlying this approach and to relate the estimated para-
meters to those needed for policy analysis. A number of in¯uential studies that have used
this approach, and related approaches, are then reviewed.
Procedures by which a researcher can fully account for non-linear taxation, ®xed costs,
welfare participation and missing wages in estimation and simulation motivate the discus-
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restrictions placed on behavior by alternative models. The practical issue of how to
account for multiple program participation and the interactions between the tax and bene®t
system are highlighted. The empirical literature in this area is vast. This aspect of labor
supply continues to attract considerable research interest, re¯ecting the recurring impor-
tance placed on the labor supply responses to tax and bene®t reforms.
Placing the labor supply problem in a context where there is potentially more than one
supplier of labor in the household is covered in Section 7, which re¯ects two important
developmentsinthisarea.The®rstistoacknowledgethecomplexsetofincentivesfacedby
multiple workers once the full tax and welfare system is accounted for. The second is the
introduction of alternative models of labor supply decision-making when multiple workers
are located in the same family. These alternative models that seek to account for collective
choices that are solutions to bargaining within the family are still in their infancy as far as
empiricalapplicationareconcerned.However,weareabletocomparethemtothestandard
``unitary'' model and review the empirical literature that has developed to date.
Our review of alternative formulations of the labor supply model is completed in
Section 8 with a discussion of dynamic models. Here we highlight generalizations of
the basic multiperiod model described in Section 4 that allow for human capital and
non-participation. The ®rst-order conditions for the standard multiperiod model can be
severely distorted in the presence of human capital choices. Human capital choices, or
purely exogenous learning by doing, can break the separability of the intertemporal deci-
sion rule that allows simple Frisch and two-stage budgeting formulations. This is also
shared by models that allow for habits. We describe the appropriate adaptation of the
multiperiod model to cover these extensions and review the results from the empirical
literature. We also consider the complications that arise in these models once non-parti-
cipation and ®xed costs are allowed for. We evaluate the trade-off between realism and
computational tractability and set up the standard discrete dynamic programming formu-
lation for this problem.
In Section 9, we conclude this chapter with a brief assessment of what has been
achieved by recent research on labor supply and ask whether we are now in a better
position to answer the policy-reform questions raised in Section 2 and better able to
understand the labor supply facts described in Section 3. We document a large number
of signi®cant contributions across a wide range of labor supply issues but we also identify
signi®cant gaps in our knowledge which will continue to place research on labor supply at
the forefront of research in labor economics for some time to come.
2. How have tax and welfare policies changed?
In few decades have we seen the marked changes in tax and welfare policies that have
occurred since the early 1980s. In the US, the number of tax brackets sharply diminished
with the passage of the federal tax reform in 1986. In the UK, the number and level of
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towards indirect taxation. Sweden and other European countries subsequently followed
this direction in reforming their income tax systems during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In both the US and the UK, in-work bene®ts increasingly became the main platform for
encouraging low-income families to increase their work effort and incomes. In the US, the
earned income tax credit (EITC) was greatly enhanced in 1993, while in the UK the
Family Credit (FC) system, based on a minimum number of weekly hours worked,
reduced the limit in 1992 from 24 to 16 h per week and signi®cantly increased the number
of recipients.
In 1996, the US adopted sweeping reforms in its welfare systems, all designed to induce
recipients to support themselves through work. In the UK, the Family Credit system was
extended to incorporate a 30-hour bene®t supplement. In the 1998 budget, Family Credit
was made more generous and was renamed Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) to
signify that payments would be paid through the tax system. The motivation of much
research on labor supply is to predict the consequences of such reforms for hours of work
and earnings. Researchers often devote considerable attention to modeling the institutional
features of tax and transfer policies. This section brie¯y summarizes the changes that have
occurred during the last decade in tax and welfare policies. We focus on policy changes for
the US and the UK. The following sections explain how labor supply analyses have
exploited these changes to assess their impacts on work behavior.
2.1. US tax and welfare programs
Perhaps the easiest way to convey the complexities introduced by the US tax and welfare
system is to describe the number of programs in which individuals participate when they
work. Workers must pay federal income taxes which account for an array of deductions,
social security tax, state income tax and a variety of health and insurance taxes. If a
worker's family has suf®ciently low income, it may be eligible for bene®ts from a patch-
work of different programs. These public assistance programs provide support in the form
of cash income as well as in-kind support for necessities such as food, housing, medical
care or home heating. The six major programs that offer the core of resource support for
poor families in the US are: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food
Stamp Program (FSP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Housing Assistance, Medi-
caid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). AFDC, SSI, and EITC pay cash assis-
tance to low-income families. FSP provides food vouchers denominated in dollars to low-
income households. Housing assistance programs come in two varieties: rent subsidies for
occupancy of private dwellings, and low-income public housing which is built, managed
and maintained by government agencies. Finally, Medicaid is an in-kind bene®ts program
providing medical assistance to poor persons.
Describing how all of these programs have changed individually during the past
decade would occupy many papers, yet this exercise would still fall short of character-
izing how these policy alterations in¯uence labor supply, as the most profound and
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1564disconcerting effects occur when families simultaneously participate in multiple
programs. Each program has its own bene®t reduction rate which determines how
much bene®ts decline as earnings increase. These rates act as tax rates on earnings,
in that they dictate how much families get to keep out of any incremental earnings they
receive while collecting bene®ts. Because bene®t reduction rates are independent across
programs, the combined bene®t reduction rate that results when a family participates in
several programs rises to staggeringly high levels that no policymaker ever intended.
This, in turn, produces signi®cant disincentives for families to work. The relevant
factor in assessing the impact of these policies on labor supply is the combined effect
of these programs through time.
2.1.1. How do programs in the US combine to tax earnings and provide income support?
Fig. 1 shows how net governmental transfers change as a family's earnings rise, given
participation in various combinations of public assistance programs. The ®gure depicts
three scenarios: the lower curve indicates transfers when the family receives bene®ts from
just EITC; the middle curve gives the total bene®ts received when the family collects food
stamps in conjunction with EITC; and the upper curve measures the total transfers when
the family participates in the AFDC program as well. The curves are for a single-parent
family with two children living in California ± only the AFDC bene®t schedule depends on
California residency. Other than the social security tax (about 7.5%), families at the low
income level pay no federal or state income taxes. As earnings increase (i.e., moving left to
right in the ®gure), net transfers initially rise due to the increase in EITC, regardless of the
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Fig. 1. Net transfers/taxes for California in 1996.combination of programs in which the family participates. However, eventually these
transfers decline with higher levels of earnings. The reversal is fastest when the family
collects AFDC, food stamps and EITC simultaneously, and slowest when collecting only
EITC.
For a family participating in all three programs, the uncoordinated nature of the
programs leads to some unintended and undesirable features. As the family's earnings
rise within the ®rst $750/month earned (30 h per week at $5.75) in 1996, the EITC
provides a tax credit increasing the value of work by 40%. If this were the only
program, the family would face an implicit tax rate of 232% (a negative tax), paying
only social security taxes. However, since both food stamps and AFDC bene®ts
decline more rapidly with earnings than EITC rises, a family who also participates
in these programs ends up losing about 23 cents out of every $1 earned up to $750/
month. This translates into an effective positive tax rate of 23% on earnings. Earning
$750/month, this family still receives bene®ts from all three programs. Increasing
family earnings from $750 to $1500/month would put it in an income range with
effective tax rates of about 89%, meaning that it would retain only 11 cents out of
every dollar earned.
Ironically, this high tax rate is the result of changes during the past ®ve years that were
designed to increase work incentives. Recent federal legislation increased the generosity
of the EITC, and at about the same time California lowered the bene®t reduction rates
through the passage of ``30 and a third'' reforms in AFDC. Comparing the bene®t structure
and tax rates in 1996 to those in 1992 reveals that these federal and California state
changes decreased the effective taxes for families in the lowest earnings range. The
marginal tax rate for the ®rst $750 of earnings fell from 71% to 23%. However, these
changes simultaneously raised the marginal tax rate for the second $750 of earnings from
59% to 89%.
Knowing that AFDC participants do not work extensively under the current system says
little about their motivation or prospects for working, because the existing bene®t structure
creates strong disincentives to working. It is quite rational for AFDC recipients to work
little or not at all. The current rules tax income highly as earnings increase. These work
disincentives become more severe the more a recipient works and the closer he or she gets
to self-suf®ciency.
Under the system today, an AFDC recipient would need to work 40 h per week at $6.90/
h to make enough to leave AFDC ($1104/month). She would need to earn $7.88/h to lose
food stamps as well ($1261/month). Yet in moving from $750/month to $1500/month,
her net income would rise by only $82 due to a combination of bene®t reductions in both
AFDC and food stamps and a reduction in the EITC as earnings enter a ``phase out range.''
Unfortunately, the resulting 89% tax rate falls precisely on the earnings range that makes
the difference between welfare receipt and self-suf®ciency.
2.1.2. How do programs differ across states?
Fig. 2 illustrates how differing AFDC programs across states affect the bene®t amounts
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family and the middle curve is for an identical family living in South Carolina. We select
South Carolina as the comparison state for California because, in the early 1990s, it
occupied an opposite position in the distribution of state AFDC bene®t levels: whereas
California had the ®fth most generous state AFDC program, South Carolina had the ®fth
least generous. The lowest curve corresponds to the taxes a family would pay if it parti-
cipated in no low-income transfer programs.
Since South Carolina paid lower AFDC bene®ts than those in California, the net trans-
fers received by the South Carolina family are everywhere below those of the California
family until monthly earnings reach between $1250 and $1500 when both AFDC
programs cease to pay bene®ts. The higher generosity of California's program has a
serious downside: California's implicit tax rates on earnings are much higher. The bene®t
reduction rates are similar, but more is lost for every dollar earned in California because
the reduction rate applies to a larger bene®t amount.
Reduction rates are still quite large for South Carolina residents. Even though the tax
rate faced by a South Carolina family increasing its earnings from $750 to $1500/month is
almost 20 percentage points below the rate faced by a California family with the same
earnings increase, this lower rate is still 70%. Such tax rates are staggeringly high and are
very likely to discourage work.
2.1.3. How have programs changed in the US?
Fig. 3 shows how net governmental transfers have changed in California during 1985±
1996. Similar changes have occurred in other states. These changes re¯ect a combination
of factors, the most prominent being decreased bene®t reduction rates for welfare
programs and increased generosity in the EITC.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of net transfers/taxes for California and South Carolina in 1996.The two lines that begin lowest on the graph represent the net bene®t receipt from EITC,
combined with taxes, alone. The difference between 1985 and 1996 is striking. In 1985,
the peak EITC bene®t was a mere $20, while in 1996 this ®gure had increased more than
tenfold to $224. As a result, the average tax rate on the ®rst $750 for a family receiving just
EITC fell from 22% in 1985 to 230% in 1996. This reduction in tax rates leads many to
argue that EITC has a strong pro-work effect. However, after $750 EITC bene®ts decline,
yielding a tax rate of 31% in 1996 versus 21% in 1985. Hence, the increased generosity of
EITC has led to increased marginal tax rates for families seeking to increase their income
from welfare-dependent levels to more self-suf®cient levels, as noted above.
When combined with changes in AFDC and Food Stamps, this shift in incentives is
even more pronounced. The top two lines in Fig. 3 depict total AFDC, Food Stamp and
EITC bene®t levels in 1985 and 1996. From 1985 to 1996, the monthly AFDC and Food
Stamp bene®t for a family with no earnings was reduced from $980 to $852. Associated
with this reduction was a ¯attening of the bene®t versus earnings graph, as shown in the
®gure. As a result, the combined tax rate fell from 83% to 25% on the ®rst $750 in earnings
during this period. However, a ¯atter bene®t reduction schedule for the ®rst $750/month
simply required a steeper schedule for the next $750. As a result, the average tax rate for
the second $750 in income/month ± as noted, that income required to move off welfare ±
rose from 67% to a staggering 89% from 1985 to 1996.
In summary, changes from 1985 to 1996, which were advanced as measures to increase
work incentives created markedly higher tax rates on income between $750 and $1500/
month. This range of income is very important for families seeking to move off welfare.
While it may be possible to enact further reforms that push this region of high bene®t
reductions and marginal tax rates to higher incomes, this can only be done at the cost of
substantially reduced bene®t levels or substantially increased program costs. This is the
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Fig. 3. Net transfers/taxes for California in 1996 versus 1985.fundamental policy dilemma facing those seeking to change tax and transfer policies.
Before undertaking this effort, it is important to understand the exact nature of the labor
supply changes induced by changing tax and transfer policy.
2.2. UK tax and welfare programs
There are effectively four important components of the British direct tax and welfare
system as it affects labor supply. The ®rst is the individual tax allowance on earned
income, below which no direct taxes are paid. Couples in the UK are taxed independently
and the tax allowance is also individually based. In 1996, it was £3650 per year (almost
$6000) and was suf®ciently large to exempt from direct taxes many part-time low wage
workers, especially married women. Approximately 36% of working women married to
employed men had earnings below this limit. The majority of workers with earned income
above this limit pay direct taxes at a ¯at basic rate, which has fallen from around 33% to
24% in the 15 years to 1996.
1
The second component is the National Insurance system which acts like a tax on earn-
ings between a lower and an upper limit. This is also individually based, adds between 2
and 9 percentage points to the basic tax rate and is paid in full once earnings rise above the
lower limit. Therefore, unlike the basic tax rate, the NI premium is payable on all earnings.
Moreover, as NI payments stop at approximately the level of the higher tax rate, the
overall tax rate through the direct tax system rarely exceeds 40%. Third is the ``in-
work'' bene®t Family Credit described in Section 2.2.1 (reformed and renamed Working
Families Tax Credit in the 1998 Budget). The last of the four components is the multitude
of largely means-tested income assistance programs that cover unemployment insurance
and housing bene®ts; child support is a ¯at-rate non-means tested bene®t examined in
more detail below. Although the welfare system is designed to acknowledge interdepen-
dencies in bene®t reduction rates so that no effective tax rate exceeds 100%, combining the
tax system with the welfare system implies some severe disincentives for work, especially
for low-wage families. This motivated the introduction of an ``in-work'' tax credit.
It is also worth noting that, over this period, the rate of Value Added Tax, paid on all
goods except food and children's clothing has risen from 9% in 1979 to 17.5%.
2
2.2.1. An hours-based ``in-work'' bene®t
An important component of the British tax and welfare system is the ``in-work'' bene®t
program called Family Credit (FC). Introduced in 1988 as an extension to Family Income
Supplement, it has many features in common with the EITC program in the US. However,
elegibility is based on a minimum weekly working hours requirement. The new Working
Families Tax Credit, which replaces FC in October 1999, has exactly the same minimum
weekly hours requirement. In this respect, the British in-work bene®t system has simila-
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1 In 1993, a lower band of 20% was introduced on a relatively small initial part of taxable income. Less than
15% of workers pay tax at the higher 40% rate.
2 Domestic energy was exempt from VAT but now attracts a reduced rate of 8%.rities to the Canadian Self-Suf®ciency Program (see Card and Robins, 1996). However, it
should be pointed out that the SSP, which is only currently operating on an experimental
basis, is time-limited and only available to parents with long durations of welfare receipt
and unemployment. The FC system was designed to encourage part-time work and to
support the income of part-time working parents. It has subsequently been extended with a
small supplement for full-time work.
The basic FC scheme is generous but has a high withdrawal or bene®t reduction rate.
Family Credit becomes payable to individuals in families with children if their working
hours exceed 16 per week and their overall income falls below some speci®ed level, which
varies with the number and age of children. The credit is then progressively withdrawn at a
reduction rate of 70% as income rises (to be lowered to 55% in the WFTC reform). This
rate is considerably higher than that for the EITC in the US.
Since the introduction of FC in 1988, the structure of the in-work bene®t system has
witnessed three major reforms: a reduction in the hours rule from 24 to 16 in 1992, the
introduction of childcare disregards to help recipients with child-care costs in 1994, and
the introduction of an additional credit at 30 h. During this period, the number of recipients
doubled to well over 500,000. The Working Families Tax Credit reform only marginally
changes the structure with a more generous level of payment and a lower bene®t reduction
rate of 55%. Consequently, more individuals in work who would not have received FC will
now receive WFTC.
For most low-income individuals, working less than 16 h per week, the income support
and housing bene®t system renders the budget constraint virtually ¯at, so that FC can act
as an important jump in the in-work income for low-wage working parents. The high
bene®t reduction rate, however, implies a reasonably ¯at constraint above 16 h, providing
a potentially strong incentive for those working more to reduce their hours. Consequently,
questions similar to those of the EITC arise as to the effectiveness of the system.
Since 1980 there has been no earnings-related unemployment insurance in the UK.
Bene®ts for the unemployed, called job-seekers' allowance (JSA), are ¯at-rate at a level
similar to the level of basic Income Support. This is worth about 20% of median full-time
male net weekly earnings and is withdrawn at a rate of 100% against earnings provided
weekly hours of work are fewer than 16. At higher hours, no income support is available.
However, a child bene®t of approximately £10 per week per child is payable to all families
regardless of income. Consequently, for childless workers with low housing costs, income
out of work is relatively low. For families with children, in particular for lone parents, this
is not the case.
Fig. 4 shows the implied net government transfers for a single parent earning £4/h with
two pre-school children in the UK. The FC at 16 h produces a large jump in net income.
The additional supplement at 30 h is also evident. Fig. 5 displays the same budget
constraint but in terms of weekly hours of work. This highlights the minimum hours
requirement in the British in-work credit system. We assume a rent level of £50 per
week. Housing Bene®t (HB) is paid to all individuals with a suf®ciently low income,
and covers all rent whether the individual is in private or public rental housing. Once
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enhanced since the 65% withdrawal is made after income tax, NI and local taxes have
been paid. Income support and other bene®ts, such as one-parent bene®ts, can be seen to
fall in line with the increase in earned income up to 16 h per week. After that point, FC
enters. National Insurance payments also become important and the budget constraint is
further ¯attened by the high bene®t reduction rate for FC. The total disposable income line
in Fig. 5 shows the combined impact of the UK tax and bene®t system.
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Fig. 4. UK net transfers 1996±1997: lone parent.
Fig. 5. UK budget constraint, 1996±1997.2.2.2. Interactions among British programs: family credit, housing bene®t and income
support
As we noted above for the US, for the purposes of analyzing labor supply it is important to
recognize the interactions between bene®ts and in-work credits. These are critically
important for low-wage families and raise similar issues to those discussed in the context
of the EITC program. In Fig. 6, we show the impact of excluding Housing Bene®t (HB).
Since FC is treated as income in determining eligibility for HB, the impact of FC is
considerably reduced by the HB program. A comparison of Figs. 5 and 6 shows there is
now a much larger increase in net income at 16 h.
Since 1986, Family Credit, Housing Bene®t and Income Support have all become
important components of the British welfare system. This is revealed in a comparison
with Fig. 7 which shows the net government transfers for the same lone parent facing the
1986±1987 welfare and tax system. Lower housing bene®ts (a mean of £35 rather than £50
per week in 1996 prices) in 1986 re¯ect the lower level of social rents in public sector
housing which, paradoxically, reduced the incentive problem facing low-wage workers. It
is probably the rise in public housing rents together with the decline in the relative real
wages of low-skilled workers that most signi®cantly changed the balance between work
and unemployment for low-wage families in the UK.
3. Recent empirical trends
In conjunction with the large changes in tax and bene®t policies detailed in Section 2, the
1980s and early 1990s have seen dramatic changes in participation, hours of work and
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Fig. 6. The impact of removing housing bene®t.hourly wages. In this section, we provide a brief documentary of these changes, drawing
on evidence from the US, the UK, Germany and Sweden.
It is the changes in participation and working hours that labor supply models attempt to
explain. The success of these models must therefore be judged according to their ability to
explain and enhance our understanding of the changes in participation and hours. More-
over, movements in the structure of real wages, in addition to reforms of the tax and bene®t
system, provide the variation needed to explain these changes. To the extent that trend
differences in real wages, government transfers and marginal tax rates across groups can
be argued to be exogenous to changes in preferences for labor supply, they provide the
most convincing data, outside social experiments, for recovering reliable estimates of
labor supply responses. This explains the central role we place on these empirical regula-
rities in this survey.
The changes in participation, hours and real wages have varied widely across economic
and demographic groups. For example, higher-educated workers in the UK and US have
seen strong growth in real wages, while less-educated workers have experienced stagnant
or falling real wages. In contrast, the real wages in all education groups in Germany appear
to have risen steadily during this period. There have also been strong differences in labor
market attachment across age groups. An increase in the overall participation of women
has been matched by a drop off in the participation of males, particularly pronounced
among older men in Europe.
In this section, we ®rst discuss changes in participation. These are analyzed by educa-
tion level for men and women separately. The contrast by education group is striking, as
are the differences in the trend changes between men and women. Next, we move to an
analysis of hours of work to highlight the changes in the average weekly and annual hours
worked by different education and gender groups since the end of the 1970s. Finally, we
consider changes in gross hourly wage rates. The detailed changes in these are documen-
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Fig. 7. UK net transfers 1986±1987: lone parent.ted elsewhere in this Handbook (see the chapter by Katz). However, our aim is to focus on
contrasts by education and gender and to evaluate differences in these between the US, the
UK, Germany and Sweden (Figs. 8±14).
3.1. Data sources
We draw from a variety of country-speci®c data sources. Our samples contain men and
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Fig. 8. Men's employment to population ratio by education: (a) US; (b) UK; (c) Germany; (d) Sweden.women above minimum school leaving age and below the standard retirement age. Parti-
cipation is de®ned as the proportion in employment out of all individuals of working age in
a speci®c group. For the US, the primary source of data is the Current Population Survey, a
monthly survey of approximately 60,000 households. A group of CPS interviewees stays
in the sample for 4 months, is out of the sample for the next 8 months, and then returns to
the sample for the following 4 months. We consider data from 1975 to 1994, for men aged
26±64 and for women in multiple-year birth cohorts ranging from 1920±1926 to 1950±
1964. For the UK it is the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), a repeated cross section.
Each FES survey consists of around 7000 households. All individuals aged between 18
and 59 years of age are used except those in full-time education, self-employment or the
armed services. The ``low'' education group includes those that left formal schooling at the
minimum school leaving age (currently age 16). The ``med'' education group includes
those in schooling until age 18. The ``high'' group includes those with college education.
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Fig. 8 (continued).For Germany, a similar selection criterion is used and we draw on individuals from the
®rst 12 waves (1984±1995) of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The design of
the GSOEP is similar to that of the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), see
Wagner et al. (1993). All ®gures reported below refer to individuals located in the
geographic area of the former West Germany. The precise details of the data construction
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Fig. 9. Women's employment to population ratio by education: (a) US; (b) UK; (c) Germany; (d) Sweden.follow the work of Dustmann and Van Soest (1997). For Sweden, three different data
sources have been used. An income survey (HINK) and the Swedish Labor Force Survey
(AKU), both from Statistics Sweden. This is supplemented with data from the Swedish
survey, Market and Non-Market Activities (HUS) (see Flood et al., 1997; Klevmarken et
al., 1997; Olovsson, 1997 for details).
3.2. Participation
Participation in work has seen some important changes since the late 1970s. Fig. 8a
provides the evidence for US men by education level (here measured by years of school-
ing). The cyclical nature of participation for the lower education group and the much lower
participation rates stand out clearly in the data. If anything, there is a slight downward
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Fig. 9 (continued).trend in participation using this employment-to-population ratio de®nition. Notice how
this differs for women, where Fig. 9a shows that both education groups saw a strong
increase in participation until the early 1990s.
This picture for male and female employment in the US has many features in common
with the experience in the UK, although, as Fig. 8b shows, male participation has fallen
dramatically in the UK since the end of the 1970s. Notice that, even at the top of the boom
in 1990, participation did not return to its 1979 levels. This is in contrast to the pattern for
women, where Fig. 9b reveals that the participation rate approached 70% in the 1990
boom. In Germany, participation throughout the late 1980s was much more stable than it
was in either the US or the UK. Fig. 8c shows that the fall in participation among lower-
educated men in Germany only set in after 1992. Remember that these data refer to the
West German region both before and after reuni®cation. For German women (Fig. 9c),
participation has been slowly rising for all groups until 1992. Finally, in Sweden, we only
have a consistent split by education available on an annual basis after 1987. However, until
that point, participation rates rose steadily for women and stayed fairly ¯at for men. The
onset of the 1991 recession in Sweden is clear from Figs. 8d and 9d.
The decline in participation for men, which has been experienced to some degree in all
countries, is particularly re¯ected in the working behavior of older age groups. For exam-
ple, Fig. 10 shows a strong fall in the US employment-to-population ratio for men in the
56±64 year old age group. This declining attachment to the labor market by older men is
mirrored in the UK and Germany (see Blundell and Johnson, 1998; Borsh-Supan and
Schnabel, 1998). Interestingly, for the UK and Germany, it is the younger birth cohorts
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Fig. 10. Men's employment to population ratio by age: US.as they age that are seeing larger declines. For older women, this picture is attenuated by
the steady rise in participation across time and across birth cohorts. In the US and the UK,
there has been an increase in participation for younger birth cohorts of women and,
consequently, at the same age, younger cohorts of women have higher participation rates.
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Fig. 11. (a) Men's annual hours worked by education level: US. (b) Men's weekly hours worked by education
level: US. (c) Men's weekly hours worked by education level: UK. (d) Men's weekly hours worked by education
level: Germany.3.3. Hours of work
Annual hours of work for men in the US display a strong cyclical pattern and, especially
during the last decade, an increasing trend. A similar story is true for weekly hours. These
two measures of working hours in the US are presented in Fig. 11a,b. For the UK, the
nature of our survey data means that we can only present weekly hours (that include
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Fig. 11 (continued).normal overtime hours). Fig. 11c shows that this measure of hours worked reveals a
similar strong cycle and trend increase although, in contrast to the US, it is the higher-
educated group in the UK that has tended to work fewer weekly hours on average. What is
notable in both of these countries is that the trend increase in weekly hours is more
accentuated for the higher-education group. Interestingly, as we shall see below, this is
precisely the group that has seen a trend rise in real wages.
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Fig. 12. (a) Women's annual hours worked by education level: US. (b) Women's weekly hours worked by
education level: US. (c) Women's weekly hours worked by education level: UK. (d) Women's weekly hours
worked by education level: Germany.Fig. 12a±c shows that a similar story is true for the weekly working hours of women in
both the US and the UK, although it is the higher-educated group that works longer weekly
hours in the UK. Fig. 12b shows that, if anything, this gap has grown during the recent
past. Annual hours have shown a strong trend increase in the US, as seen in Fig. 12a. In the
UK this is probably less pronounced, at least for weekly hours of work. None the less, the
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Fig. 12 (continued).UK has seen a steady rise in women's weekly hours since the early 1980s when the
cyclical downturn in 1980 and 1981 had a depressing effect on female and male hours
of work alike. Although not reproted here, working hours in Sweden for employed males
have been quite stable despite a major tax reform in 1991. After 1993 there is a small
increase for highly educated workers. For females there has been an upward trend in hours.
This is especially pronounced for the highly educated. Working hours in Germany have
seen a slow and smooth decline, as evidenced in Figs. 11d and 12d.
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Fig. 13. (a) Men's real average hourlyearnings by education level: US. (b) Men's real average hourly earningsby
education level: UK. (c) Men's real average hourly earnings by education level: Germany.3.4. Real wages
The contrasts among the US, the UK, and continental Europe are probably most stark
when it comes to a comparison of the level and growth of real wages. This is especially the
case when split by education level. However, there are serious pitfalls in the interpretation
of raw wage trends. First, there is a considerable change in composition across time both in
terms of the total group of employees and in terms of the different education groups, and
these composition changes are very different across countries. Second, there is the dubious
comparability of de®nitions of education levels across countries.
The ®rst issue is really at the heart of labor supply analysis itself, since it relates to the
changing composition of those in work over time. For example, if lower real wages at the
bottom of a cycle mean fewer lower-ability workers supplying labor at that time, then this
systematically biases upwards the real wage at the bottom of the cycle. Similarly, if the
increasing levels of non-participation by older men re¯ect a higher proportion of lower-
ability workers leaving employment due to a relatively generous social security and
bene®t system, then this results in an upward bias in measured real wages and in measured
returns to experience for low educated workers. This biases upward the trend increase in
real wages for lower-educated workers and biases downward the apparent return to educa-
tion. Any comparison of the growth of real wages and returns to education between the US
and European economies must therefore acknowledge the impact of differential changes in
composition on real wages.
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Fig. 13. (continued)With these points in mind, turning ®rst to the US, Fig. 13a for men tells a dramatic story.
For the lower-education group, real wages have fallen almost relentlessly since the late
1970s. Consequently, the education differential has widened signi®cantly. As Fig. 14a
shows, this is less clear-cut for women but, given the rise in participation for the lower-
education group of women, a comparison over time may be less interpretable. None the
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Fig. 14. (a) Women's real average hourly earnings by education level: US. (b) Women's real average hourly
earnings by education level: UK. (c) Women's real average hourly earnings by education level: Germany.less, the increase in the differential is clear and the rise in the real earnings of the higher-
educated women is quite spectacular, with a consequent fall in the raw gender differen-
tials. For the UK, Fig. 13b shows an increase in the educational differential for men but, in
contrast to the US, no fall in real wages for the lower education group. Although this
lower-education group refers only to individuals who left school at 16 or earlier, it still
makes up nearly 70% of the UK sample. For this group, composition changes are likely to
be quite severe since, as we have already seen, there was a dramatic fall in participation
during this period. By contrast, in Sweden there has been an increase in wages for low-
educated workers. The wage difference has decreased over time. In Germany, we also see
no decline in real wages for the lower-education group. Indeed, at least for the decade
1986±1995, if anything Fig. 13c points to a slight fall in the raw educational differential for
men. Given the stable employment rates during most of this period, it is dif®cult to
attribute this rise to a composition effect.
4. A framework for understanding labor supply
Evaluating and interpreting labor supply estimates requires economic models to provide a
context for comparison. Estimates often diverge simply because studies focus on evaluat-
ing behavioral responses corresponding to different wage and income effects. Sometimes
empirical analyses are not precise about what model underlies their estimates. Is a static or
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Fig. 14. (continued)a lifecycle model used? What do substitution effects hold constant? Does the analysis
recognize taxes and joint decision-making by family members? Does the model assume
perfect certainty or can it allow for uncertainty? Does it assume a representative agent or is
individual heterogeneity allowed? When researchers discover divergence in their labor
supply estimates, they frequently cite sampling or data differences to explain discrepan-
cies. Equally important, and often more informative for economists seeking to reconcile
them, are the differences in economic frameworks used in the studies.
Many empirical studies of labor supply leave the reader to deduce the underlying model
from the set of outcome and control variables incorporated in the analysis. Apart from
hourly wages and other income, are controls for lifetime wages included? Is a measure of
property income included and, if so, how is it measured? Do researchers account for
expected changes in income sources? What demographic characteristics are included as
controls? Differences in the included conditioning variables implicitly determine the
economic framework as well as the response parameters estimated within that framework.
Hence, a clear understanding of the implication of these decisions is necessary for any
comparison of divergent estimates.
This section presents a unifying framework in which different basic labor supply models
can be compared. By considering existing empirical work in one consistent framework, we
can determine whether individual studies estimate meaningful parameters and, if so, which
parameters are comparable across papers. Empirical studies will have to contend with
practical issues concerning non-linear taxation, measurement error and the discreteness in
choices. This section abstracts from these complexities so as to focus on the differences in
interpretation across models. These complexities are then taken up in the remaining
sections of the paper where speci®c empirical studies are also reviewed.
The development of a unifying structure for interpreting labor supply studies should not
suggest that there is one correct way to estimate labor supply equations. Quite to the
contrary, we recognize that many of the differences across existing empirical models
re¯ect differences in data availability; our approach seeks to provide a synthesis in
which results from each data source can be compared. Data vary in the forms of income
that are included, the de®nition of hours and wage variables, and whether observations are
longitudinal or cross-sectional, but meaningful and comparable results can be derived
from each if the implications of the estimated function are carefully considered. An
understanding of labor supply is greatly enhanced by any available source of exogenous
wage and income variation, and no dataset providing this information should be discarded.
At the same time, results from varying studies must be comparable, and the framework
presented here seeks to facilitate these comparisons.
4.1. The static labor supply model
To set the scene, we begin by outlining the standard static, within-period labor supply
model. This is an application of basic consumer theory. Assume each individual has a
quasi-concave utility function
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 4:1
in which Ct, Lt, and Xt are within-period consumption, leisure hours and individual attri-
butes, in period t.
3 Utility is assumed to be maximized subject to the budget constraint
Ct 1 WtLt  Yt 1 WtT; 4:2
where Wt is the hourly wage rate, Yt is non-labor income, T is the total time available and a
single consumption good is taken as the numeraire. The right-hand side of (4.2), then,
includes the full value of one's endowment of time as well as all other sources of income.
This is often de®ned as ``full income'' from which the consumer purchases consumption
goods and leisure. We denote this income concept as Mt, so that
Mt ; Yt 1 WtT: 4:3
In static models, non-labor income, Yt, is typically the sum of two components: asset
income and other unearned income. We return to the measurement of non-labor income
in our analysis of multiperiod models below.
First-order conditions take the familiar form
UCCt;Lt;Xtlt; ULCt;Lt;Xt $ ltWt; 4:4
where lt is the marginal utility of income. If the inequality in (4.4) holds strictly then the
individual is not working and Lt  T. The wage, WRt, such that ULYt;T;XtltWRt,i s
the reservation wage below which the individual will not work.
Many have the mistaken impression that labor supply analyses rely on the assumption
that individuals can freely choose their hours of work at a ®xed wage with a single
employer. The behavioral models considered here can readily be thought of as character-
izing situations wherein persons choose their hours of work by selecting across employers
offering different wage packages. In such instances, the labor supply function approxi-
mates the ``average'' relationship describing consumers' preferences for work hours and
hourly earnings. Moreover, one can also allow for ``wages'' to vary as a function of hour of
work with relatively straightforward modi®cations of the subsequent analyses.
4.1.1. Alternative representations of labor supply
An equivalent expression for the labor supply conditions (4.4) can be given in terms of the
marginal rates of substitution (MRS). Eliminating lt from the ®rst-order conditions (4.4)
yields the equation
UL=UC ; MRSLCt;Lt;Xt $ Wt: 4:5
This equation contains all information necessary to relate the level of leisure to the level of
consumption.
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3 Xt includes all consumer attributes in this speci®cation ± observed and unobserved. Since many individual
attributes will not be fully observed by the econometrician, it is important to consider the treatmentof unobserved
heterogeneity in analyzing empirical speci®cations.Solving the ®rst-order conditions yields the Marshallian demand functions:
Ct  CWt;Mt;Xt; Lt  LWt;Mt;Xt # T: 4:6
Equivalently, using Ht  T 2 Lt and the de®nition of Mt in terms of Yt, we have the hours
of work rule,
Ht  HWt;Yt;Xt: 4:7
Many empirical studies of labor supply seek to estimate forms of (4.7). They vary
widely in the measurement of the wage Wt, the income variable Yt and the demographic
controls incorporated in the speci®cation. Depending how these issues are resolved, our
full lifecycle framework, developed below, shows that ``static'' estimates can represent
several types of substitution and income effects, ranging from those predicting responses
to intertemporal movements in wages to those predicting responses to shifts in entire wage
pro®les.
Studies generally focus on the wage elasticity of the Marshallian supply function in
(4.7), and on the associated utility-constant Hicksian wage elasticity. The Marshallian
(uncompensated) wage elasticity is de®ned as
Ku  2lnHt=2lnWt: 4:8
Denoting the Hicksian (compensated) wage elasticity by Kc, the Marshallian and Hicksian
wage elasticities are linked by the Slutsky equation






where the share WtHt=Yt is the size of earnings relative to non-labor income. The standard
sign, homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions from consumer demand theory apply to the
Hicksian supply function and have been used to check on the theoretical predictions of the
model. Assuming that leisure is a normal good, this expression implies that the Hicksian
compensated elasticity is larger than the Marshallian elasticity ± the well known result that
income and substitution effects work in opposite directions in Marshallian demand.
4.1.2. Family labor supply
Placing labor supply in a family or household context adds a number of important dimen-
sions. Many tax and bene®t policies designed to in¯uence labor supply behavior can only
be properly understood within a family labor supply framework. Moreover, the changes in
the structure of wages facing men and women presented in Section 3, as well as changes in
fertility, have important consequences in understanding the changing balance between
men and women in family labor supply.
The standard ``unitary'' family labor supply model treats the family as a single decision-
making unit. The attractions of this formulation are that standard welfare results from
consumer theory are available and that the family labor supply model can be placed easily
within the intertemporal framework. However, although with suf®cient separability in
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household allocations, these allocations continue to satisfy the Slutsky symmetry restric-
tions from consumer theory and also the ``income-pooling'' restrictions in which the
marginal value of non-labor income is equalized across decision-making units within
the family. Slutsky symmetry and income pooling are often considered to be unreasonable
restrictions and a popular alternative framework that relaxes these latter two restrictions is
the collective family labor supply model. This alternative representation of joint labor
supply decisions also implies testable restrictions and is sensitive to the introduction of
household production. A full discussion of the collective model and its relationship to the
standard unitary framework is presented in Section 7. That section also provides a detailed
evaluation of the empirical studies offamily labor supply and considers the introduction of
non-linear taxation and welfare programs. Here we simply outline the basic family labor
supply model.
Suppose a family or household consists of two working-age individuals. Children and
any other dependents are included in the vector of household attributes, Xt. Families are
assumed to maximize joint utility over consumption, Ct, and the leisure of each family
member, L1t and L2t. For such a household, utility may be written
UtCt;L1t;L2t;Xt: 4:10
The budget constraint now takes the form
Ct 1 W1tL1t 1 W2tL2t  Yt 1 W1tT 1 W2tT; 4:11
with full income now given by
Mt  Yt 1 W1tT 1 W2tT: 4:12
The unearned income term, Yt, combines all sources of non-labor income.
For the present discussion we consider consumption measured as a single aggregate,
Ct.
4 The ®rst-order condition for consumption (4.4) continues to hold, but now it governs
family consumption. For leisure choices, (4.4) is extended to give
UCCt;L1t;L2t;Xtlt;
UL1Ct; L1t; L2t; Xt $ ltW1t; 4:13
UL2Ct;L1t;L2t;Xt $ ltW2t:
Reservation wages can be computed for each family member exactly as above. Demand
functions now take the form
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4 Typically, consumption, even for privately consumed goods, is recorded at the household level. Conse-
quently, measuring individual consumption is dif®cult. However, for goods such as clothing, separate measure-
ment is often recorded and can be helpful in identifying individual preferences within a household. This is
described further in Section 7.Ct  CW1t;W2t;Mt;Xt;
L1t  L1W1t;W2t;Mt;Xt # T; 4:14
L2t  L2W1t;W2t;Mt;Xt # T:
This model provides a useful framework for thinking about household labor supply
decisions. Clearly, if utility is weakly separable in the individual leisures then, provided
the appropriate de®nition of income is used, individual labor supplies can be modeled in
the usual way. However, separability is a strong restriction and one that would typically
fail in a model that allowed for household production. In Section 7 we describe the family
labor supply model more fully, particularly its relation to collective models of labor
supply, household production and the analysis of discrete choices. We also present an
overview of recent empirical results on family labor supply.
4.2. Multiperiod models of labor supply under certainty
Although its study is often placed in a static framework, labor supply is clearly part of a
lifetime decision-making process. Individuals attend school early in life, accumulate
wealth while in the labor force, and make retirement decisions late in life; each of these
activities can only be understood in a lifecycle framework. We know that savings from
labor earnings are often required to sustain individuals, or their dependents, during periods
when they are out of the labor market. In addition, variations in health status, family
composition and real wages provide incentives for individuals to vary the timing of
their labor market earnings for income-smoothing and insurance purposes. In this section,
we present the basic components of a single-agent lifecycle labor supply model assuming
perfect certainty.
A full lifecycle model, starting at time t, is characterized by a utility function of the form
Ut  UCt;Lt;Xt;Ct11;Lt11;Xt11;¼;Ct;Lt;Xt: 4:15
The intertemporal budget constraint can be represented by the time path of assets, A,a s
At11  1 1 rt11At 1 Bt 1 WtHt 2 Ct; 4:16
where At11 is the real value of assets at the beginning of period t 1 1, rt11 is the real rate of
return earned on assets between t and t 1 1, and Bt represents unearned-non-asset income.
Individuals maximize (4.15) subject to the series of constraints given by (4.16) for all t
through some ®xed horizon t; t is assumed to be known for simplicity.
This full model is empirically intractable, so virtually all studies assume some form of





In this case, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption in period s
can be written as





Combining this with the intertemporal budget constraint, we see that a necessary condition
for maximization is
MRSLs $ Ws: 4:19
So, with separability across time, the within-period marginal rate of substitution condition
continues to characterize the relative amounts of leisure and consumption. All that
remains, then, is to ®nd a summary statistic that captures the impact of other periods on
this decision, thus allowing one to pin down the levels of leisure and consumption. The
two common methods for this are two-stage budgeting and marginal-utility-of-wealth-
constant labor supply.
4.2.1. Two-stage budgeting
The idea behind two-stage budgeting is simple.
5 Since the within-period marginal rate of
substitution conditions continue to characterize behavior, we only need an allocation of
full income, Mt, to each period to allow each maximization problem to be solved exactly as
it was in the static problem. Hence, the decision rule can be decomposed into two stages:
®rst, determine an allocation of wealth across periods; second, within each period, solve
the standard static maximization problem. The solution to this problem can be found by
reversing the two stages: ®rst, maximize each period's utility, given some Mt; this yields
an indirect utility function, Vt(Mt,Wt), for each period. Then, insert the Vt's into Ut and
choose the Mt's to maximize this function given current wealth and future wages (expected
wages under uncertainty). This solution can be represented by the demand Eqs. (4.6) and




where we have de®ned At21
* to be the end of period t 2 1 assets
6 and Zt represents future
values of W, Y, r and X.
To compare this speci®cation to the static speci®cation introduced in Section 4.1, notice
that the two-stage budgeting model automatically corrects the full income measure for the
change in assets appropriate in the multiperiod model. From the de®nition of Mt, we may
write




t 1 Bt 1 WtT;
where now rt At-1
* is the real interest income available for expenditure on consumption at
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5 Gorman (1959, 1968) is widely credited with developing the full implications of two-stage budgeting.
MaCurdy (1983) and Blundell and Walker (1986), among others, have applied this concept in empirical analyses
of labor supply.
6 In the discussionof multiperiod models,we use two de®nitions of assets: At11 in Eq. (4.16) is the beginningof
period t 1 1 assets and is therefore equal to 1 1 rt11A

t . We do this to make our de®nition of the within-period
budget for the two-stage budgeting problem consistent with the intertemporal constraint on assets (4.16).the beginning of period t and DAt
* is the adjustment in the level of real assets by the end of
period t. In contrast, the full income variable in the static model simply includes real
interest income and other non-asset income and is given by
Yt 1 WtT  rtA

t21 1 Bt 1 WtT;
omitting the term DAt-1
* which captures the intertemporal adjustment in assets.
The hours-of-work rule in the two-stage budgeting framework, mirroring (4.7), has the
form
maxUCt;Ht;Xt
subject to the budget constraint
Ct 1 WtHt  Y
C
t ;
















Note the appeal of the two-stage budgeting formulation. If consumption and leisure
(work) hours for the period are observed, then Mt is observable via the within-period
budget constraint
Mt  Ct 1 WtLt: 4:21
The appropriate adjustment of full income Mt or other income Yt can be made either with
information on assets across periods or with information on consumption. Hence, given
some speci®cation for the expectational variables Zt, one can estimate (4.6) and (4.20) just
as in the static framework. Marshallian elasticities can be derived by conditioning on Yt
C in
place of Yt and can be converted to compensated elasticities via the Slutsky equation,
yielding estimates of all other response parameters of interest. Of course, even if the static
model were true, or some variant in which there were borrowing restrictions, the within-
period allocations that condition on the consumption based measure offull income remain
valid.
7
In evaluating studies using this framework, one must keep two important considerations
in mind. First, the appropriate measure of income is the value of consumption plus the
value of leisure ± that is the full income allocated to the period. Many researchers perform
their analyses in a static framework, arguing that they are estimating the second stage of
the two-stage budgeting process, but de®ne income as current wages plus unearned
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7 Note that this speci®cation places no restrictions on the path of wages or interest rates, so that employment or
capital market constraints can be accounted for, with a wage of 0 indicating no acceptable employment oppor-
tunities and an interest rate of 1 indicating completely constrained capital markets.income. As we have shown, in a lifecycle setting, these current income ®gures are irre-
levant to current period work and consumption decisions except in so far as they impact
the determination of Mt. Second, often elasticities or other response parameters estimated
in this basic framework take Mt as ®xed and exogenous, just as it is in the static model. Not
only does this require the far-fetched notion that consumption is exogenous (iffull income
is valued with a consumption measure), but it misses any of the response to shocks that
occurs through the ®rst stage ± that is, through a reallocation of the Mts. In general, it is
only by estimating both stages of the intertemporal allocation model that such responses
can be fully accounted for. We take up this issue further in our discussion of multiperiod
models under uncertainty.
4.2.2. Frisch labor supply equations and the Euler condition
Marginal-utility-of-wealth-constant labor supply functions, known as Frisch functions,
provide an alternative and extremely useful method for analyzing lifecycle maximization
problems. In this framework, the marginal-utility-of-wealth parameter, lt, serves as the
suf®cient statistic which captures all information from other periods that is needed to solve
the current-period maximization problem. Our discussion critically relies on intertemporal
strong separability in preferences, and, for simplicity, the analysis assumes a non-stochas-
tic interest rate.
A useful representation of the problem is given by the functional equation formulation
of dynamic programming. Consumers choose consumption and leisure according to the
value function
VAt;tmaxUCt;Lt;Xt 1 kVAt11;t 1 1 4:22
subject to the asset accumulation rule (4.16). k represents the consumer's discount factor.
Standard dynamic programming techniques yield the following ®rst-order conditions:
UcCt;Lt;Xtlt;
ULCt;Lt;Xt $ ltWt; 4:23
lt  k1 1 rt11lt11;
where lt is the marginal utility of wealth, 2V/2At. These are the same ®rst-order conditions
as in the static problem, with the addition of the Euler equation for l. This equation is
central to the solution method since it determines the rule for the allocation of wealth
across periods. In this formulation, the consumer chooses savings so that the marginal
utility of wealth in period t equals the discounted value of the marginal utility of wealth in
period t 1 1, where the rate of discount is k1 1 rt11.
These ®rst-order conditions imply consumption demand and hours-of-work supply
functions of the form
Ct  Clt;Wt;Xt; Ht  Hlt;Wt;Xt $ 0: 4:24
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8 Their functional form
depends only on the form of the utility function and whether a corner solution is chosen
for hours of work at age t. These functions decompose consumption and labor supply
decisions into components observed in the current period, X and W, and l, which
summarizes the relevant information from all other periods. Variables such as future
wealth, wages, or personal characteristics affect consumption and labor supply only by
changing the value of lt. Thus, lt serves the role of suf®cient statistic, just as Mt was a
suf®cient statistic in the two-stage budgeting model.
9
These Frisch labor supply functions are a third type of labor supply function along with
the Marshallian and Hicksian functions previously discussed. Whereas Marshallian func-
tions hold income constant and Hicksian functions hold utility constant, Frisch functions
hold the marginal utility of wealth constant. One can calculate wage elasticities of the form
2Ht/2Wt for Frisch functions just as for Marshallian and Hicksian functions. We saw above
that the Hicksian elasticity is larger than the Marshallian when leisure is a normal good;
MaCurdy (1981) and Browning et al. (1985) show that the Frisch elasticity is the largest of
the three.
The Euler equation implies a time path for l of the form
ln lt  bt 1 ln lt-1 4:25




bj 1 lnl0: 4:26
Hence, the l term in (4.24) can be captured as an individual ®xed effect, lo, plus a
function of age which is common across consumers.
10 This ability to model differences
in l as individual effects is very important in the empirical speci®cations discussed below.
Estimation of (4.24) only allows computation of the Frisch elasticity. This measures the
effect of a change in wages holding l constant. As shown above, in this world of perfect
certainty, the path of l through time is determined solely by the known path of interest
rates and the discount factor. Hence, for a given individual, changes in wages have no
impact on l and thus the Frisch elasticity is the correct elasticity for assessing the impact
of wage changes through time on labor supply. However, researchers are often interested
in comparing the impact of wage variation across consumers on labor supply. In this case,
we do not simply examine evolutionary wage changes through time, but rather variation in
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8 We have presented the hours-of-work supply function here, rather than the equivalent leisure demand func-
tion. With only two uses for a consumer's time, the two are obviously related by the identity Lt  T 2 Ht.
9 Note that if labor and capital income is taxed jointly by a non-linear tax, these conditions may need adapting
(see, e.g., Blomquist, 1985).
10 The bj terms are functions of k and r which are assumed constant across consumers. Note that if we assume
the rate of time preference, r (where k  1=1 1 r), equals the rate of interest, bj is 0 for all j and l is constant
over time.the entire wage pro®le. This variation certainly impacts the value of lo and, thus, the
Frisch wage elasticity is inappropriate for measuring the effect of such wage variation. To
estimate the full impact of wages requires a speci®cation of the impact of the wage pro®le
on lo. We consider this further at the end of this section where we evaluate the appropriate
elasticity measures for alternative policy questions.
4.2.3. Multiperiod models of family labor supply
The family labor supply model becomes more complicated with the addition of multiple
periods or uncertainty, as family composition may change over time. As long as the
unitary model is maintained, however, its analysis is straightforward. The marginal condi-
tions for the l-constant, Marshallian and marginal rate of substitution labor supply equa-
tions described above follow naturally from the ®rst-order conditions given by (4.13).
Notice that there is still only a single marginal utility of wealth, lt, and, therefore, there
remains only one Euler condition as in the third equation of (4.23). Consequently, alloca-
tions to each individual in this time separable model satisfy equality of marginal utility of
wealth. However, to avoid strong separability assumptions between each family member's
leisure, careful choice of speci®cation for Frisch labor supplies is required. Further exten-
sions of the multi-period to the family labor supply case are presented in Section 7.
4.3. Multiperiod models of labor supply under uncertainty
The concepts developed in the certainty case essentially carry over to a lifecycle model
that recognizes that individuals make labor supply choices in an environment in which
they are uncertain about their futures. This requires replacing the deterministic dynamic
programming characterization of behavior that we considered in the previous section with
a formulation in which agents optimize expected lifetime utility.
11
4.3.1. Two-stage budgeting under uncertainty
Accounting for uncertainty in two-stage budgeting is inconsequential. Eqs. (4.6) and
(4.20) continue to summarize choices. Actually solving for the optimum period-speci®c
expenditure allocation, Mt, is now more dif®cult since wealth cannot be allocated once at
the beginning of life and instead must be reallocated each period as information is
revealed. One can solve this problem, however, via standard dynamic programming
formulations. Instead of including realized values, the variables Zt in (4.20) (or (4.20
0))
now include attributes of the distribution of future wages and income, and future deter-
minants of preferences. In Section 4.5, we consider approaches to estimation of the full
lifecycle model which combine the two-stage budgeting formulation with the intertem-
poral ®rst-order conditions on consumption. This turns out to be a useful way of char-
acterizing the preference restrictions underlying various empirical speci®cations.
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11 Much of this framework comes from MaCurdy (1985). We refer the reader to this reference for details of the
development of these speci®cations.4.3.2. Frisch labor supply under uncertainty
With the introduction of uncertainty over future wages, the dynamic programming repre-
sentation of the consumer's problem changes to
VAt;tmax{UCt;Lt;Xt 1 kEtVAt11;t 1 1} 4:27
subject to the asset accumulation rule (4.16).
12 The ®rst-order conditions now include
(4.23) and (4.24) together with a modi®ed Euler equation,
lt  kEtlt111 1 rt11: 4:28
The only change from the certainty case is that lt11 is now a random variable which is
not realized until the start of period t 1 1. The savings allocation rule, given by (4.28),
determines the path followed by l through time. Given that the consumer cannot perfectly
control the level of his wealth, his environment changes as he acquires information and lt
is stochastic. Condition (4.28) describes how the consumer allocates his resources to
account for unanticipated shocks. He sets his savings policy so that the expectation of
next period's marginal utility of wealth is revised by the full amount of the unanticipated
elements; in other words, the consumer revises the means of all future values of l to
account for all forecasting errors when they are realized. The standard Euler equation for
consumption is derived by replacing lt and lt11 in (4.28) by UcCt;Lt;Xt and
UcCt11;Lt11;Xt11, respectively.




t 1 lnlt21 1 1
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t ;
where the coef®cient bt
* depends on the discount factor, k, the interest rate, rt, and the
moments of the forecast error, 1t
*.


















where the last expression assumes bt
*  b
* for expositional simplicity.
Combining Eq. (4.29) with the consumption and labor supply conditions in (4.23)
suggests a simple view of lifecycle behavior under uncertainty. At the start of the lifetime,
the consumer sets the initial value of l0 to include all available information. As he ages, he
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12 For simplicity of presentation, we continue to assumea non-stochastic interest rate, althoughthe extension to
random interest rates is trivial.
13 To develop this expression, write lnlt  Et21{lnlt} 1 1
*
t . This relation implies Et21{lt} 
expEt21{lnlt}Et21{exp1
*
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t . Taking natural logs gives ln lt  b
*
t 1 lnlt21 1 1t
* where b
*
t ; 2lnk1 1
rt2 lnEt21{exp1t}:responds to new information by updating l according to (4.29). At each age, the consumer
only needs the updated l, along with current wages and characteristics, to determine his
optimal consumption and labor supply.
A substantial complication to the labor supply models described in this section arises if
we relax the assumption of time-separable utility. For example, consider allowing an
individual's wage to be a function of human capital, which this person chooses to acquire
by training. In this case, the wage is endogenous, as it is determined by an individual's
training decision. The primary method of dealing with this complication is to move to a
fully structural model of lifetime decision-making in which parameter values are chosen to
match closely the observed work, training and consumption decisions. We defer a discus-
sion of this and other related dynamic generalizations of the labor supply model that relax
the time separability assumption to Section 8, which considers dynamic structural models.
4.4. Basic empirical speci®cations
A prototype empirical speci®cation that encompasses many economic models of labor
supply takes the form
lnHt  alnWt 1 bQt 1 et; 4:30
where a and b are parameters, Qt is a vector of ``controls'' and et is a stochastic term
unobservable to the economist. In what follows, we consider alternative speci®cations for
bQt.
Studies also often use alternative transformations of H as the dependent variable. For
example, a popular alternative is the semi-log speci®cation
Ht  alnWt 1 bQt 1 vt; 4:30
0
which is particularly attractive for dealing with non-participation. One also ®nds various
formulations for wages as right-hand side variables (such as after-tax wages or non-linear
functions of wage rates). In each case, additivity between the log wage variable, unearned
income variables and the other controls will imply restrictions on preferences. The prefer-
ence restrictions underlying these and other popular labor supply speci®cations are
reviewed in Appendix A.
The value of a in (4.30) determines the substitution effect associated with the response
of labor supply to changes in wages. As discussed above, the interpretation of this substi-
tution effect varies according to precisely which controls one includes in the vector Qt and
which of these controls are treated as exogenous.
4.4.1. Static speci®cations
The conventional static speci®cation involves estimating equation (4.30) with controls set
according to
bQt  rXt 1 uYt; 4:31
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income. Non-labor income is typically measured as the sum of interest income rtAt-1 and
exogenous income Bt. This static speci®cation is only appropriate if the static model of
Section 4.1 is correct. This could be the case if consumers behave completely myopically
or if capital markets are completely constrained so that it is impossible to transfer capital
across periods. If the static model is correct, the wage coef®cient in speci®cation (4.30)
measures
a  ay  uncompensated substitution elasticity given income Y: 4:32
The parameter ay corresponds to the Marshallian wage elasticity in the static model. Its
estimation requires instrumental-variable techniques to account for the endogeneity of the
wage, arising from unobservable characteristics affecting both Wt and Ht or from measure-
ment error. Nevertheless, if consumers adjust their behavior to account for factors in future
periods, the coef®cient on log wage lacks economic meaning, no matter what econometric
methods are applied. That is, if the labor supply decision has any lifecycle elements, static
regressions confuse shifts of wage pro®les with movements along wage pro®les and, thus,
yield parameters that lack economic interpretation.
4.4.2. Two-stage budgeting speci®cations
To estimate a labor supply equation within a two-stage budgeting framework, set




C is the consumption-based income measure de®ned in (4.20
0). (Alternatively, one
can condition on the full income measure Mt de®ned by (4.20)). In applying these controls,
one should note that Yt.
C (or Mt) is de®ned by leisure and consumption choices and, thus, is
endogenous. Appropriate instrumental-variable techniques must, therefore, be applied to
obtain consistent estimators. The wage elasticity coef®cient, a, can then be interpreted as
a  ac  uncompensated substitution elasticity given total consumption C 4:34
This wage effect determines the impact of wages on hours worked, holding the ®rst-stage
income allocation constant. Hence, it captures the impact of anticipated wage movements
through time, but does not capture the impact of shifts of the entire wage pro®le, as these
shifts would also impact hours through their effect on the allocation of Yt.
C. In general, one
needs a model of Yt
C that includes the impact of all current and future wages to assess the
impact of wage pro®le shifts. We take up this issue further in the discussion of relevant
elasticities for policy evaluation in Section 4.5.
4.4.3. Frisch speci®cations
To create a Frisch labor supply function in the form of (4.30), suppose the contempora-
neous utility function for period t takes the form
Ut  GCt;Xt 2 CtHt
s; 4:35
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t  where n
*
t re¯ects the contribution of unmeasured characteristics and
r
* is a vector of preference parameters.
Assuming an interior optimum, the implied Frisch hours-of-work function takes the
form of (4.30) with
b Qt  Ft 1 r Xt; 4:36
where Ft  alnlt 2 lns, a  1=s 2 1, r  ar
*, and et  an
*
t . Modifying Eq. (4.29)
by assuming that the b
*
t terms are constant across consumers and time, and substituting
this into (4.36) yields
bQt  F0 1 bt 1 rXt; 4:37
where b  ab
*, and et now includes sums of forecast error terms. So, the necessary
controls are the exogenous variables Xt, age and an individual effect Fo. Taking ®rst
differences of this form of Eq. (4.30) yields
DlnHt  b 1 rDXt 1 aDlnWt 1 Det: 4:38
Given the availability of instruments for the change in wage, one can ®t this equation on
panel data to yield an estimate of a. In these speci®cations a corresponds to the Frisch
wage elasticity discussed above, which the literature commonly designates
a  aI  intertemporal substitution elasticity: 4:39
This elasticity holds marginal utility of wealth constant, and it describes how changes in
wages induced by movements along an individual's wage pro®le in¯uence hours of work.
Individuals fully anticipate these wage movements and this is why Fo remains ®xed. For
this reason, they are often referred to as evolutionary wage changes.
14
If we wish to measure the impact of wage variation across consumers, or unanticipated
shifts of an individual's wage pro®le, we must complete the model and provide an empiri-
cal speci®cation of the evolution of wages and other incomes as well as accounting for the
impact of these shifts on Fo. Hence, we need an empirical speci®cation for l and, thus, for
F. This is provided by the lifecycle speci®cations that we now consider.
4.4.4. Lifecycle speci®cations
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14 Although the particular form for utility, (4.35), conveniently implies a log-linear Frisch labor supply
equation, it also places strong restrictions on the form of within period and intertemporal preferences. In this
speci®cation, labor supply and consumption are explicitly additive in utility both within period and across
periods.where Do is a vector of demographic characteristics either observed at 0 or anticipated in
future periods, and a
*
o is an error term. This implies a form for Fo:
F0  D0w0 1
X t
j0
g0jE0flnWj} 1 u0A0 1 a0; 4:41
where the parameters and error term equal their superscript ``
*'' counterparts multiplied by
a, and with the intercept de®ned to include the term 2alns. This empirical speci®cation
imposes strong simplifying restrictions ± it assumes that the consumer knows he will work
t periods and it incorporates any effect of interest rates or time preference into the
intercept and other parameters.
Relations (4.41) and (4.37) yield a formulation for (4.30) with
bQt  D0w0 1
X t
j0;j±t
g0jE0{lnWj} 1 u0A0 1 bt 1 Xtr; 4:42
a  aI 1 g0t; where the disturbance in (4.30) is et  a0 1 nt 2 gotlnWt 2 Eo{lnWt}.
So, Qt now includes all start-of-life controls used to form l0 and all controls needed for the
period-t utility function: age, initial wealth and the expected wage pro®le as of age 0.
Estimation of this equation yields an estimate of aI 1 got, the wage elasticity of hours
corresponding to a shift in the period t wage rate, as well as estimates of the gots determin-
ing the impact of a shift in the entire wage pro®le. As we argue below, this formulation
also provides us with precisely the parameters we need for the analysis of tax reform.
Implementing (4.42) requires the econometrician to have consistent predictions of the
consumer's expected future wages. Assume that the lifetime wage path anticipated in
period 0 is
E0{lnWt}  po 1 p1t 1 p2t
2 1 ut; 4:43
where the p's are deterministic functions of time invariant characteristics of the consumer
and ut is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with all demographic variables in Mo as
well as with those used to predict wages or wealth (below).
A researcher also requires a speci®cation for initial wealth since most datasets do not
include this variable. If we assume that property income, Yt, follows a path similar to
wages (with the similar properties for errors and parameters)
E0{Yt}  zo 1 z1t 1 z2t
2 1 ht; 4:44
then using the fact that Yo  Ao=1 1 roro, we see that initial wealth can be predicted by
zo1 1 ro=ro.
Combining these forms for wages and wealth with (4.41), we arrive at an expression for
the individual effect:
F0  D0w0 1 p0  g0 1 p1  g1 1 p2  g2 1 z0  u 1 m; 4:45
where




kg0j; for k  0;1;2;  u  u0r0=1 1 r0
and m is a disturbance depending on the errors a0, ut's and ht's. This equation relates a
consumer's individual effect to the parameters of his wage and income pro®le. Relations
(4.37) and (4.45) yield a formulation for (4.30) with
bQt  D0w0 1 p0  g0 1 p1  g1 1 p2  g2 1 z0  u 1 bt 1 Xtr; 4:46
a  aI 1 g0t;
where the disturbance et in (4.30) now incorporates the error component m. Hence, in this
formulation, D0 and age remain as controls, but initial wealth and the expected wage
pro®le are replaced by the parameters describing wage and property income pro®les
through time. Simultaneous estimation of (4.43), (4.44) and (4.46) yields estimates of
all parameters needed to compute the response of hours of work to both evolutionary and
parametric wage changes. In this formulation, only wages and property income are endo-
genous.
4.4.5. Interpreting cross-sectional speci®cations in a lifecycle framework
Many labor supply studies attempt to estimate ``wage elasticities'' using cross-sectional
variation in wages. As we have seen above, the term wage elasticity is ambiguous ± it is
crucial that the researcher distinguish between evolutionary and parametric wage shifts.
Since most do not, the reader is left trying to compare elasticity estimates that may not be
comparable. Add to this the dif®culty of identifying any lifecycle effects in a cross-
sectional setting and, even if there were no data measurement differences, it would not
be surprising to see many different elasticity estimates.
Utilizing the above framework, we can evaluate what cross-sectional speci®cations
actually allow meaningful lifecycle parameter estimates to be recovered and which speci-
®c parameters are being estimated given the included control variables. To develop a
simple expression for (4.46) which can be compared to those of existing cross-sectional
studies, assume that Dofo, po, p1, p2, and zo are linear functions of the variables
contained in a vector, K. Then we have
lnHt  Kq 1 bt 1 Xtr 1 aI 1 g0tlnWt 1 et; 4:47
where q is a vector of coef®cients. Alternatively, we could assume that Do contains only an
intercept and that the coef®cients on age and age-squared for the lifetime wage and income
paths (i.e., po, p1, p2, and zo) are constant across consumers. Then one can write (4.46) as
lnHt  d1 1 d4t 1 d5t
2 1  uYt 1 Xtr 1 aI 1  g0lnWt 1 et; 4:48
where
d1  g0 1 p1  g1 1 p2  g2;
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d5  2p2  g0 2 ua2z:
So, there are two equations which one can estimate using instrumental variable techniques
on cross-sectional data to yield meaningful lifecycle parameter estimates. If a researcher
regresses log hours of work on age; all age-invariant characteristics determining lifetime
wages, preferences, and initial permanent income; and log wage, then the coef®cient on
the current wage rate is a, the Frisch elasticity. Intuitively, this approach controls for
differences in the value of Fo across consumers and leaves higher-order age variables as
instruments to identify wage variation. Hence, only evolutionary wage variation along the
age-wage path is included.
If, alternatively, a researcher regresses log hours worked on property income, age, age
squared, and log wage, the coef®cient on wage is the response of labor supply to a
parametric wage shift ± including both the intertemporal substitution effect, a, and the
reallocation of wealth across periods captured by a change in F. Intuitively, this approach
controls for age effects and leaves individual characteristics as instruments for wage.
Changes in these characteristics capture full pro®le shifts, rather than movements along
the age-wage path. The static equations presented in (4.30) ®t neither of these patterns,
however, as they include property income together with personal characteristics rather
than age and age squared. Hence, as noted above, given the existence of lifecycle effects
they confuse the effect of movements along the wage pro®le with shifts in the pro®le and,
thus, yield parameters without an economic interpretation.
4.5. Which elasticities for policy evaluation?
This section has highlighted four ``core'' wage elasticities which correspond to four key
speci®cations for control variables that can be found in the empirical literature on labor
supply. Two are within-period elasticities: aY relating to the purely static formulation
(4.31) and aC relating to the two-stage budgeting speci®cation (4.33). Two are lifecycle
elasticities: aI the intertemporal elasticity of substitution relating to the Frisch speci®ca-
tion (4.38) and measuring responses to evolutionary movements along the lifecycle wage
pro®le, and aI 1 g0 relating to the full lifecycle speci®cation (4.42) and measuring
responses to parametric shifts in the lifecycle pro®le itself. As most tax and bene®t reforms
are probably best described as once-and-for-all unanticipated shifts in net-of-tax real
wages today and in the future, the most appropriate elasticity for describing responses
to this kind of shiftis aI 1 g0. Here we examine the relations among each of the elasticities
and consider their relevance for policy evaluation.
4.5.1. Relationships among the lifecycle elasticities
The Frisch speci®cation treats the individual marginal-utility-of-wealth as a ®xed effect
and allows the researcher to estimate only the intertemporal substitution elasticity, aI.
Given that appropriate methods are employed to account for the ®xed effect (generally ®rst
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simply within-period characteristics and age.
15 The Frisch elasticity, by ignoring this
(unexpected) shift in wealth from a once-and-for-all change in real wages, is larger than
the policy-relevant elasticity aI 1 g0 and overestimates the impact of a reform.
Direct estimation of the simple parameterization of the full lifecycle model, required to
recover aI 1 g0, relies on speci®cations for both within-period utility and the individual
marginal-utility-of-wealth effect. As a result, controls are needed for all of the following:
``start of life'' characteristics which impact the initial setting of F0, current-period char-
acteristics which affect the within-period utility function, age, expected wages as of time 0,
and initial wealth. Expected wages are unobservable and initial wealth is generally not
included in data sets, so these should be replaced with the parameters governing the time
path of wages and property income, which must be jointly estimated with the labor supply
equation. Estimation of this full framework allows computation of both the intertemporal
substitution elasticity and the elasticity of labor supply in reaction to a full, parametric
wage pro®le shift. However, it is also the most demanding in terms of data.
It is worth noting that the elasticity derived from the static speci®cation, aY, can be
placed in an intertemporal setting but is economically meaningful only under a strong
assumption of either complete myopia or perfectly constrained capital markets. Otherwise,
this elasticity confuses movements along wage pro®les with shifts of these pro®les and,
thus, yields response parameters which are a mixture of these. Such hybrid estimates lack
an economic interpretation and are not generally useful in policy evaluation.
However, we have also described several formulations which appear essentially static,
but which vary greatly based on included controls. Under simplifying assumptions, formu-
lation (4.47) allows the researcher to compute the intertemporal substitution elasticity
using cross-sectional data alone. Age and age-invariant consumer characteristics are the
required controls. In contrast, formulation (4.48) allows one to estimate the response to a
parametric wage shift. Required controls here are property income in period t, age, and age
squared.
4.5.2. Relationships among within-period and lifecycle elasticities
In general, a tax policy reform will lead to a change in the optimal level of consumption
and full income. The within-period elasticity, aC, based on the two-stage budgeting frame-
work, does not account appropriately for intertemporal adjustments in consumption. So
how should we interpret elasticity aC from the two-stage budgeting formulation? Under
the strong assumption of either complete myopia or perfectly constrained capital markets,
this elasticity is identical to aY. But in the lifecycle model with capital markets, the precise
relationship between the policy-relevant elasticity, aI 1 g0, and aC is ambiguous.
However, since aC is bounded above by the Slutsky compensated elasticity and aI is
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15 In the model with uncertainty the ®xed effect is replaced by a random walk (see Section 4.3.2), but the ®rst
differencesolutionto estimation is retained withappropriate adjustmentfor the endogeneityofdifferencedwages.bounded below by the Slutsky elasticity, aC is no greater than the Frisch elasticity. It may
well be much smaller and, unlike aI, can be negative.
Indeed, in certain cases, aC precisely re¯ects the labor supply adjustment induced by the
shift in wealth, capturing exactly the impact of the parametric shift in the wage pro®le that
corresponds to a policy reform involving an unexpected and permanent change in real
wages. To see this, consider the case where within-period preferences are of Stone±Geary
form
Ut  ulngH 2 Ht 1 1 2 ulnCt 2 gC; 4:49
where u, gH and gC are preference parameters. Suppose also that intertemporal prefer-
ences are explicitly additive over Ut.
16 The labor supply speci®cation from the two-stage
budgeting approach has the form
Ht  gH 2 u=Wt{Y
C
t 2 gC 1 gHWt} 4:50
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Now consider a permanent change in the wage, W. Assume (i) k1 1 r1 and (ii) future








1 2 u 2 1; 4:53
which, in this case, is identical to the within-period uncompensated elasticity from the
two-stage budgeting formulation (4.51). In this case, it turns out that the consumption-
based measure of other income, Yt
C, is constant for a permanent uniform shift in real wages
and, consequently, aC matches the policy-relevant elasticity. Consumption levels adjust
but are exactly offset by the change in Wt Ht in the de®nition of Y
C
t  Ct 2 WtHt.T h i s
example shows that, in certain cases, the adjustment for the wealth effect needed to
account for the unexpected and permanent change in future wages arising from a policy
change is completely captured in the two-stage budgeting formulation. It also highlights
the degree to which the intertemporal substitution elasticity overestimates the policy
relevant effect.
For completeness, consider now the Frisch elasticity for this Stone±Geary speci®cation.
The Frisch labor supply has the form
Ch. 27: Labor Supply: a Review of Alternative Approaches 1605
16 See Ashenfelter and Ham (1979) and Bover (1989) for further discussion of this speci®cation.Ht  gH 2 u=Wtl
21
t ; 4:54










This intertemporal substitution elasticity must be non-negative since gH $ Ht and, since u
lies between zero and one, this elasticity is larger than aC from the two-stage budgeting
formulation.
In general, the equivalence between aC and aI 1 g0 found in this Stone±Geary example
without uncertainty does not hold. The Stone±Geary preference speci®cation and explicit
additivity over time places strong restrictions on preferences. In Appendix A we describe
the properties of this and other popular preference models for within-period labor supply.
One general way to exploit the simplicity of the second stage of the two-stage budgeting
formulation under uncertainty is to use the linkages between within-period and intertem-
poral preference restrictions.
17 This combines the within period stage, which conditions on
consumption, with an Euler equation for the marginal utility of wealth under uncertainty.
All preference parameters needed to describe both stages of the intertemporal allocation
model under uncertainty are identi®ed by combining the second stage of the two-stage
budgeting framework with the Euler equation for consumption. Within-period allocations
between consumption and leisure are completely described by the labor supply equations
that condition on the consumption-based measure of full income or the marginal rate of
substitution condition between consumption and hours. The Euler condition on the
marginal utility of wealth then recovers the remaining parameters describing intertemporal
allocations.
This approach of combining the two-stage budgeting formulation with the Euler equa-
tion for the marginal utility of consumption has many potential advantages over the Frisch
and full lifecycle approaches. Frisch labor supply models specify hours of work directly in
terms of wages and the marginal utility of wealth. The strong restrictions on preferences in
the standard log linear speci®cation can be seen directly from the implied form of utility in
(4.35). Utility is explicitly additive over time, goods and leisure. In general, for the Frisch
labor supply model to be log linear in the wage and log marginal utility, the intertemporal
utility must be explicitly additive over time, consumption and hours. However, the two-
stage budgeting approach requires accurate measurement of consumption as well as labor
supply and real wages. Moreover, there are many potential pitfalls. Additive heterogeneity
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17 Consider writing the period-speci®c utility function U(Ct,Lt,Xt) in the intertemporal program (4.27) as
UCt;Lt;XtGuCt;Lt;Xt;Xt, where G is some positive monotonic transformation of a quasi-concave,
differentiable, within-period utility, u. This expression is convenient since the marginal within-period allocation
conditions (4.4) become GuucCt;Lt;Xtlt and GuuLCt;Lt;Xt $ ltWt. The marginal rate of substitution
uL=uC ; MRSLCt;Lt;Xt $ Wt does not depend on G. Consequently, within-period allocations place no restric-
tions on G and, therefore, provide no information on the identi®cation of G. In contrast, the Euler condition
(4.28) involves the derivatives of G and u. Given u, the form of G places restrictions on intertemporal
preferences.at the within-period level does not ®t easily into a non-linear Euler equation. Similar issues
arise with measurement error, endogeneity and non-participation.
18 As with static labor
supply models, simple speci®cations may be preferred in empirical applications where
heterogeneity and measurement error are considered to be overriding issues.
4.5.3. Summary and some quali®cations
This section has demonstrated the importance of understanding which elasticity is being
recovered in the empirical analysis of labor supply and has shown that this depends
crucially on the conditioning variables included in estimation. We have identi®ed four
``core'' elasticities that are commonly estimated and which differ substantially in their
interpretation. For this purpose we have abstracted, in this section, from important issues
such as non-linear taxation, discreteness in choices and ¯exibility in the speci®cation of
preferences, so as to highlight the differences in interpretation of coef®cients across
alternative speci®cations. We have argued that, in general, a full lifecycle parameteriza-
tion of the model is needed to evaluate policy reforms. However, we have shown how key
policy-relevant elasticities can be recovered from the analysis of available data sources.
The analysis presented here and elsewhere in this chapter is conducted in a partial
equilibrium framework and, therefore, considers only one side of the market. To analyze
the impact of a policy reform, a general equilibrium analysis will sometimes be required,
though discussion of this is outside the scope of this chapter. The model speci®cations
examined in this section have been stylized and often relate to simple linear formulations,
which place strong restrictions on preferences.
19 Furthermore, in focusing on one side of
the market, these speci®cations may not directly capture short-term constraints on the
adjustment of labor supply. Nevertheless, they do include error terms to re¯ect this and
should be viewed as representing ``average'' behavior. Ham (1986a,b) provides evidence
of the importance of short-run constraints. Extreme liquidity constraints may also limit the
usefulness of the intertemporal model. Finally, it may be that these simple intertemporal
models are inappropriate for certain types of workers. For example, in a (unionized)
bargaining model, hours-wages contracts might implicitly allow for smoothing consump-
tion via clauses that provide for a steady stream of income in exchange for additional effort
from the workers in good times. See Card (1994) for a critical review of the intertemporal
labor supply model. In Section 8 we consider many extensions of the basic intertemporal
model, though we focus only on those extensions that allow for human capital, habits and
discrete participation choices.
5. Policy reforms and the natural experiment approach
``Natural experiments'' have gained considerable popularity recently, and the simplicity of
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19 In Appendix A, we summarize the preference restrictions underlying popular parameterizations of labor
supply.this estimation method will undoubtedly make its popularity enduring among empirical
economists for some time to come. This method often goes by the name of the difference-
in-difference estimator. This section interprets the essence of this approach, and it relates
those applications that estimate how tax and welfare policies in¯uence labor supply to the
empirical models surveyed elsewhere in this chapter. Although the discussion focuses on
labor supply analyses, the evaluation presented here applies to any implementation of the
natural-experiment approach.
The natural-experiment approach is not new, nor is it a method that is ``non-structural''.
The statistical apparatus underlying this approach has been extensively applied in the
labor-economics literature since the inception of empirical work in the ®eld. The basic
idea is to compare (at least) two groups, one of which experienced a speci®c policy
change, and another with similar characteristics whose behavior was unaffected by this
policy change. The second group is assumed to mimic a control environment in experi-
mental terminology. Such comparisons provide the foundation for most empirical work in
labor economics. The problem comes in creating a control environment, which is done
either by including exogenous variables in an analysis designed to adjust for relevant
differences among sample observations, or by selecting observations in a manner that
permits a matched-pair type of analysis.
Contrary to many researchers' perceptions, the natural experiment approach relies on
restrictive structural assumptions analogous to those of most other methods. In fact, this
approach is entirely equivalent to the ®xed-effects model popularized in the 1970s. By
writing the model in this way, we are able to compare it with the alternative structural
models outlined in the previous section and to state the conditions under which a structural
interpretation can be placed on estimates from studies that use this approach.
5.1. The natural-experiment approach and the difference-in-differences estimator
Suppose one is interested in estimating the in¯uence of a policy instrument on an outcome
for a group, say outcome yit measuring hours of work or participation. The group consists
of individuals i  1;¼;N, with these individuals observed over a sample horizon
t  1;¼;T. (Individuals here may refer to data on groups such as the average in a state
or in a speci®c demographic category.) Suppose further that the policy instrument changes
in particular period t for only a segment of the group. Let dit be a zero-one indicator that
equals unity if the policy change was operative for individual i in period t. Members of the
group who experience the policy change react according to a parameter g. A framework
for estimating g expressed in terms of a conventional ®xed-effect model takes the form
yit  gdit 1 hi 1 mt 1 1it; 5:1
where hi is a time-invariant effect unique to individual i, mt is a time effect common to all
individuals in period t, and 1it is an individual time-varying error distributed indepen-
dently across individuals and independently of all hi and mt.
Estimation of coef®cients in ``error-components'' models, of which Eq. (5.1) is a special
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Nerlove (1971) discuss a variety of estimation procedures under various assumptions
regarding the distributions of hi and mt. When hi and mt are random components, meaning
their distributions are independent of observed right-hand side variables, then conven-
tional generalized least squares produces an estimator that is consistent and asymptotically
ef®cient.
20 When the distributions of hi and mt depend on right-hand side variables, the
literature implements a differencing procedure to calculate consistent estimators, where
the form of differencing depends on the particular nature of the simultaneity problems
induced by hi and mt. Analysts commonly refer to these as ``within'' estimators because
they rely only on variation within groups in calculations. The ®xed-effect estimator, which
treats hi and mt as parameters, is a special case of such an estimator.
5.1.1. Difference-in-differences estimators
Suppose both hi and mt are believed to be dependent on dit in some unknown manner, and
one wants to compute a consistent estimate of g in (5.1). A popular version of a within
estimator involves ®rst differencing (5.1) over time to obtain
Dtyit  gDtdit 1 mt 1 Dt1it; 5:2
where Dtyit ; yit 2 yit21 and mt ; Dtmt. The operator Dt differences an individual's
observation across periods, and mt is merely de®ned to be a parameter representing the
difference in common time effects.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the sample consists of only two periods: period t 2 1 which
is before the implementation of the policy instrument and period t which is after. Let group
e represent the ``experimentals'', the individuals who experienced the change in the policy
instrument ± and let group c denote the ``controls'' ± the individuals who encountered no
policy change. Then least squares applied to (5.2) yields the estimators
^ g  Dt y
e 2 Dt y




k   y
k
t 2  y
k








; k  e;c;
where  y
k
j is the average outcome for group k.
21
The estimator ^ g in (5.3) is identical to what is now known in the literature as the
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and for correlation across individuals implied by the disturbances mt.
21 The notation
P
i [ k designates that summation is over all individuals included in group k, and Nk is the total
number of individuals in group k.difference-in-difference estimator. The ®xed-effect and difference-in-difference estimators
do not merely share the same asymptotic distribution; they are computationally identical.
The literature considers many generalizations of ®xed-effects models, which in turn
imply generalizations of the natural-experiment approach. A common extension incorpo-
rates covariates in (5.1) to obtain
yit  gdit 1 Zitu 1 hi 1 mt 1 1it; 5:4
where Zit includes observed exogenous and/or endogenous variables.
22 A further general-
ization of this model allows for treatment effects to vary randomly across individuals.
Under the stringent structural assumptions on time effects and composition highlighted
below, the difference-in-differences estimator can be shown to recover the average treat-
ment effect for the treated (i.e., the parameter Eg j dit  1). Unfortunately, this para-
meter is subject to conventional sample selection biases and in general cannot be used to
simulate policy responses.
5.1.2. Structural assumptions maintained by the difference-in-difference estimator
Applications of the natural experiment approach typically suggest that it is a ``non-struc-
tural'' estimation procedure, but its equivalence to error-components models clearly indi-
cates that all of the restrictions required for consistent estimation of these models must also
hold for the difference-in-difference estimator to measure a behaviorally meaningful para-
meter. The literature has never interpreted the ®xed-effect model as non-structural. The
requirement of two sets of structural restrictions are likely to challenge the credibility of
many natural-experiment applications concerned with estimating behavioral responses in
labor supply.
Assumption 1. Time effects in (5.1) (or (5.4)) must be common across experimentals
and controls.
More ¯exible speci®cations of (5.1) include the following:
yit  gdit 1 hi 1 mct 1 met 1 1it 5:5
and
yit  gdit 1 lthi 1 mt 1 1it: 5:6
Many factors can lead to these generalizations, including failure to include relevant time-
varying variables in Zit that differ across experimentals and controls. Speci®cation (5.5)
recognizes that experimentals and controls might experience dissimilar trends and/or
cyclical effects. Such an event is likely, for example, when the demographic composition
of experimentals and controls differs; empirical analysis usually shows that the trends and
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22 Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), for example, develop asymptotically
ef®cient estimators for model (5.4).cycles differ for married and single people, for men and women, and for high- and low-
skilled workers. Speci®cation (5.6) allows individual effects to in¯uence outcomes differ-
entially over time. This phenomenon often happens in analyses of work or wage outcomes
over the life cycle. An analysis of the differential time trends, before and after the policy
intervention, for each group provides useful information in assessing the reliability of this
assumption.
Assumption 2. The composition of both experimentals and controls must remain stable
before and after the policy change.
The averages in (5.3) presume that the same individuals make up each group in both
period t and period t-1. If this is not the case, then differencing does not eliminate averages
of the individual effects hi. Instead, the terms
Dth
e   h
et 2  h
et21; Dth
c   h









; kj  et;et21;ct;ct21
contaminate the estimate of g given by (5.3). Even when the groups et and et21 consist of
different individuals, it can still happen that Dth
e vanishes asymptotically keeping ^ g
consistent. These circumstances typically involve random selection mechanisms.
However, selection into groups made up of workers, as is the case in analyses of labor
supply, is invariably not random since it depends intricately on the nature of the policy
change. For example, a tax change can be expected to alter who works and who does not in
a systematic manner. As a consequence, sample selection terms prevent Dth
e from vanish-
ing. Exactly the same problem arises for a shifting composition of the control groups ct and
ct21, which keeps Dth
c from disappearing.
5.1.3. Grouping estimators
Applications occasionally have grouped data available for their analyses, or they may have
a discrete grouping variable (instrument) Git that allocates individuals into g  1,¼,J
groups of size Ngt in each period t  1;¼;T. A modest modi®cation of®xed-effect model
(5.1) (or (5.4)) provides a framework for estimating relevant coef®cients in many of these
cases. Suppose also that the discrete grouping variable satis®es the assumption
yit  gd it 1 ug 1 hi 1 mt 1 1it; 5:7
where ug is a time-invariant effect unique to group g and hi is now an error re¯ecting the
deviation of a particular observation's individual effect around its respective group mean.
De®ning the group averages
















and averaging Eq. (5.7) over groups yields
 ygt  g  d gt 1 ug 1 mt  1gt: 5:8
This is just another version of a ®xed-effect model, as long as one maintains the structural
assumptions for the error components ug, mt and  egt for grouped data analogous to those
outlined in Section 5.1.2 for the components hi, mt, and 1it using individual data.
Estimation of model (5.8) ± or its variant with the grouped covariates  Xgt also included ±
involves no complications beyond those already discussed.
23 Under the structural assump-
tions presumed for the conventional ®xed-effect model, differencing eliminates the source
of endogeneity for  d gt. The quantity  d gt represents the proportion in group g receiving the
treatment. The asymptotically ef®cient estimators developed for model (5.4) apply here as
well, with instrumental variables now speci®ed for groups. When there are two groups and
when the grouping instrument coincides exactly with the policy reform dummy variable
dit, then this estimator is identical to the difference-in-differences estimator. In any parti-
cular application, the objective is to ®nd a suitable grouping instrument such that the
resulting grouped error components satisfy the structural conditions of the ®xed-effect
speci®cation.
5.1.4. Repeated cross-section or panel data?
Since the difference-in-differences estimator and the instrumental variable estimator
de®ned by Eq. (5.3) are expressed in terms of sample means, they can be computed equally
well using either repeated cross-section or panel data. Panel data only become useful when
the instrumental variable method uses an historic individual variable as an instrument. For
example, if past employment status or past tax status is the instrument, then this estimator
would typically not be available using cross-section data.
In both the panel data and the repeated cross-section case, the structural conditions are
still needed to pursue the difference-in-difference estimator. Provided there is no systema-
tic attrition across groups, panel data allow the groups to be determined in a time-invariant
way and, therefore, the difference-in-difference approach completely eliminates the indi-
vidual ®xed effects hi. Thus, no restrictions need be placed on the distribution of the
individual effects. Repeated cross section data, on the other hand, must satisfy the assump-
tion that the unobservable individual effects are drawn from the same population distribu-
tion across periods before and after the reform. Otherwise, the difference-in-differences
estimator and the instrumental-variable estimator suffer from composition bias. Panel data
applications still require the strong restrictions on the distribution of the individual ``tran-
sitory'' time-varying effects and must retain the common-trend assumption.
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Most advocates of the natural-experiment approach would answer this question as NO,
and they would be right if behavioral responses refers to substitution and income effects
familiar in labor supply analyses. Indeed, researchers applying a difference-in-difference
procedure often emphasize that they have no intention of estimating such effects.
What, then, is the interpretation of g in Eq. (5.1) (or Eq. (5.4))? Clearly, under ideal
circumstances, g measures the total response of a policy change, or, more precisely, how a
shift in a policy regime in¯uences the average outcome for a worker in the experimental
group. But one can seldom translate this response into interpretable behavioral effects
because most shifts in policy regimes involve simultaneous changes in marginal wages
and net income, and rarely are these changes the same for all individuals making up a
group.
To illustrate the issues, reconsider the prototype empirical speci®cation given by Eq.
(4.30), which we repeat here for convenience:
lnHit  alnWit 1 bQit 1 eit: 5:9
Suppose that a policy shift results in changes in lnW and Q equal to DtlnW and DtQ,
respectively. A translation of this model into the simple ®xed-effect framework,
yit  gdit 1 hi 1 mt 1 1it;
is possible by specifying
yit  lnHit; 5:10a
g  aDtlnWit 1 bDtQit; 5:10b
hi 1 mt  alnWit 1 bQit; 5:10c
1it  eit 1 ditaDtlnWit 1 bDtQit 2 g: 5:10d
The coef®cient g is the average of aDtlnWit 1 bDtQit among the experimentals, and the
error 1it includes the difference between aDtlnWit 1 bDtQit and its mean as one of its
components. This is one interpretation of the heterogeneous treatment-effects model
discussed in Section 5.1.1. Formulation (5.9) assumes that only experimentals experience
the change in policy, with dit  1 signaling the periods and individuals affected by the
change. Speci®cations (5.9) restrict the permissible variation in W and Q across indivi-
duals and time; a form of variation satisfying this property occurs when both lnWit and Qit
can be represented as the sum of an individual and time effect. (Of course, consideration of
®xed-effect formulation (5.4) permits some relaxation of these variability restrictions.)
The natural-experiment framework requires 1it to be independent of dit, meaning neither
the structural error, eit, nor changes in W and Q provide any information indicating whether
an individual is in the experimental group or not.
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weighted substitution-income effect given by Eq. (5.10b). We know from our discussion
in Section 4 that the interpretation of this combined effect depends on the other control
variables included in Q. If one imagines a situation in which Q properly includes a
measure of static income or within-period expenditure (such as Eqs. (4.31) or (4.33)),
then the substitution effect a corresponds to an uncompensated substitution elasticity. If,
on the other hand, Q incorporates age-invariant characteristics controlling for lifetime
wages, preferences and initial permanent income (see Section 4.6), then a conforms to
the intertemporal substitution elasticity. For still another interpretation, if Q now
includes controls for age, initial wealth and the expected wage pro®le (such as Eq.
(4.46)), then a measures the wage elasticity of hours corresponding to a shift in the
entire wage pro®le.
Without, then, carefully specifying the labor-supply model underlying the ®xed-effect
formulation, it is dif®cult to know exactly what combination of parameters is being
estimated by the natural-experiment approach. Including variables in Q needed for an
interpretation of g invariably implies that one must rely on the generalized ®xed-effect
speci®cation given by Eq. (5.4), meaning that covariates Zit must be accounted for when
calculating the difference-in-difference estimator. In addition to entering speci®cations
directly, the presence of Zit typically alters the formulation of DtQ which further compli-
cates the interpretation of g.
Another critical quali®cation revealed by this attempt to interpret the difference-in-
difference estimator involves the requirement that only the experimental group experi-
ences the policy change. If controls also undergo a change at the same time, albeit a
different change, then the appropriate speci®cation for Eq. (5.1) becomes
yit  gedit 1 gc1 2 dit 1 hi 1 mt 1 1it; 5:11
where ge and gc represent the behavioral response of the experimentals and controls,
respectively.
Such a circumstance would arise, for example, in the case of the 1986 US tax reform.
A particular change in the tax code may have directly impacted only a segment of
taxpayers (experimentals), but many changes were made to the tax code simultaneously
and literally all taxpayers were affected. This would also be the case if there were general
equilibrium effects of the policy intervention that affected all wages (or prices) in the
economy.
With the term gc1 2 dit present in Eq. (5.11), the difference-in-difference estimator ^ g
loses its interpretation as a response to any policy change. Fixed-effect estimation of Eq.
(5.11) directly can inprinciple, recover behavioral responses geand gcwithinterpretations
analogous to Eq. (5.10), but most formulations imply correlation between dit and 1it,
rendering least squares inconsistent. Such correlation arises when the size of the policy
change is systematically different across experimentals and controls, and this occurs
almost by de®nition since it is the nature of the policy change that distinguishes experi-
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1614mentals and controls. With endogeneity induced by this correlation, instrumental-variable
procedures must be implemented to estimate (5.11).
5.3. A review of some empirical applications
The empirical applications reviewed here all consider the impact of tax reforms on labor
supply. The usual strategy adopted for estimation in these studies is to include the policy
dummy with some controls for the wage, other income and demographic variables. As our
analysis in Section 5.1 has shown, the interpretation of the estimates from these studies
depends on which control variables were included and whether, for the groups chosen, the
required assumptions on the unobservable error terms are plausible.
A difference-in-differences estimator was used by Eissa (1995a) to evaluate the effects
of the US 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) on married women's labor supply. She uses the
repeated cross sections of the March Current Population Surveys (CPSs) and compares
data from the 1984±1986 surveys just preceding the reform and the 1990±1992 surveys
sometime after. Her study compares the behavior of wives married to high-earning
husbands (those who were at or above the 99th percentile of the CPS income distribution)
to that of wives of lower earning husbands (between the 75th and 80th percentile of the
income distribution). The two groups were affected differentially by the 1986 tax reform.
Estimates are provided for both participation and hours. In particular, a reduced form
probit equation for participation and an hours equation which included an inverse Mills
ratio control for selection were estimated. Demographic variables were entered in the
model and some speci®cations allowed for interactions of the response coef®cient with
education level. These adjustments were found to signi®cantly reduce the elasticity esti-
mates. The reported wage elasticities for hours were between 0.6 and 1 while, for parti-
cipation, elasticity estimates were surprisingly smaller ± between 0.1 and 0.6. The choice
of grouping is controversial since it might be thought that, even given the observed
included controls, husband's income is not exogenous for the change in his spouse's
labor supply. Moreover, given the increasing dispersion of incomes and wages among
all groups during that period, the common time effects (common trends) assumption
among the unobservable components across the two groups may not be satis®ed.
Eissa's approach was also followed in a recent panel data study of the 1987 Danish tax
reform by Graversen (1996). He considered the participation and hours worked of women,
split according to marital status. In both cases, for controls he used a group for which
predicted tax rate changes were small, using pre-reform hours and wages on the post-
reform tax parameters. No exclusion restrictions appear to have been used to identify the
selection term. For the difference-in-differences estimates with no controls for observable
individual characteristics, he found perversely signed effects, but including numbers and
age of children, for example, resulted in small but positive responses. This sensitivity of
the difference-in-differences parameter estimates to the inclusion of observable time-vary-
ing characteristics is indicative of the importance of the conditions placed on the distribu-
tion of unobservables within each group over time.
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with children. Again, they used data from the March CPSs for the US. Their identi®cation
strategy was to compare the change in labor supply for women with children to the change
in labor supply for women with no children. They found that the participation of single
women with children increased by 1.9±2.8 percentage points relative to single women
with no children (from a base of 73%). Eissa and Lieberman also found a rather more
surprising result that the EITC expansion in the Tax Reform Act had no perceptible effect
on the hours of work of single women with children who were already in employment. The
use of women with no children as a control group is open to criticism on a number of
grounds. First, the conditions on the time and composition effects among the unobserva-
bles is unlikely to be satis®ed in the repeated cross-sections of the CPS, even given the
included regressors. Second, women with no children are probably working closer to their
upper bound, as far as participation is concerned, and would not, therefore, be expected to
increase participation. This is really a failure of the common trends assumption since such
women may not, therefore, be able to absorb an upward common trend to labor supply on
the participation margin.
Blundell et al. (1998b) consider the use of the sequence of tax reforms in the UK over
the 1980s and early 1990s to study the hours responses of married women from a long time
series of repeated cross-sections. A semi-log linear labor supply equation (see Eq. (4.54))
was speci®ed with additive controls for other income, children, education and birth cohort.
In contrast to the other studies discussed in this section, the hours equation included the log
of the post-tax hourly wage rate and other income as well as a number of demographic
controls. Other income was de®ned by the difference between consumption and the
product of hours worked and the post-tax marginal hourly wage. This de®nition of
other income is consistent both with intertemporal two-stage budgeting in the absence
of liquidity constraints and with the presence of liquidity constraints as described in
Section 4 above. The estimated labor supply model allowed the demographic variables
to interact with the log wage and other income variables.
Two alternative estimators were considered. The ®rst was a difference-in-differences
estimator that grouped the sample by taxpayers and non-taxpayers. This was argued to be
invalid because, under very general conditions, the composition of the two groups could be
expected to change in a non-random way in response to the tax reforms. The second
approach grouped by education and age cohort. This exploited the systematically changing
distribution of wages by education and cohort group in the UK described in Section 3.4.
The idea was that the differential growth in wages across birth cohorts by education group
re¯ects changes in the demand for labor, possibly due to skill-biased technical change, and
could be excluded from the labor supply equation. The log marginal hourly wage, which
was included directly in the labor supply speci®cation regression, together with the other
income variable and participation in work, were treated as endogenous. The estimator can,
thus, be interpreted as a (grouping) instrumental variable estimator in which the changes in
the demand for the different skills of each education and cohort group are assumed to be
exogenous and validly excluded from labor supply given the inclusion of the wage and
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excluded instruments, were found to be jointly signi®cant in the wage and other income
reduced forms.
The reported uncompensated labor supply elasticities, although small, were all positive
and highest for women with children of pre-school age. The income elasticities were all
negative, except for those women with no children, for whom they were essentially zero.
As a result, the compensated wage effects, which matter for welfare, were all positive and
the model was found to be consistent with standard theory everywhere in the data. In
comparison, the estimates that use taxpayer status as a grouping instrument showed a
signi®cant negative wage elasticity. This negative estimate was argued to re¯ect the
systematic change in the composition of the taxpaying group. During the period consid-
ered, there were many new entrants into this taxpaying group who had systematically
lower hours. This non-random change in composition invalidates the second assumption
of Section 5.1.2 on the composition of groups across time.
A number of additional experiments were reported that varied the control variables
and instruments. In one experiment the time effects and the cohort/education effects
were excluded. Only age and age squared were entered along with the demographic
variables, the log marginal wage and the other income variable. This makes the speci-
®cation similar to that in traditional cross section studies, such as those reviewed by
Mroz (1987), except that the data contain a large number of time periods. Both the
other income and wage elasticities became much larger. The resulting estimators are
similar to those reported in the Arellano and Meghir (1992) study on the UK where
education was used as the identifying instrument. As in the Eissa (1995b) study,
controlling for education in the labor supply equation has the property of reducing
the wage elasticity.
Eissa (1996) considers the case of labor supply responses to the sequence of tax
reforms during the 1980s in the US. As in her previous studies, she uses March CPS
data but this time over a longer period ± 1976 to 1993. Moreover, the grouping was by
education level. She ®nds only weak evidence of an increase in male labor supply in
response to the Tax Reform Act. This poses an interesting issue relating to the larger
effects on taxable income that have been found in studies that use tax-return data directly
such as Feldstien (1995).
24
6. Estimation with non-participation and non-linear budget constraints
To analyze how tax and welfare policies in¯uence hours of work, there has been a steady
expansion in the use of sophisticated statistical models characterizing distributions of
discrete-continuous variables that jointly describe work and program participation.
Considered at the forefront of research in this area, these models offer a natural mechan-
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margins.ism for capturing the institutional features of both tax and welfare programs. This section
describes how to estimate the effect of these programs on labor supply using these
models.
These models build on standard approaches for dealing with censored and missing data.
The basic principles underlying these approaches are well documented in the econometrics
literature. In what follows, we provide explicit details on applying these methods to
incorporate ®xed costs, missing wages and discrete program participation in models of
labor supply behavior with taxes and welfare.
6.1. Basic economic model with taxes
Consider a model of static labor supply where individuals determine hours of work and
consumption by maximizing a utility function U(C,h) subject to the budget constraint
C  Wh 1 Y 2 tI; 6:1
where C is the consumption, W is the gross wage/h, h is the hours of market work, Y is the
non-labor income, t is the taxes determined by the function t(´), I is the taxable income
per year, I  Wh 1 Y 2 D, and D is the deductions per year.
Due to different marginal tax rates in the various income brackets combined with the
existence of non-labor income, the budget set is inherently non-linear in most instances.
The literature applies two approaches for modeling the non-linearities induced by taxes:
piecewise-linear functions that recount the brackets making up tax schedules; and smooth
differentiable relations that summarize the tax rates implied by bracketed schedules. This
section outlines each of these approaches, along with the procedures implemented to
estimate labor-supply parameters associated with each approach.
In the absence of taxes, maximization of the utility function subject to the budget
constraint de®nes the labor supply function
h  fW;Y;y; 6:2
where y is an error re¯ecting the contribution of factors relevant to economic agents and
unobserved by the econometrician.
25 With W and Y reinterpreted as ``after-tax'' measures,
the construction of which is presented below, f continues to describe hours-of-work
behavior even when complex non-linearities affect budget constraints, as is the case
with taxes. The objective of most labor-supply analyses is to estimate the parameters of
the function f.
6.1.1. Structure of taxes
The institutional features of income and program taxes occupy a great deal of attention in
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25 It is straightforward to replace Eq. (6.2) by f(W,Y,X,y) where X is a vector incorporating measured variables
affecting agents' choices. We suppress X for notational convenience. f, of course, depends on a parameter vector
which we also suppress.the labor supply literature. As described in Section 2, the complexities introduced by the
US and the UK tax system, for example, contort the budget constraint faced by a typical
worker. Modeling this constraint is often thought to be essential in labor supply analysis
for capturing the opportunities available to individuals. For example, the overall tax
schedule in the US consists of ®ve components:
tY;EFEDTX 1 STATX 1 EITC 1 SSTAX 1 WELFARE; 6:3
where t(Y,E) is the overall tax schedule, E is earned income, FEDTX is the federal income
tax schedule, STATX is the state income tax schedule, EITC is the earned income tax
credit schedule, SSTAX is the social security tax schedule, and WELFARE is net transfers
from public assistance programs.
Each of these schedules has its own method of computing ``taxable'' income, but all in
some way base calculations on a distinction between Y and E. We ignore these considera-
tions here. Both federal and state income tax schedules compute taxes based on income
brackets, which induces piecewise linear budget constraints. The other programs are
applicable over only part of the income range which also creates brackets.
6.1.2. Piecewise linear constraints
Fig. 15 shows a hypothetical budget constraint for an individual in the US faced with
federal income taxes alone, state income taxes alone, or both.
26 In this diagram, h denotes
hours of work, and ``Consumption'' denotes total after-tax income or the consumption of
market goods. The segments of the budget constraint correspond to the different marginal
tax rates that an individual faces. In particular, he faces a tax rate of tA between Ho hours
and H1 hours (segment 1) and tax rates of tB and tC, respectively, in the intervals (H1, H2)
and (H2, H) (segments 2 and 3). Thus, the net wages associated with each segment are:
Ch. 27: Labor Supply: a Review of Alternative Approaches 1619
Fig. 15. Budget constraint with income taxes.
26 Note that h  H0  0 corresponds to 0 h of work. As we move from right to left in these ®gures, hours of
work increase.w1  1 2 tAW for segment 1, w2  1 2 tBW for segment 2, and w3  1 2 tCW for
segment 3. Virtual income for each segment (i.e., income associated with a linear extra-
polation of the budget constraint) is calculated as: y1  Y 2 tY;0;
y2  y1 1 w1 2 w2H1; and y3  y3 1 w2 2 w3H2. Changes in tax brackets create the
kink points.
Fig. 16 shows a budget constraint affected only by the EITC schedule,
27 and Fig. 17
shows a budget constraint that re¯ects the effects of the social security tax alone.
28 As seen
in Fig. 18, welfare bene®t programs create a budget set that resembles the one for Social
Security. All of these taxes induce non-convexities in opportunity sets.
Summing these various tax components creates an overall tax-transfer schedule with
two noteworthy features. First, the schedule faced by a typical individual includes a large
number of different rates. Translated into the hours-consumption space, this implies a
large number of kink points in the budget constraint. Second, for most individuals the tax
schedule contains non-convex portions, which arise from four potential sources. The ®rst
arises from a fall in the EITC tax rate at the break even point. In Fig. 16, that point occurs
at H2 where the tax rate falls from a positive value to zero. The second source occurs when
the social security tax hits its maximum (at H1 in Fig. 17), where the corresponding tax rate
goes from a positive value to zero. A third source is the non-convexity introduced by the
structure of the standard deduction. Finally, if a worker's family participates in any
welfare program, then signi®cant non-convexities arise as bene®ts are withdrawn when
earnings increase.
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Fig. 16. Budget constraint with EITC.
27 The EITC is a negative income tax scheme which can induce, in the simplest case, two kinks in a person's
constraint: one where the proportional credit reaches its maximum (H1 in Fig. 16), and one at the break even point
where the credit is fully taxed away (H2 in the ®gure). The tax rates associated with the ®rst two segments are tA,
which is negative, and tB, which is positive. Thereafter, the EITC imposes no further tax.
28 The social security tax is a proportional tax on earnings up to a speci®ed earnings level, after which the
amount of tax paid is the same regardless of earnings. As a result, Fig. 17 shows a constraint with a single interior
kink (given by H1 in the ®gure) corresponding to the maximum proportionally taxed earnings level. The tax rate
on the segment leading up to that kink is tA, switching to zero on the second segment.6.1.3. Constructing a differentiable constraint
Approximating the tax schedule by a differentiable function leads to a simple approach for
developing an empirical model of labor supply that recognizes the in¯uence of taxes. A
convenient approach for constructing this function is to approximate the marginal tax rate
schedule ± a step function ± by a differentiable function. This approximation must itself be
easily integrable to obtain a simple closed form for the tax function.
An elementary candidate for constructing a differentiable approximation that can be
made as close as one desires to the piecewise-linear tax schedule has been applied in
MaCurdy et al. (1990). To understand the nature of the approximation, return to Fig. 15.
One can represent the underlying schedule as follows:
t
0Ih  tA from IH0 to IH1
 tB from IH1 to IH2
 tC above IH2; 6:4
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Fig. 17. Budget constraint with Social Security Tax.
Fig. 18. Budget constraint with welfare.where t
0(I(h)) is the marginal tax rate, I(h) is taxable income at h hours of work, and ti is
the marginal tax rate, i  A;B;C.For expositional simplicity, suppose that tA  0.
Consider the following approximation of this schedule which uses three ¯at lines at the
heights tA (  0), tB and tC and weight functions parameterized to switch the three lines on
and off at appropriate points:
^ t
0Ih  tBF1Ih 2 F2Ih 1 tCF2Ih; 6:5
where the weight functions are given by Fi(I(h))  the cumulative distribution function
with mean mi and variance si
2, i  1;2. The middle segment of the tax schedule has height
tB and runs from taxable income I(H1)t oI(H2). To capture this feature, parameterize F1(´)
and F2(´) with means m1  IH1 and m2  IH2, respectively, with both variances set
small. The ®rst distribution function, F1(´) takes a value close to zero for taxable income
levels below I(H1) and then switches quickly to take a value of one for higher values.
Similarly, F2(´) takes a value of zero until near I(H2) and one thereafter. The difference
between the two equals zero until I(H1), one from I(H1)t oI(H2) and zero thereafter. Thus,
the difference takes a value of one just over the range where tB is relevant. Notice that we
can control when that value of one begins and ends by adjusting the values m1 and m2.
Also, we can control how quickly this branch of the estimated schedule turns on and off by
adjusting the variances of the cumulative distribution functions, trading off a more
gradual, smoother transition against more precision. In general, adjusting the mean and
variance parameters allows one to ®t each segment of a schedule virtually exactly, switch
quickly between segments, and still maintain differentiability at the switch points.





FiIh 2 Fi11IhbiIh; 6:6
where the functions bi(I(h)) are polynomials in income. With the Fi denoting normal
c.d.f.s, function (6.6) yields closed form solutions when it is either integrated or differ-
entiated.
29 The resulting approximation can be made to look arbitrarily close to the budget
constraint drawn in Fig. 15, except that the kink points are rounded.
6.2. Instrumental-variable estimation
Conventional non-linear instrumental-variable procedures offer a robust method for esti-
mating particular forms of the labor-supply function f in Eq. (6.2), forms that permit the
speci®cation of structural equations that are linear in all sources of disturbances. As
discussed in Section 4, the development of such speci®cations is a substantial challenge




0IdI. Thefollowingrelations enableoneto calculateanexplicitformfor
t(X):
R
FdI  IF 1 w,
R
IFdI  1=2I








4F 2 3=4F 1 3=4IF 1 1=4I
3w. In this expression, F refers to any Fi's, and w designates
the density function associated with Fi.for it proves dif®cult to discover a preference map that produces additivity in structural
disturbances ± errors re¯ecting unobserved differences among people (heterogeneity) ±
while at the same time permitting measurement errors in hours and wages to enter linearly.
6.2.1. A useful characterization of labor supply with taxes
The introduction of a non-linear tax schedule into a model of labor supply poses few
analytical dif®culties when the schedule generates a strictly convex constraint set with a
twice-differentiable boundary. Utility maximization in this case implies a simple charac-
terization of the hours-of-work choice.
With t denoting the smooth function that approximates the tax schedule, specify the
marginal wage rate and ``virtual'' income as
v  vh 1 2 t
0W;
y  yhY 1 E 2 t 2 vh  Y 1 t
0Wh 2 t  C 2 vh; 6:7
where E  Wh is gross earnings, and t and t
0 (the derivative of the tax function with
respect to income) are evaluated at income level I  IhY 1 Wh 2 D which directly
depends on the value of h. In Eq. (6.7) we write the marginal wage v  v(h) and virtual
income y  y(h) as functions to emphasize their dependence on hours h.
Utility maximization implies a solution for hours of work that obeys the implicit
equation
h  fvh;yh;y; 6:8
where we write the marginal wage v  vh and virtual income y  yh as functions to
emphasize their dependence on hours. Figs. 15 and 18 illustrate this representation of the
solution for optimal hours of work. This characterization follows from work on taxes and
labor supply (e.g., Hall, 1973) that represents a consumer as facing a linear budget
constraint in the presence of non-linear tax programs. This linear constraint is constructed
in a way to make it tangent to the actual non-linear opportunity set at the optimal solution
for hours of work. The implied slope of this linearized constraint is v(h) and the corre-
sponding value of virtual income is y(h). Eq. (6.8) constitutes a structural relationship that
determines hours of work. By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to speci®cation
(6.8), we can solve this implicit equation for h in terms of W, Y, and other variables and
parameters entering the functions t and f. This operation produces the labor supply func-
tion applicable in the non-linear tax case.
6.2.2. A structural equation of labor supply with taxes
Relation (6.8) directly provides the basis for formulating a structural equation that can be
estimated by standard instrumental-variable procedures. Consider, for example, the semi-
log speci®cation
30:
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30 See Eq. (A.5) in Appendix A.h  fv;y;ym 1 Zg 1 alnv 1 by 1 y; 6:9
where m, g, a, and b are parameters, Z is a vector of observed determinants of labor
supply (e.g., age, family size, etc.), and y is a structural disturbance capturing unobserved
factors in¯uencing hours-of-work decisions. The marginal after-tax wage v enters this
speci®cation in a natural log, so a represents a hybrid of an uncompensated substitution
effect and elasticity. The coef®cient b corresponds to an income effect.
Conventional instrumental-variable procedures offer a robust method for estimating the
coef®cients of the semi-logarithmic speci®cation of the labor supply function given by Eq.
(6.9). In the absence of measurement error, inspection of Eq. (6.9) reveals that the error
term enters linearly into the speci®cation. Consequently, variables that are orthogonal to
the structural disturbance y can serve as instruments for estimating the parameters deter-
mining substitution and income effects. The implementation of such procedures imposes
no parametric restrictions and it allows one to consider a wide variety of exogeneity
assumptions.
In many data sets there are serious suspicions that hours of work and wages are reported
with error. Suppose h
* denotes measured hours of work and that the function h
*(h,1)
relates h
* to actual hours, h, and to an error component, 1. An interesting speci®cation







where 1 is distributed independently of h and y, and the distribution of the measurement
error component 1 satis®es the moment condition E(e
1)  1, implying that h
* and h have
the same expected value. Whereas W  E/h de®nes the true hourly wage rate, W
* desig-
nates the data available on wages. This formulation presumes not only measurement error
in hours, but also the existence of reporting error in hourly wage rates due to its construc-
tion. Assuming accurate observations on E, calculating wages by dividing total labor
earnings by reported hours induces a reciprocal relation in the measurement error linking
data on hours and wages.
Incorporating the multiplicative measurement error model given by Eq. (6.10) into the
semi-logarithmic speci®cation of labor supply presented in Eq. (6.9) yields the empirical
relations
h
*  ~ u 1 Zg 1 alnv




* 1 ln1 2 t
0;
~ m  m 2 as
2
1=2; 6:12
u  y 1 a1 1 s
2
1=2 1 h




Relation (6.7) continues to de®ne the variable y. This virtual income quantity and the
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0 are not contaminated by measurement error because they are functions
of Y, E and t
0 which are known without errors. The variable lnv
* represents the natural
logarithm of the after-tax wage rate evaluated at observed hours, which differs from the
actual marginal wage due to the presence of reporting error in hours. The disturbance u
possesses a zero mean since E12s
2
1=2, Ee
11, and the error 1 is distributed
independently of all endogenous components determining h, including the heterogeneity
disturbance y.
Interpreting relation (6.11) as a structural equation describing labor supply, instrumen-
tal-variable methods continue to offer a ¯exible scheme for consistent estimation of
substitution and income parameters. Due to the heteroscedasticity of the disturbance u
in Eq. (6.11), the estimation procedure must compute robust standard errors to produce
valid test statistics. For consistent estimation of the parameters of Eq. (6.11), one needs to
be able to identify a set of variables X that are orthogonal to the structural disturbance y,
independent of measurement error 1, and are capable of predicting the endogenous vari-
ables v
* and y. Selecting alternative formulations of X offers the opportunity to entertain a
variety of exogeneity assumptions, even with measurement error present, thereby indicat-
ing the direction of potential biases in estimated work disincentive effects arising from
these assumptions. The maximum-likelihood approaches discussed below typically main-
tain that all sources of income are exogenous determinants of work hours, including W,
and Y (i.e., the gross wage rate, non-taxable non-labor income, and non-labor taxable
income). Judicious inclusion and exclusion of these income sources in X provides a
basis for judging whether endogeneity of wages and/or incomes is a problem. Of course,
the ability to test these exogeneity assumptions critically relies on there existing a suf®-
cient number of elements in X that satisfy exclusion restrictions in Eq. (6.11).
6.2.3. Lifecycle considerations
As outlined in Section 4, substituting an alternative measure for the variable y in Eq. (6.9)
creates a labor-supply speci®cation that is consistent with decision-making in a lifecycle
context, and this speci®cation can in turn be modi®ed to account for the existence of
income taxes.
31 In a static analysis with taxes, one speci®es virtual income as
y  Q 2 vh; with Q  Y 1 E 2 t; 6:13
where the income components making up the quantity Q represent current income in the
period. In such an analysis Q  C by assumption. However, in an intertemporal setting it
need not be the case that y  Y 1 E 2 t 2 vh since one can have C 2 vh ± Y 1 E 2
t 2 vh due to saving or borrowing. As shown in Section 4, in a multiperiod framework,
with or without an uncertain future, the construction of the virtual income variable y (or,
more precisely, the quantity Q) must account for net savings in the period.
Given the availability of data for each family's total consumption, a formulation for Q
that obviously accomplishes this task is to set
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6:14
as the measure of virtual income. Given this construction for y, and lifetime utility maxi-
mization with strongly separable preferences over time, the function h  fv;yy char-
acterizes the optimal lifecycle choice of labor supply in the period under consideration.
Standard two-stage least squares procedures continue to provide a computationally
simple method for consistently estimating the parameters of the function f, assuming, of
course, that the empirical speci®cation of f is linear in disturbances±such as speci®cation
(6.9). One can apply linear or non-linear instrumental-variable procedures to estimate
coef®cients depending on whether the speci®cation of f is linear or non-linear in para-
meters, with robust standard errors computed when appropriate.
6.3. Maximum likelihood: convex differential constraints with full participation
Maximum-likelihood estimation of labor-supply models with a tax schedule described by
a twice-differentiable boundary implying a convex budget set poses few dif®culties.
Provided the gross wage variable and the other income variable are assumed free from
measurement error and independent of unobserved heterogeneity, such an estimation
approach need not heavily rely on exclusion restrictions to identify parameters. In contrast
to the case when implementing instrumental-variable procedures, even though marginal
wages and virtual incomes are endogenous, non-linearities introduced through distribu-
tional assumptions provide a valuable source of identi®cation. Because exclusion restric-
tions are often dif®cult to justify, many researchers turn to maximum likelihood to avoid
making ad hoc exclusion properties. Of course, the independence assumptions on the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in these maximum likelihood approaches are
strong and are precisely what is being relaxed in the ®xed effects models that underlie
the difference-in-differences and related approaches outlined in Section 5.
6.3.1. Speci®cation of likelihood functions with multiplicative measurement error
Considering maximum-likelihood estimation of the model analyzed in Section 6.2,
suppose the heterogeneity-error-component y in the labor-supply function (6.9) and the
disturbance 1 in the measurement-error equation (6.10) for hours of work is independent
of the gross wage and other income and possesses the joint distribution: n;1 < gn1,
where gn1 designates a density function. Using relations (6.9) and (6.10) to perform a
standard change in variables from the errors y and 1 to the variables h and h
* produces the
likelihood function needed to compute maximum-likelihood estimates. The transforma-
tion from (y,1)t o( h,h
*) is monotonic for a wide range offunctional forms for f as long as
the underlying preferences satisfy quasiconcavity and budget sets are convex.
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h 2 m 2 Zg 2 alnW 2 aln1 2 t
0 2 by; 6:15
where gn is the marginal density for n, and the Jacobian term is













which is required to be non-negative. In Eqs. (6.15) and (6.16), the derivative t
0 is
evaluated at I  Wh 1 Y 2 tWh 1 Y.











* 2 lnh;h 2 m 2 Zg 2 alnv 2 bycWdhdW; 6:17
where integration occurs over the hourly wage, which is unobserved, using its density
c(W).
32,33 The non-negativity of the Jacobian term clearly places restrictions on the
behavioral parameters and we discuss these restrictions further below.
6.3.2. A popular linear empirical speci®cation
One of the most numerous commonly applied empirical speci®cation for labor supply
implemented in maximum likelihood analyses ± particularly those using the piecewise-
linear approach discussed below ± takes the linear form:
h  fv;y;ym 1 av 1 by 1 Zg 1 y ; ^ h 1 y; 6:18
where the unobserved error component y represents heterogeneity in preferences with
y < g&nu;, where gn denotes the marginal density of n. In conjunction with this speci®ca-
tion, analyses also presume measurement error in hours of work possessing the classical
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32 This likelihood function fundamentally differs from the one proposed in Eq. (D.5) in Appendix D of
MaCurdy et al. (1990). The particular form of the labor-supply model considered in MaCurdy et al. (1990) is
a h*  ~ m 1 Zg 1 av* 1 by 1 u
with h*  he








lnh* 2 lnh;h 2 m 2 Zg 2 av 2 bycWdhdW
with dy=dh1 1 a 2 bhW
22t
0=2I. Likelihood function (b) is the valid speci®cation for estimating model
(a), whereas likelihood function (D.5) presented in MaCurdy et al. is not ± unbeknownst, unfortunately, to the
authors of MaCurdy et al. Speci®cation (D.5) of MaCurdy et al. implicitly conditions on the true wage rate W,
even though earnings, E, rather than W appears in (D.5). W is an unobserved variable in the analysis and,
therefore, must be integrated out of (D.5) to obtain a valid formulation. Speci®cations (b) and (6.17) incorporate
this integration. MaCurdy recognized this oversight when reconciling some Monte Carlo ®ndings done by
Lennart Flood during his visit to Stanford in 1996; Lennart's assistance in revealing this problem is gratefully
acknowledged.








gn1Wlnh* 2 lnh;h 2 m 2 Zg 2 alnv 2 by;WdhdW;
where gn1W is the joint density of n, 1, and W.linear functional form
h
*  h
*h;1h 1 1; 6:19
where 1 < g1, with 1 and y independent. The measurement error component 1 represents
reporting error that contaminates observations on h for individuals who work.
The derivation of likelihood functions for this case is straightforward given the assump-
tions about preferences and budget constraints maintained to this point. Assuming no
measurement error (i.e., h
*  h), a change in variables from the heterogeneity error y





gy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where the Jacobian term is
dy
dh





This Jacobian term is restricted to be non-negative over the admissible range. Maximizing
(6.20) yields maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters of the labor supply func-
tion f, which provide the information needed to infer the work disincentive effects of
taxation.
If hours are indeed contaminated by additive measurement error, then the likelihood
function for observed hours h






* 2 hghhdh: 6:22
This expression resembles relation (6.20) except that integration occurs over hours to
account for the existence of reporting error, and h
* replaces actual hours h in the Jacobian
term in (6.17).
6.3.3. Imposition of behavioral restrictions with differentiable constraints
The implementation of maximum likelihood procedures imposes interesting and important
restrictions on behavioral parameters in the presence of non-linear budget constraints.
Consider, for example, likelihood function (6.22). For this speci®cation to be a prop-
erly-de®ned likelihood functions, the Jacobian (6.21) must be non-negative. Violation
of this condition implies that the density function for h is negative, which obviously cannot

















s (  f)refers to the labor supply function. The left-hand side of this inequality is
the Slutsky term. This inequality result does not require compensated substitution effects
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become too negative.
Maximum likelihood procedures yield nonsensical results unless Eq. (6.23) holds.
Without measurement error, estimated parameter values cannot imply a violation of Eq.
(6.23) at any of the data combinations (h,w(h),y(h)) actually observed in the sample. If a
violation occurs, then the evaluation of Eq. (6.22) for the observation associated with this
combination would result in a non-positive value which causes the overall log likelihood
function to approach minus in®nity-which clearly cannot represent a maximum. With
measurement error, maximum likelihood estimation applied to Eq. (6.22) ensures that a
weighted average of Eq. (6.22) holds, with weighting occurring over all combinations of
hours, marginal wages, and virtual income lying in the feasible range of the budget
constraint of any individual included in the sample. Since maximum likelihood procedures
assume the validity of such restrictions when calculating estimates of the coef®cients of h
s,
the resulting estimated labor supply function can be expected to exhibit compensated
substitution effects that obey inequality (6.23) over a very wide range of hours, wages,
and incomes.
34 Section 6.4.3 revisits these restrictions, relating them to those invoked in
cases when maximum likelihood is used with non-differentiable (piecewise-linear) tax
functions.
6.4. Maximum likelihood: convex piecewise-linear constraints with full participation
The majority of empirical labor-supply studies incorporating taxes treat the tax schedule
as a series of brackets implying a piecewise-linear budget set. With such a tax function,
the familiar change-in-variables techniques implemented in conventional maximum like-
lihood do not apply due to the non-existence of the Jacobian over measurable segments
of the sample space, which occurs since the functional relationships characterizing
hours-of-work choices are not differentiable. Moreover, a piecewise-linear budget set
creates endogenous variables (hours and after-tax wages) that are both discrete and
continuous in character, complicating the use of instrumental-variable procedures,
which require the inclusion of sample-selection terms in equations to produce distur-
bances with zero means.
6.4.1. Characterization of labor supply with piecewise-linear constraints
To illustrate the derivation of an estimable labor supply model using the piecewise-linear
approach for the model described in Section 6.1.2., consider the simple case of a budget set
with only three segments as presented in Fig. 15. The preceding discussion de®nes the
variables yj, vj, and Hj appearing in this ®gure. To locate the kinks and slopes of the budget
constraint for an individual, a researcher must know the individual's level of non-labor
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34 It is, of course, computationally feasible to use (6.22) in estimation and not require gh to be de®ned over the
entire range of its support. Computationally one merely requires gh to be non-negative over a suf®ciently large
region to ensure (6.22) . 0. Of course, not requiring gh $ 0 over its relevant range produces a nonsensical
statistical model.income, gross wage rate, hours of work, and the structure of the tax system. The hours of
work at which kinks occur are given by Hj  Ij 2 Y 1 D=W, where Y and D, respec-
tively, represent taxable non-labor income and deductions, and Ij is the maximum taxable
income for segment j. The slope of each segment is given by the marginal wage rate for
that segment: vj  W1 2 tj, where j denotes the segment, tj signi®es the marginal tax
rate for that segment, and W is the gross wage rate/h. Finally, the non-labor income at zero
hours of work ± the intercept of the budget line ± is y1  V 1 Y 2 tY 2 D, where t(´) is
the tax function evaluated at the individual's taxable income at zero earnings. Given this
intercept value, virtual incomes or the intercepts associated with successive budget
segments are computed by repeated application of the formula: yj  yj211
vj21 2 vjHj21.
Given a convex budget constraint, an individual's optimization problem amounts to
maximizing U(C,h) subject to
C  y1 if h  0;
 v1h 1 y1 if H0 , h # H1;
 v2h 1 y2 if H1 , h # H2;
 v3h 1 y3 if H2 , h #  H;
 v3  H 1 y3 if h   H; 6:24
The solution of this maximization problem decomposes into two steps. First, determine the
choice of h conditional on locating on a particular segment or a kink. This step yields the
solution
h  0i f h  0 lower limit;
 fv1;y1;y if 0 , h , H1 segment 1;
 H1 if h  H1 kink 1;
 fv2;y2;y if H1 , h , H2 segment 2;
 H2 if h  H2 kink 2;
 fv3;y3;y if H2 , h ,  H segment 3;
  H if h   H kink 3  upper limit: 6:25
Second, determine the segment or the kink on which the person locates. The following
relations characterize this solution: choose
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if H0 , fv1;y1;y , H1 Segment 1;
if fv2;y2;y # H1 , fv1;y1;y; Kink 1;
if H1 , fv2;y2;y , H2 Segment 2;
if fv3;y3;y # H2 , fv2;y2;y Kink 2
if H2 , fv3;y3;y ,  H Segment 3;
if fv3;y3;y $  H Kink 3: 6:26
Combined, these two steps imply the values of h and C that represent the utility-maximiz-
ing solutions for labor supply and consumption.
6.4.2. Speci®cation of the likelihood function with measurement error: all participants
The linear speci®cation off given by Eq. (6.18) implies the following stochastic speci®ca-
tion for labor supply:
^ h1 1 y 1 1 if 0 , ^ h1 1 y # H1 segment 1;
H1 1 1 if ^ h2 1 y , H1 , ^ h1 1 y kink 1;
h
*  ^ h2 1 y 1 1 if H1 , ^ h2 1 y # H2 segment 2;
H2 1 1 if ^ h3 1 y , H2 , ^ h2 1 y kink 2;
^ h3 1 y 1 1 if H2 , ^ h3 1 y #  H segment 3;
 H 1 1 if ^ h3 1 y $  H upper limit: 6:27
This represents a sophisticated variant of an econometric model that combines discrete and
continuous choice elements.
All studies implementing the piecewise-linear approach assume the existence of
measurement error in hours of work. With the linear measurement error model given by
Eq. (6.19), observed hours h
*  h 1 1. As long as the measurement error component 1 is
continuously distributed, so is h
*. In contrast to information on h, knowledge of h
* suf®ces
neither to allocate individuals to the correct branches of the budget constraints nor to
identify the marginal tax rate faced by individuals, other than at zero hours of work. The
state of the world an individual occupies can no longer be directly observed, and one
confronts a discrete data version of an errors-in-variables problem. The interpretation of
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contaminates the observation on h for persons who work.
35
The log-likelihood function for this model is given by Siloggh*h
*
i , where i indexes






















* 2  H;ydy upper limit; 6:28
where g1(´,´) and g2(´,´) are the bivariate density functions of (1,y) and (1 1 y,y), respec-
tively. Maximizing the log-likelihood function produces estimates of the coef®cients of
the labor supply function f. These estimates provide the information used to infer both
substitution and income responses, which in turn provide the basis for calculating the work
disincentive effects of income taxation.
6.4.3. Comparisons of the piecewise-linear approach with other estimation procedures
The piecewise-linear approach for estimating the work disincentive effects of taxes offers
both advantages and disadvantages relative to other methods. Concerning the attractive
features of this approach, piecewise-linear analyses recognize that institutional features of
tax systems induce budget sets with linear segments and kinks. This is important if one
believes that a smooth tax function does not provide a reasonably accurate description of
the tax schedule. The piecewise-linear approach admits randomness in hours of work
arising from both measurement error and variation in individual preferences and it expli-
citly accounts for endogeneity of the marginal tax rate in estimation, but so do the instru-
mental-variable and differentiable likelihood methods discussed above. As we will see
below, the piecewise-linear approach more readily incorporates ®xed costs of holding a
job, regressive features of the tax code, and multiple program participation than other
procedures due to the discrete-continuous character of hours-of-work choices induced in
these environments. These features of the piecewise-linear method make it a vital
approach in empirical analysis of labor supply.
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35 Note that expected hours of work, in this convex piece-wise linear case, is additive in each hours choice
weighted by the probability of each segment or kink. Each term in this sum being at most a function of two
marginalwagesandtwo virtualincomes.Blomquistand Newey(1997)exploitthisobservationto developa semi-
parametric estimator for hours of work with piece-wise linear taxation, imposing the additivity through a series
estimator.On the other hand, the following shortcomings of the piecewise-linear procedure raise
serious doubts about the reliability of its estimates of work disincentive effects. First, the
piecewise-linear methodology assumes that both the econometrician and each individual
in the sample have perfect knowledge of the entire budget constraint that is relevant for the
worker in question. Errors are permitted neither in perceptions nor in measuring budget
constraints. Taken literally, this means that: all income and wage variables used to
compute each sample member's taxes are observed perfectly by the econometrician;
individuals making labor supply choices know these variables exactly prior to deciding
on hours of work; each individual and the econometrician know when the taxpayer will
itemize deductions and the amount of these itemizations; and each taxpayer's understand-
ing of the tax system is equivalent to that of the econometrician (e.g., the operation of such
features as earned-income credits). Clearly, given virtual certainty that most of these
assumptions are violated in empirical analyses of labor supply, the estimates produced
by methods relying on these assumptions must be interpreted very cautiously. The differ-
entiable-likelihood methods rely on the same assumptions. The instrumental-variable
methods do not, so they are likely to be more robust.
Second, measurement error plays an arti®cial role in econometric models based on the
piecewise-linear approach. Its presence is needed to avoid implausible predictions of the
model. The statistical framework induced by the piecewise-linear approach implies that
bunching in hours of work should occur at kink points if hours precisely measure h.
However, for the vast majority of data sources currently used in the literature, only a
trivial number of individuals, if indeed any at all, report hours of work at interior kink
points. Unless one presumes that the data on hours do not directly represent h, such
evidence provides the basis for immediately rejecting the distributional implications of
the above speci®cations. Considering, for example, the labor-supply characterization
proposed in Eq. (6.27), almost any test of the distributional assumptions implied by this
speci®cation would be readily rejected because observed hours would take the values H0,
H1, H2, and H with only a trivial or zero probability. Instead, observed hours essentially
look as if they are distributed according to a continuous distribution. When a continuously-
distributed measurement error 1 is added to the model, observed hours h
* are continuously
distributed. This provides an essential reason for introducing measurement error in the
data, for without it the piecewise-linear structure provides a framework that is grossly
inconsistent with the data. Of course, several sound reasons exist for admitting measure-
ment error in a labor supply model, including the widespread suspicion that reporting error
contaminates data on hours of work. However, measurement error in hours of work
implies measurement error in wages, since they are typically computed as average hourly
earnings. Current applications of the piecewise-linear analysis mistakenly ignore this by
assuming perfectly measured budget constraints.
36 The unnatural role played by measure-
ment error raises questions about the credibility of ®ndings derived from the piecewise-
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36 It is possible to argue that this error does not result in measurement error in the hourly wage, if the
measurement error is interpreted as an ``optimization'' error.linear approach.
37 In contrast to the piecewise-linear approach, it is not essential to intro-
duce measurement error in either the differentiable-likelihood or the instrumental-variable
approach because hours in the distribution of h are continuous without measurement error.
Third, existing research implementing the piecewise-linear methodology relies on very
strong exogeneity assumptions. Other than hours of work, all variables involved in the
calculation of taxes are presumed to be exogenous determinants of labor supply behavior,
both from a statistical and from an economic perspective. These variables include gross
wages, the various components of non-labor income, and deductions. In light of the
evidence supporting the view that wages and income are endogenous variables in labor
supply analyses, particularly in the case of wages,
38 suspicions arise regarding the depend-
ability of estimated substitution and income effects based on procedures that ignore such
possibilities. Most of the exogeneity assumptions are also maintained in the differentiable-
likelihood approach, but are easily relaxed when applying instrumental-variable proce-
dures (given the availability of a suf®cient number of other instrumental variables).
Fourth, some concerns about the reliability of estimates produced by the piecewise-
linear approach ensue due to the static behavioral framework maintained in the formula-
tion of empirical relations. Piecewise-linear studies invariably rely on the textbook one-
period model of labor supply as a description of hours-of-work choices, and impose it to
estimate parameters. Existing implementations of the differentiable-likelihood approach
suffer from the same problem. Everyone acknowledges that individuals are not simply
myopic optimizers; they transfer income across periods to achieve consumption plans that
are infeasible without savings. A serious question arises concerning the relevance of such
considerations in estimating substitution and income effects used to predict responses to
tax policy.
6.4.4. Imposition of behavioral restrictions with convex constraints
The econometric model produced by this piece-wise linear formulation implicitly imposes
parametric restrictions that constrain the signs of estimated substitution and income
effects. As developed in MaCurdy et al. (1990), particular inequality restrictions must
hold in the application of estimation procedures with piecewise-linear budget constraints
for likelihood functions to be de®ned (i.e., to ensure that the components of these functions
are non-negative). More speci®cally, in applications of such procedures the Slutsky condi-
tion must be locally satis®ed at all interior kink points of budget sets that represent feasible
options for any individual in the sample such that the compensated substitution effect must
be positive. For the linear speci®cation of the labor supply function considered in the
preceding discussion, the speci®c inequality constraints imposed are
a±bHji $ 0; ;i;j; 6:29
where the quantities Hji represent the hours-of-work values that correspond to interior kink
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37 See Blomquist (1996) for some Monte Carlo comparisons of ML and IV with measurement error.
38 See Da Vanzo et al. (1976) and Pencavel (1986) for summaries of this evidence.points j on a sample member i's budget set. Because many values of Hji exist in most
analyses of piecewise-linear constraints, ful®llment of relations (6.29) essentially requires
global satisfaction of the Slutsky condition by the labor supply function. Such a require-
ment, in essence, globally dictates that the uncompensated substitution effect of a wage
change on hours of work must be positive for the labor supply speci®cation considered in
the preceding discussion, and the income effect for hours of work must be negative. The
imposition of these restrictions, especially for men, is highly suspect given the available
evidence from other studies. These restrictions carry over to more general labor supply
functions.
6.5. Maximum likelihood: accounting for ®xed costs of participation and missing wages
6.5.1. Fixed costs
As mentioned above, some applications of the piecewise-linear approach incorporate ®xed
costs to working ± costs such as transportation that must be paid for any amount of work
but which may vary across individuals. This signi®cantly complicates the analysis because
the optimized level of work under the budget constraint while working may not represent
the optimal choice overall; one must explicitly consider the option of not working and thus
avoiding the ®xed costs. For any level of®xed costs, a minimum number of hours worked
is implied creating an attainable range in the observable hours of work distribution;
individuals will not work unless the gain is large enough to overcome the ®xed costs.
In essence, these complications arise because the budget constraint is not convex, inva-
lidating simple maximization procedures.
If an individual must pay ®xed monetary costs, F, to work, then non-labor income, Y, in
the above budget constraints is replaced by
Y 2 F; if h . 0;
Y; if h  0: 6:30
F is partially unobservable and, thus, modeled as a stochastic element, varying across
individuals. Hence, we see that the budget constraint discontinuously jumps down by F
when the individual chooses to work.
To solve for the optimum when faced with this budget constraint, two regimes must
explicitly be considered: working and not working. Estimation proceeds by ®nding the
maximum utility under each regime and then comparing these to determine which option
is chosen. In either regime, the utility function U(C,h,n) ± where we explicitly note the
unobserved component, n ± is maximized subject to Eq. (6.1) modi®ed by Eq. (6.30).
In the no-work regime, the solution is simple. We know h is 0, so utility is given by
UY 2 tY 2 D;0;n.
The solution in the work regime closely follows the solution presented in Section 6.3.
Again utilizing the labor supply function, f(v,y,n) yields the solution for h given in Eq.
(6.25), where the virtual income y now subtracts ®xed costs F. However, to compute
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choice. Utility along any segment, i, is given by the indirect utility function, V(vj,yj,n). At
kinks, the direct utility function must be used, so the utility at kink j is given by
UvjHj 1 yj;Hj;n. Hence, utilizing exactly the same solution procedure derived in
Section 6.3, we can de®ne maximized utility when working, V
*:
21; f1 # 0;
Vv1;y1;n; 0 , f1 , H1;
Uv1H1 1 y1;H1;n; f2 , H1 # f1;
V
*v;y;nVv2;y2;n; H1 , f2 , H2;
Uv2H2 1 y2;H2;n; f3 , H2 # f2;
Vv3;y3;n; H2 , f3 , H3;
Uv3  H 1 y3;  H;n; f3 $  H; 6:31
where




with Vv and Vy denoting the partial derviatives of V; relation (6.32) is, of course, Roy's
identity de®ning the labor supply function, f, evaluated at wage and income levels vj and
yj. The use of 2 1 for h  0 simply indicates that h  0 is not included in this regime and,
thus, selecting it indicates that the no-work regime is preferred. Given functional forms for
V and U, ®nding V
* is straightforward.
Given maximized utility under each regime, the ®nal step in the solution is to compare
the two regimes. An individual chooses to work at the hours speci®ed by the solution in
Eq. (6.25) if
V
*v;y;n $ UY 2 tY 2 D;0;n 6:33
and chooses not to work otherwise. For any level of n, treating Eq. (6.33) as an equality
implies a critical level of ®xed costs, F
*(n) above which the individual will choose not to
work; F enters this relation through the virtual income variable y. Because desired hours of
work increase with n, this critical value will generally be increasing in n ± greater
propensity to work implies that higher ®xed costs are required to prefer the no-work
option. If restrictions are placed on the support of F, such as F . F, there will be values
of n low enough to rule out the work regime, thus implying a hole at the low end of the h
distribution.
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As a ®nal step before deriving the likelihood function, note that in the no-work regime,
gross wage, W, is not observed and, thus, the budget constraint cannot be derived. Hence,
W must be endogenized. This can be accomplished by the simple function
W  WZ 1 h 6:34
where Z includes all observable variables determining W and h is the unobservable
component. In a richer model, the equation for W could be derived as an equilibrium
condition.
To derive the likelihood function, ®rst consider the likelihood contribution of an indi-
vidual who does not work. We assume this no-work decision can be observed, so there is
no measurement error. In the no-work case, one of two situations applies: (i) ®xed costs are
suf®ciently high with F . F
* ; F
*n;h for any given n and h, or (ii) if this ®xed-cost
threshold falls below the lowest admissible value for F (i.e., F
* # F), then desired hours
are suf®ciently low with n , n
* ; n
*h for any h.









where gyhF is joint density of (n,h,F).
For the work regime, the likelihood contribution looks very much like that derived in
Eq. (6.28), as we continue to assume the linear hours of work function and the form of
measurement error assumed there. The only changes are the addition of terms for d and F
(accounting for the fact that F , F
*n) and the removal of the term for the lower limit
which is no longer part of that regime and is now perfectly observable. Using g1 and g2 to



























* 2  H;n;W 2 WZ;FdFdn; 6:36
where
nj solves the equation fvj;yj;njHj21;
nj solves the equation fvj;yj;njHj: 6:37
All variables are de®ned as in Section 6.4. De®ne PE  1 if the individual works and 0
otherwise. Then the likelihood function for an individual is given by
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39 The critical value n* solves relation (6.33) treated as an equality with virtual income y evaluated at F.l  l1
PEl0
12PE: 6:38
Estimation proceeds by maximizing the sum of log likelihoods across individuals, as
always.
This is quite complex in this case, requiring knowledge of both the direct utility U and
the indirect utility V, and also requiring comparisons across regimes for all individuals and
all parameter values.
6.6. Welfare participation and non-convex budget constraints
A common source of non-linearity in budget constraints involves participation in welfare
programs. To illustrate this situation, consider the simplest case in which the only taxes
faced by an individual result from bene®t reduction on a single welfare program. Fig. 18
presents this scenario. As discussed in Section 2 of this survey, individuals face very high
effective tax rates when they initially work due to large reductions in their bene®ts
occurring when earnings increase. Once bene®ts reach 0, the tax rate drops to a lower
level, creating a non-convex kink in the budget constraint. This non-convexity invalidates
the simple procedures of Section 6.4 implemented to divide sample spaces into locations
on budget sets.
6.6.1. Simplest welfare case with no stigma
In this simple case, an individual maximizes U(C,h,n) subject to the budget constraint
C  Wh 1 Y 1 BIh; 6:39
where bene®ts are given by the simplest bene®t schedule:




G gives the guarantee amount which is reduced at the bene®t reduction rate b as the
earnings, Wh, increase. This implies a kink point at H1  G=bW where bene®ts reach 0
and, thus, the marginal wage rises to W. So, the individual faces two segments: segment 1
has h , H1 with net wage v1  1 2 bW and virtual income y1  Y 1 G; and segment 2
has h . H1 with net wage v2  W and virtual income y2  Y.
40
Because the budget constraint is non-convex, the solution cannot be characterized
simply by ®nding a tangency with the budget constraint as it was in Section 6.3. Multiple
tangencies are possible and these must be directly compared to determine the optimum.
Hence, the regime shift approach of Section 6.5 is needed.
Consider ®rst the regime in which positive bene®ts are received; that is, h , H1.
Maximization, given the effective wage and income, on this linear segment follows the
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40 We continue to use N to denote unearned non-taxable income for ease of notation. In addition, we ignore any
upper bound on hours worked for simplicity.method of Section 6.3. We can characterize the optimal choice according to the function
f(v1,y1,n). Denote the value of n which implies fv1;y1;n0a sn0. Then the optimal
hours choice along that segment is given by
h  fv1;y1;n; n . n0; h  0; n # n0: 6:41
The optimized value on this segment (including the zero work option), accounting for




Vv1;y1;n; 0 , f1 # H1
Uy1;0;n; f1 # 0




where Eq. (6.32) de®nes f1.
Next, consider the regime without bene®ts, that is with h $ H1. Again the optimal
choice, given the wage and income, on this segment is given by the labor supply function






Vv2;y2;n; f2 $ H1;








2, and regime 2










For values of n above n
*, regime 2 is chosen; and for values below n
*, regime 1 is realized.
We can de®ne three sets, V0, V1, and V2,, such that for n [ V0 the individual chooses
not to work, for n [ V1 the individual locates on segment 1 with positive hours of work,
and for n [ V2 the individual locates on segment 2. We must consider two cases to de®ne
these sets exactly. First, suppose n
* . n0. Then we have
V0  {n j n # n0};
V1  {n j n0 , n # n
*};
V2  {n j n . n
*}: 6:45
Alternatively, if n
* # n0, then the switch to regime 2 occurs before positive hours are
worked in regime 1, that is
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41 In the following formulation, we implicitly assume that the event f2 $  H occurs with zero probability.V0  {n j n # n
*};
V1  B;
V2  {n j n . n
*}: 6:46
Hence, for certain individuals and parameter values, no value of n exists such that they
will locate on segment 1 with positive hours of work.
To characterize the likelihood function we again need a functional form for the gross
wage of the form W  WZ 1 h. We ignore measurement error here for simplicity, and
because there is no problem with individuals failing to locate at the kink in this non-
convex case. De®ne PB  1 if the individual receives bene®ts, and PE  1 if the indivi-
dual works, both 0 otherwise. The likelihood function is given as follows, incorporating
ghn(h,n) and the general inverse function n  nh:
PB  1; PE  1; l11 
2n
2h
gnhnh;W 2 WZIn [ V1;
PB  0; PE  1; l01 
2n
2h
gnhnh;W 2 WZIn [ V2;




where I(´) represents an indicator function equal to 1 if the condition in the parentheses is
true. Because the value of n implied by the hours choice may be inconsistent with the
value implied by the regime choice, it is possible to have ``holes'' in the hours distribution
around the kink point. For example, an individual on segment 1 must have n # n
*.I fh i s
hours choice is too close to the kink, this may imply a value of n . n
* and thus an
observation with zero likelihood.





Estimation proceeds by maximizing this sum of the log likelihoods across individuals.
6.6.2. Welfare stigma
The above analysis assumes that all individuals eligible for welfare are on welfare. Indi-
viduals working less than h0 but failing to receive welfare are operating below the implied
budget constraint, a possibility not permitted in the analysis. Yet, many individuals are in
exactly this situation. This is generally explained by assuming the existence of some utility
loss or stigma associated with welfare.
To capture welfare stigma the utility function is modi®ed to take the form
U  UC;h;n 2 PBj; 6:49
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duals.
42 With this modi®cation we again consider the welfare and non-welfare regimes.
Since the welfare stigma term does not affect the marginal decisions, given that the
individual is on welfare, the discussion of hours of work presented above for regime 1
is still valid. The optimal utility is now given by
V
*v1;y1;n
V1v1;y1;n 2 j; 0 , f1 # H1;
Uy1;0;n 2 j; f1 # 0;




The analysis for regime 2 is altered in this case, because an individual can be observed
on welfare for any value of h ± that is, given welfare stigma, it is possible to observe an
individual with h , H1, but PB  0. So regime 2 is now de®ned solely by PB  0. Optimal
hours of work, given v2 and y2, are given by f(v2,y2,n). De®ning the value of n for which
fv2;y2;n0a sn
1, hours of work under this regime are now given by
h  fv2;y2;n; n . n
1;
h  0; n # n
1: 6:51




Vv2;y2;n; f2 . 0
Uy2;0;n; f2 # 0:
(
6:52
Choice of regime still proceeds by comparing V1
* and V2
*, as done in Eq. (6.44). For any
n in the sets V0 or V1 de®ned by Eq. (6.45) or (6.46), there is now some critical level of
j
* ; j
*n, which depends on n, such that regime 2 is chosen when j . j
*; regime 1 is
chosen otherwise.
Given this characterization, we can derive the likelihood function for each combination
of PB and PE, using the joint densities gnjh(n,j,h) and gnhn;h:






gnjhnh;j;W 2 WzIv [ V1dj;
PB  0; PE  1; l01 
2n
2h





j* gnjhnh;j;W 2 WzIv [ V1dj;
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Estimation proceeds as in the non-stigma case by selecting the appropriate likelihood
branch for each individual and then maximizing the sum of the log likelihoods.
As with the ®xed cost case, the likelihood function is complex even in this extremely
simpli®ed welfare case. For each possible set of parameter values, the maximum must be
computed for each regime and then compared to compute j
*. Adding the tax codes, with
their implied kinks, increases computational complexity. As a result, the literature has
adopted a simplifying methodology which we present in Section 6.8.
6.6.3. Multiple program participation
In principle, the extension to the case of multiple program participation is straightforward.
For simplicity, we consider a case in which the individual can choose between participat-
ing in no welfare programs, participating in welfare program 1, participating only in
program 2, or participating in both welfare programs 1 and 2. We extend the utility
function as follows:
U  Uc;h;n 2 P1j 2 P2x 6:54
where P1  1 if the individual participates in program 1, and P2  1 if the individual
participates in program 2.
43 Bene®ts from program 1, Bj(I(h)), are given:




Bene®ts from both together are given as




where G  G1 1 G2 and b  b1 1 b2. In general, the bene®t functions for programs 1 and
2 will have different breakeven points, implying the values of hours de®ning kinks (H1 in
Fig. 18) will not be the same.
This formulation expands the model considered in Section 6.4.3. To adapt this earlier
model, one must designate three distinct regimes in place of regime 1 speci®ed above:
regime 1a indicating an individual participates only in program 1, regime 1b signifying
this person collects bene®ts only from welfare program 2, and regime 1c designating
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43 The use of two additive errors is a simplifying assumption which ensures that the stigma from both programs
is higher than stigma from program 1 alone.participation in both programs. Optimal hours and utility for participation in a regime are
given by (6.41), (6.42), (6.50), (6.51), and (6.52), with net wages and virtual income in
these formulations speci®ed as vj  W1 2 bj and yj  Y 1 Gj, with j  1a, 1b, or 1c. In
particular, relations analogous to (6.41) and (6.42) de®ne the labor supply and utility
functions for each of the new regimes for the ``on-welfare'' segments associated with
relevant combination of welfare programs. Relations (6.51) and (6.52) still de®ne the labor
supply and utility functions for the non-welfare regime. The set of relations de®ne thresh-
olds for n demarcating the regions of unobserved tastes determining when a person works
(n0 in (6.41) and n
1 in (6.51)). Maximization again requires selection of a regime. Rela-
tions analogous to (6.50) and (6.52) characterize utilities corresponding to the various
regimes. Conditional on values n, these relations in turn imply thresholds for the stigma
errors j, x, and j 1 x that determine individuals' welfare participation. The likelihood
function for this model takes a form similar to Eq. (6.53), with more branches appearing in
the function re¯ecting the additional regimes analyzed in this formulation.
Again, note the complexity of these, extremely simpli®ed welfare cases, even these
involve signi®cantly ®nancial burden. For each possible set of parameter values, one must
compute the maximum for each regime, account for the bene®t structure, and then
compare these to compute the error ranges for the likelihood function. When the individual
is unemployed, one must perform these calculations for all possible wage values and all
values of n consistent with the no-work decision. Adding the tax code, with its implied
kinks, increases computational dif®culties. Introducing additional sources of unobserved
heterogeneity enlarges the number of dimensions over which one must calculate integrals,
requiring sophisticated numerical procedures and considerable computer resources. As a
result, the literature has adopted simplifying methodologies, a topic to which we now turn.
6.7. An approach for computational simpli®cation and discrete hours choices
To make estimation problems manageable, a popular method is to presume that consumers
face only a limited set of hours choices. For example, a worker may choose only full-time
work, part-time work, or no work, with each of these options implying a prescribed
number of hours. Formally, this is done by assuming that unobservable tastes components,
n, possess a discrete distribution, usually characterized as a multinomial distribution
conditional on covariates. Combined with a 0/1 welfare decision, this ®nite set of hours
choices yields a relatively small set of discrete states, say S states, over which the utility
function must be maximized.
Given a speci®c form for the preference function, utility can be readily evaluated at each
of the hours choices and the maximum can be determined. Given an assumed joint
distribution for unobservable tastes components, n, for the error component determining
wages, h, and for welfare stigma, j, one can compute a probability that a family selects
alternative ``j''. This in turn de®nes a sample log likelihood of the form
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X S
j1
djlnPj j X;Q; 6:57
where dj is an indicator for whether individual i chooses alternative j, X is a vector of
observable characteristics, and Pj j X;Q is the probability of choosing alternative j with
Q the set of unknown parameters. Such formulations are substantially less complicated
than the speci®cations considered above because one avoids the intricate process of
calculating thresholds and dealing with combined continuous-discrete endogenous vari-
ables; only discrete choices are allowed for here.
This formulation requires each individual to be placed into a limited set of preassigned
work states, even though observed hours worked take many more values, making hours
look as if they were continuously distributed. To overcome this issue, analyses applying
this approach necessarily introduce measurement error in hours of work to admit hours to
deviate from the discrete values assumed for the choice set. Hence, conditional on n, each
alternative ``j'' contributes some positive probability Pj j X;Q;n which now depends on
the value of the unobservable measurement error variables.
We illustrate this approach by considering the linear measurement error model given by
Eq. (6.19) where the reporting error 1 , g1, with 1 and y independent. Further, as typi-
cally assumed, we specify that hours are not subject to measurement error in no- work


















where PE denotes a 0/1 variable with 1 indicating that the individual works, S0 designates
the set of all states associated with the individual not working, the set S1 includes all states
in which the individual works, and hj denotes the admissible values of true hours. Earnings
depend on the values of hj and wages. In Eq. (6.58), observed hours are continuously
distributed among workers.
6.8. Survey of empirical ®ndings for non-linear budget constraints models
Having developed a theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of taxes on labor
supply, we proceed in this section to brie¯y survey the body of empirical literature that
seeks to estimate labor supply elasticities in the presence of welfare and taxes. The
selection of studies considered here illustrate the empirical methodologies developed in
the preceding subsections.
44 The survey begins with the empirical work involving maxi-
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44 See also Burtless and Hausman (1978), Heckman (1979c), Hausman (1980, 1985a,b), Cogan (1981), Naka-
mura and Nakamura (1981), Ashenfelter (1983), Mof®tt (1983, 1986, 1992a,b), Fraker et al. (1985), Robins
(1985), Blundell et al. (1986, 1988), Blau and Robins (1988), Fraker and Mof®tt (1988), Zabalza (1988), Kell and
Wright (1989), Mof®tt and Wolfe (1992), Ribar (1992), Bingley et al. (1995), Blomquist (1996) and Bingley and
Walker (1997).mum likelihood estimation with convex budget sets. This case, which we discussed in
Sections 6.3 and 6.4, has received the most attention in the received empirical literature.
We then consider papers that report at least one model estimated by instrumental variables
or involving non-convex budget sets, the cases we considered in Sections 6.2 and 6.5. The
survey concludes with an application of the multiple welfare program participation model
which we presented in Section 6.6. In what follows we restrict our attention to post-1980
analyses of the United States and Western Europe. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results
for men and women, respectively.
6.8.1. Maximum likelihood estimation with convex budget sets
Blomquist (1983) estimates labor supply functions for prime-age Swedish males, using a
piecewise-linear analysis with a convex budget set to account for the highly progressive
Swedish income tax. His approach follows closely that of Hausman (1981). The 1973
cross section of 688 males, aged 25±55, used in his study is derived from a survey




i  avi 1 byi 1 gZ 1 1i; 6:59
where a, b, and g are preference parameters, hi
* is hours worked in 1973, Z is a vector of
individual characteristics, vi is the net wage rate on the ith extended budget segment, yi is
the virtual income for this segment, and 1i is a disturbance. Non-labor income is de®ned as
the spouse's after-tax income plus the family's capital income after tax and family allow-
ances, where after-tax capital income is computed as it would have been if the person had
worked no hours.
Blomquist assumes that a and g are constant across individuals, whereas each person's
b is assumed to be a draw from f(b), the normal density function with upper truncation at
zero. Since the individual bi are not identi®ed, Blomquist estimates mb and sb
2, the
parameters of f, in addition to a and g. Estimation by maximum likelihood yields an
income elasticity of 2 0.03, a compensated wage elasticity of 0.11, and an uncompen-
sated wage elasticity of 0.08. The author also reports results from estimation with the
restriction sb
2  0 imposed. Although the resulting estimates are similar to those of the
unconstrained model, a likelihood ratio test rejects the restriction at conventional levels.
MaCurdy et al. (1990) analyze the labor supply of prime-age married males using the
1975 cross-section from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They
show that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer-choice problem with non-linear
budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into
behaviorally meaningful restrictions. These constraints arise from the requirement to
create a well-de®ned statistical model, and not as a consequence of economic theory
(see Section 6.4.4). The authors then present empirical results suggesting that these impli-
cit constraints play a major role in explaining the disparate results found in the literature on
men's labor supply. The empirical work is based both on the piece-wise linear approach



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and the differentiable constraint case, and the authors only consider convexi®ed budget
sets.
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch consider three speci®cations of the labor supply function,
along with both an additive and a multiplicative structure for the measurement error term.
The ®rst is a linear labor supply function with substitution and income effects constant
across individuals. The second assumes the substitution coef®cient to vary across indivi-
duals, and the third allows the income effects to vary. The third approach is also taken by
Hausman (1981) and Blomquist (1983). In the piece-wise linear equations, the authors use
only the additive structure for measurement error rather than the multiplicative, since the
latter implies the unattractive feature that earnings are observed without error. The
evidence from all models suggests a strong in¯uence of the implicit inequality restrictions
invoked by the maximum likelihood procedure. This offers an explanation for the diver-
gent results of previous research relying on various empirical methodologies.
Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) use British cross-sectional data on married women from the
1974 General Household Survey to estimate a model of female labor supply that re¯ects
the joint decision on labor force participation and hours, the non-linear budget constraint
created by income taxation, the effect of heterogeneous preferences, and the existence of
optimization errors. These optimization errors cause agents' actual position on the budget
constraint to differ from their preferred position. The structural model is based on the






a  expbZ 2 j; x=l  x=l
*exp1; 6:61
where (x/l)
* is the utility-maximizing income-leisure ratio, Z is a vector of personal
characteristics, b is a vector of parameters, and (j,1) is distributed bivariate normal
(0,0,sj
2,s1
2,0). The budget constraint looks like Fig. 15 in (x,l) space. The maximum
likelihood estimator yields an estimated elasticity of substitution of 1.21. The elasticities
with respect to own wages, husband's wages, and unearned family income are 2.03,
21.27, and 20.20. This own wage elasticity of approximately two is larger than those
estimated in previous studies using British data.
Blundell et al. (1988) estimate a generalized version of the Stone±Geary labor supply
model using a sample of almost 1400 married women from the British Family Expenditure
Survey for 1980. A truncated likelihood approach was used that considered hours of work
conditional on participation. The preference speci®cation was chosen according to stan-
dard likelihood diagnostics.
45 Although uncompensated wage elasticities were small, the
compensated elasticities were found to be quite large and positive across a wide range of
demographic groups. This model was then used to simulate a number of reforms to the
British tax system in Blundell et al. (1988).
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45 See Blundell and Meghir (1986).Friedberg (1995) analyzes data from the United States March Current Population
Survey. She uses a convex budget set with a piece-wise linear constraint for studying
progressive taxes and the social security earnings test, and assumes a linear functional
form for the labor supply equation. The Heckman sample selection technique is used to
predict non-participant wages in the labor supply equation. Maximum likelihood estimates
of the model yield a compensated wage elasticity of 1.12, an uncompensated wage elas-
ticity of 0.36, and an income elasticity of 20.76.
Van Soest et al. (1990) analyze a cross-section of Dutch households from a 1985 labor
mobility survey by the Organization of Strategic Labor Market Research. They consider a
piece-wise linear framework with a convex budget set and normally distributed random
preferences and optimization errors. As a second speci®cation, they estimate a simple
reduced form model of the demand side of the labor market, in which employers offer
wage-hours packages and individuals choose among a limited number of these offers. The
authors impose the distributional assumptions stated following Eq. (6.61), and estimate the
models using maximum likelihood. In their second speci®cation, the error term n is
replaced by a job offer mechanism, which treats the number of hours worked as a discrete
rather than a continuous random variable. Their results imply wage-rate elasticities of 0.65
and 0.79 for women and 0.12 and 0.10 for men. These and the estimated income elasti-
cities are in harmony with previous work using Dutch data.
6.8.2. Non-convex budget sets: maximum likelihood and instrumental variable estimation
Hausman (1981) estimates the effect of taxation and transfers on the labor supply of a
subsample of prime-age husbands, wives, and female family heads who have children
under the age of eighteen from the 1975 PSID, treating the husband as the primary earner
and the wife as the secondary earner. For husbands and wives he considers two cases: the
non-convex piece-wise linear case representing a tax and transfer schedule based on actual
law, and a convexi®ed tax schedule where the effects of FICA, the earned income credit,
and the standard deduction are approximated by a consistently progressive convex budget
set. For female household heads he considers only the non-convex case because of the
large initial non-convexity introduced by AFDC.
Hausman assumes a linear functional form for the labor supply equation. Although the
wage coef®cient in the hours equation is assumed to be constant across individuals, the
coef®cient of virtual income is assumed to vary. Blomquist (1983) also uses this approach,
as discussed at the beginning of this survey. Hausman assumes that the coef®cient of
virtual income is the mean of the truncated normal distribution. Since it is assumed that
this coef®cient is non-positive, the relevant part of the distribution is to the left of zero.
Hausman considers the possibility of selection bias, since market wages are unobserved
for non-workers, but ®nds that it is not a problem in his sample. Estimation is by maximum
likelihood.
For husbands, he ®nds that the uncompensated wage coef®cient is essentially zero
which accords with previous empirical ®ndings. However, his ®nding of a signi®cant
income effect is at odds with prior work. Since the wage and income variables from the
Ch. 27: Labor Supply: a Review of Alternative Approaches 1653convex and non-convex budget sets are similar, Hausman concludes that for estimation
purposes it is probably reasonable to smooth the non-convexities created by the earned
income credit, social security taxes, and the standard deduction. For wives, he ®nds
substantial uncompensated wage and income elasticities. In addition to the convex and
non-convex cases, a speci®cation that explicitly accounts for the ®xed costs of working is
included for wives. The resulting wage elasticities are midway between those of husbands
and those of wives.
Triest (1990) considers the sensitivity of Hausman's results to changes in the model
speci®cation. To this end, he estimates several variants of Hausman's model using a 1983
subsample of the PSID. Both the labor supply equation and the measurement error equa-
tion are linear, with the distributional assumptions stated following Eq. (6.61). A speci-
®cation representing preference heterogeneity as a random income coef®cient, rather than
an additive disturbance, is also estimated following Hausman. Triest considers maximum
likelihood estimation under the assumptions of preference heterogeneity only, measure-
ment error only, and both heterogeneity and measurement error, in addition to instrumen-
tal variables estimation assuming only heterogeneity. In the heterogeneity-only model for
women, GMM was used to estimate an IV version of the Tobit model. Triest follows
Hausman by treating the convex hull of the budget set as the effective budget set in
estimation.
The results, which are consistent across model speci®cations, suggest that the labor
supply of prime-aged married men is relatively invariant to the net wage and virtual
income. The ®nding of no virtual income effect, however, starkly contrasts with Haus-
man's result. Furthermore, the estimated net wage elasticities are positive and of larger
magnitude than the one reported by Hausman. The results for women are more sensitive to
the speci®cation of the labor supply function. Net wage elasticities resulting from a
censored estimator are similar to those of Hausman. But when a truncated estimator is
used (conditioning on positive hours), estimated wage elasticities are much smaller. The
same is also true (in absolute value) of the virtual income elasticities.
Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990) estimate a potpourri of labor supply func-
tions for married men and women in Sweden. They consider both linear and quadratic
supply functions, with and without random preferences. For males, the linear ®xed-prefer-
ence speci®cation is estimated ®rst with the non-convex budget set and then using the
convex hull as an approximation. The random-preference linear speci®cation also uses this
convex approximation. The ®xed-preference model is a special case of the random-prefer-
ence model when the constraint s
2
j  0 is imposed. A likelihood-ratio test rejects this
constraint at the 1% signi®cance level. The fourth model for males includes a quadratic
term in wages. A likelihood-ratio test of the null that this coef®cient is zero is rejected at
the 1% signi®cance level. All estimation results for males imply a substantial compensated
wage rate elasticity and a smaller income elasticity.
For females, the authors correct for sample selection bias using Heckman's two-stage
technique. They offer four speci®cations for female labor supply: (i) linear supply func-
tion, ®xed preferences, Heckman method; (ii) quadratic supply function, ®xed preferences,
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1654Heckman method; (iii) linear supply function, random preferences, Heckman method; (iv)
linear supply function, ®xed preferences, full-information maximum likelihood. As was
the case for men, an asymptotic likelihood-ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of ®xed-
preferences. The wide differences in compensated wage elasticities between women and
men, which are reported in Tables 1 and 2, are somewhat misleading since the wage rate
elasticities for both groups are evaluated at different points on the labor supply functions.
Using a quadratic supply function and evaluating the female wage rate elasticity at the
mean male sample values yields an estimate of 0.10, comparable to the 0.12 estimate for
males.
Bourgiugnon and Magnac (1990) estimate labor supply functions separately for a
sample of French married men and women, using a piece-wise linear constraint and a
convexi®ed budget set. They assume that family labor-supply decisions are sequential,
with the men ®rst choosing their labor supply under the assumption of no other labor
income in the family. Then the other family members choose their own labor supply,
taking the household head's labor supply as given. Under the assumption that (1,j)i s
distributed bivariate normal (0,0, s1
2,sj
2,0), where 1 represents preference heterogeneity
and j is a measurement error term, the authors estimate the model using maximum like-
lihood. The authors also consider the joint labor supply model, assuming that the original
kinked budget constraint is approximated by some differentiable function as in Section
6.1.3. They use an instrumental variables estimator to estimate this model.
Flood and MaCurdy (1992) apply the full spectrum of methods for convex budget sets to
a 1983 cross section of prime-age, married, Swedish men from the Swedish Household
Market and Non-market Activities Survey (HUS), in hopes to reconcile the discrepant
results of previous work on the disincentive effects of Swedish income taxes. They
consider the piece-wise linear and differentiable constraint approaches, estimation using
both instrumental variables and maximum likelihood, various functional forms for both
labor supply and the structure of measurement error in hours worked, and extensions to
incorporate family labor supply and lifecycle considerations. The authors also explore the
viability of the standard exogeneity assumptions that underlie the maximum likelihood
estimation approach.
Flood and MaCurdy report maximum likelihood results for the following speci®cations:
piecewise-linear and the differentiable method with additive errors, linear labor-supply
with and without multiplicative error, and logarithmic labor supply with and without
multiplicative error.
46 These speci®cations yield uncompensated and compensated wage
elasticities of around 0.15 and 0.20, slightly higher than those reported by Blomquist
(1983).
47 The authors note the minor consequences both of accounting for measurement
error and of using the piece-wise linear as opposed to the differentiable approach. This is
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46 See Section 6.2.2for a discussion ofthe multiplicative measurement error structureand the logarithmiclabor
supply function. Also, recall from Section 6.4.3 that speci®cations relying on differentiable budget constraints
need not assume any measurement error to render the empirical model data-consistent.
47 Blomquist and Newey (1997) ®nd slightly lower wage elasticities and slightly higher income elasticities
using their non-parametric formulation of the piece-wise linear labor supply model.consistent with the ®ndings of Hausman (1981). The instrumental variable estimation
results are summarized in Table 2. The key insight from these results is that the data
reject the exogeneity assumptions maintained by the maximum-likelihood procedures.
These assumptions dramatically in¯uence the estimates of the substitution and income
effects; conventional endogeneity tests reject the exogeneity of gross wages and all
components of non-labor income. Finally, the results of Flood and MaCurdy suggest
that altering the form of the structural labor-supply function produces only small changes,
and neither lifecycle adjustments in the computation of virtual income nor attempts to
explore the interaction of husband's and wife's labor choices substantively change the
results.
Blundell et al. (1998a) present instrumental variable estimates of a labor supply model
for the hours of work of married women in the UK that accounts for the endogeneity of
gross wages and other income as well as accounting for selection and non-linear taxation.
This model and its results are fully documented in our discussion of difference-in-differ-
ences speci®cations in Section 5.
6.8.3. Multiple welfare program participation
We close this section with a look at the labor supply effects of multiple welfare programs,
as addressed in the working paper by Keane and Mof®tt (1995).
48 They use a single-actor
labor supply model to consider the joint decision of whether to work, whether to partici-
pate in AFDC, and whether to participate in the Food Stamps program. This necessitates
estimation of the labor supply equation jointly with two welfare participation equations to
account for the correlation between unobservables. The authors limit agents to full-time,
part-time, and no work. Together with the 0/1 decision for two welfare programs, this
implies twelve alternatives over which the utility function must be maximized.
Keane and Mof®tt estimate the model using a sample from the 1984 SIPP of 968 female
heads of households with children. Explanatory variables used include education, age,
number of children, region, SMSA, and state characteristics. Using their estimates, they
compute the uncompensated wage elasticity, at variable means, as 1.94. This is at the high
end of prior estimates, which seems reasonable since this is a study offemale-heads rather
than married women. They estimate an income elasticity of 2 0.21, a small (in absolute
value) estimate which they attribute to measurement error in unearned income. The
estimate of l, the parameter indicating the extent to which welfare stigma is additive,
is 0.05.
In addition, the authors simulate policy changes in the AFDC and Food Stamp
programs. First, they consider the impact on predicted choices of reducing the AFDC
bene®t reduction rate from 100% to 50%. This has limited effect on labor supply but
increases both AFDC and Food Stamp participation. Second, they ®nd that a reduction of
both AFDC and Food Stamp bene®t reduction rates to 10% would increase average labor
supply by two hours, but would also increase AFDC participation by one third and Food
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48 See also the discussion of family labor supply and program participation models in Section 7.Stamp participation by one fourth. This would lead to an 80% increase in net costs even
accounting for the increase in tax revenue. Third, they ®nd that increasing gross wages by
one dollar would increase average labor supply by about 3.5 h and reduce AFDC and Food
Stamp participation, but that a government ®nanced minimum wage of ®ve dollars could
accomplish the same changes at lower cost. Finally, they simulate the impact of the 1981
increase in the AFDC tax rate from 67% to 100%, by comparing predictions for the 1984
sample using both the 1980 and the 1984 welfare rules. They ®nd decreased AFDC
participation, with many AFDC recipients working part-time in 1980 either leaving
AFDC to work full-time or quitting their jobs. As a result, they ®nd an increase of
14.6% in the percentage of AFDC recipients who do not work. All of these results closely
match those that were actually observed.
7. Family labor supply
This section considers two important developments to the family labor supply model. The
®rst concerns the extension to cover non-participation and non-convex budget constraints.
The second refers to the development of a collective framework for the study of family
labor supply. Both are likely to be critical to our understanding of the impact of tax and
welfare reforms discussed in Section 2 and our interpretation of the changing patterns of
female and male labor supply documented in Section 3.
We develop the analysis of non-participation and non-convex budget constraints in a
family labor supply context in two steps. The ®rst simply accounts for non-participation
via a corner solution in the labor supply of one of the individuals. The second incorporates
a more general speci®cation for welfare programs and ®xed costs.
The discussion of the collective labor supply model that follows draws heavily from the
recent literature on the speci®cation and identi®cation of these models. We also consider
the robustness to alternative model speci®cations and to the introduction of home produc-
tion. We round up this section with a review of the results from recent empirical applica-
tions of the family labor supply model.
7.1. The basic economic model of family labor supply
The standard approach to family labor supply modeling, discussed in Section 4.1.2,
extends the consumption-leisure choice problem to include two leisure decisions. As
will be clear from our discussion of collective family labor supply models in Section
7.2, this simple extension of the standard model is controversial. However, it is attractive
because it extends naturally to cover multiperiod labor supply decisions
49 and, perhaps
more interestingly, it can be used to place the discussion of non-linear budget constraints,
®xed costs and participation problems introduced in Section 6 in a family labor supply
setting.
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49 In Section8, we considerin detail the issuesthat arise in a mulitperiodlabor supply model withparticipation.7.1.1. Family labor supply with participation
The standard family labor supply model concerns the labor supply behavior of a household
comprised of two working-age individuals. Children and other dependants are included in
the vector of observable household characteristics, X. We assume that families maximize
joint utility over consumption, C, and the leisure time of both workers U(C,L1,L2,X) where
L1 and L2 are the hours of leisure for two family members. For expositional reasons, we
also consider non-participation for the second individual. The ®rst-order conditions for
this problem (see Eqs. (4.15) and (4.16)) can be written
UL1  lW1 and UL2 $ lW2; 7:1
where strict equality holds in the latter marginal condition when individual 2 works.
Substituting out for the marginal utility of consumption Uc  l results in
UL1 2 UcW1  0 and UL2 2 UcW2 $ 0; 7:2
in which each marginal utility is a function of L1 and L2 since from the budget constraint
we can write consumption as C  Y 1 W1T 2 L1 1 W2T 2 L2.
The optimal labor supply choices in this framework satisfy the standard consumer
demand restrictions of symmetry, negative semide®niteness of the Slutsky substitution
matrix, and homogeneity of degree zero in wages, prices and full income. Homogeneity is
satis®ed by specifying the labor supply model in terms of real wages and real incomes.












for i ± j: 7:3
The negativity restriction generalizes the Slutsky condition on the sign of compensated
labor supply by requiring the matrix of the own- and cross-Slutsky substitution terms to be
negative semide®nite. To complete the speci®cation, we may add taste heterogeneity
terms to the marginal utility conditions to produce
UL1 2 UcW1 2 11  0 7:4
and
UL2 2 UcW1 2 12 $ 0; 7:5
with joint density g(11,12). These terms are introduced directly into marginal utility rather
than into the labor supply equations themselves (in contrast to Section 6) to preserve the
taste heterogeneity interpretation of the error terms in a model with multiple labor supply
decisions.
These ®rst order conditions describe two regimes of behavior:
(i) both spouses participate: H1 ; T 2 L1 . 0;H2 ; T-L2 . 0,
(ii) individual 2 does not participate: H1 ; T 2 L1 . 0;H2 ; T-L2  0,
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1658where H1 and H2 are the hours of work choices of each of the two adults in the family.
The sample likelihood for this model has two contributions and is similar to the sample
likelihood for the single worker corner solution model described in Section 6. Ignoring
taxation and measurement error, and additionally assuming wages are known and exogen-
ous, the likelihood contribution for families observed in the ®rst regime where both
spouses work is given by
lH1.0;H2.0  J jj gUL1 2 UCW1;UL2 2 UCW2; 7:6
where the term J jj is the Jacobian term that corresponds to Eq. (6.15) in the single worker
case. This term is the determinant of the own and cross derivative matrix of 11 and 12 in
terms of hours of work. It recognizes that 11 and 12 are non-linear functions of H1 and H2.
For the non-participation regime we note that 12 . UL2 2 UCW2 de®nes a reservation
wage condition, so that the choice of L1 involves solving the marginal conditions with
L2  T which we write as ~ UL1 2 ~ UCW1 2 11  0: Consequently, the likelihood contribu-
tion for observations on families in the regime where the second worker does not parti-
cipate is given by
lH1.0;H20  K jj
Z1
UL22UCW2
g ~ UL1 2 ~ UCW1;12d12; 7:7
where again the term K jj is the corresponding Jacobian term. It is interesting to note that
the Slutsky symmetry and negativity conditions are suf®cient to guarantee that both of the
matrices J and K in the Jacobian terms are positive de®nite.
50
Missing wages, and also the endogeneity of gross wages, is best addressed by rewriting











2 lnW2 2 ~ 12 $ 0; 7:9
in which case wage equations of the form lnWj  Z
0
jgj 1 jj can be easily incorporated.
Education variables, typically excluded from preferences but included in the Z variables in
each wage equation, can then be used to identify the model ± under the strong assumption
that education is uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity in labor supply.
Finally, in order to estimate the wage equation on the sample of observed wages for
which H2 . 0, one needs to account for the selection bias induced by correlation in the
unobservables and j 2. The parameters of the wage equation are identi®ed through the
exclusion of the exogenous income variable Y which does enter the determination of
participation.
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50 See Ransom (1987) and Van Soest et al. (1990).7.1.2. Family labor supply with taxes and program participation
The extension of these models to allow for convex piecewise linear budget constraints is
a straightforward adaptation of the discussion presented in Section 6. Non-convexities in
the budget constraint and welfare program participation pose further dif®culties because
direct comparisons of utilities are required as documented in Section 6.
Consider the problem of jointly modeling the work and welfare participation decisions
of a two-worker family. Suppose we assume that families maximize a standard utility
function of the form
U  UL1;L2;C;1 2 hPB; 7:10
where, in keeping with the notation in Section 6.6.3, PB is a 0-1 program participation
indicator. Unobservable preference heterogeneity is entered directly in utility through the
vector 1 which correspond to the 11 and 11 terms in Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5). As in Eq. (6.49)
the hPB term is included so as to capture the costs of being on welfare, including ``welfare
stigma''. The budget constraint that determines consumption is given by
C  W1H1 1 W2H2 1 Y 2 TY;W1H1;W2H2 1 BPB; 7:11
where Y is unearned income, T(´) is a tax function, and B is program bene®ts.
Due to the computational dif®culties encountered when considering the hours and
participation of two persons with non-linear budget constraints, the approach outlined
in Section 6.7 offers a tractable method for estimating the family labor supply model.
In particular, given an assumed joint distribution for unobservable tastes components,
errors determining wages, and welfare stigma, one can compute a probability that each
family member selects among alternative employment and program participation states.
This in turn de®nes a sample log likelihood of the form Eq. (6.57). As described in Section
6.7, this formulation requires that each individual be placed into a limited set of preas-
signed work states, even though observed hours worked take many more values. To
overcome this issue, analyses applying this approach invariably introduce measurement
error in hours of work to admit hours to deviate from the discrete values assumed for the
choice set, as described in likelihood (6.58).
7.1.3. Drawbacks of the standard family labor supply
The ``unitary'' model described in Section 7.1 implies three broad groups of testable
restrictions. The ®rst set of restrictions covers the standard consumer demand restrictions
of symmetry, negative semide®niteness of the Slutsky substitution matrix, and homoge-
neity of degree zero in wages, prices and full income, see Eq. (7.3) and the related
discussion above. The second set of restrictions refer to income pooling. This is the
condition which implies that, as far as the household's utility-maximizing choice of family
labor supplies are concerned, one can combine all sources of non-labor income into a
single unearned income measure, Y. If, for example, each of the two individuals has
private unearned income Y1 or Y2 respectively, then pooling implies










This is a controversial assumption in the welfare reform debate since it implies that the
source of non-labor income is irrelevant in within-family labor supply decisions.
Finally, there are the non-participation or ``corner solution'' conditions which state that
if one individual is at a corner solution, it is the reservation wage of that individual rather
than the market wage that affects the labor supply decision of the partner. As in the case of
the income pooling assumption, this is far from innocuous, implying as it does that the
``outside option'' value of paid work for a non-participant does not in¯uence the allocation
of consumption and leisure within the household.
7.2. The collective model of family labor supply
Recent research has focused on relaxing the assumptions of symmetry and income pool-
ing, seeking instead solutions from ef®cient bargaining theory. The advantages of the
unitary model of family labor supply are well known. As we have seen they allow the
direct utilization of consumer theory, recovering preferences from observed behavior in an
unambiguous way and providing a framework for interpretation of empirical results. One
can then use standard welfare economics to evaluate tax and welfare reform. An argument
often raised by critics of the standard model is that it treats all individuals in the family as a
single decision making unit rather than as if they were a collection of individuals. More-
over, researchers often conclude that allocations within the family derived from the
unitary model cannot be recovered in a meaningful way. This conclusion is too strong.
The standard decentralization theorems from consumer theory
51 apply equally well to
individual members' utilities in a ``unitary'' household.
Suppose there are no public goods and that individual utilities are weakly separable over
their private consumption and leisure. Let C1, C2, L1, and L2 refer to the private consump-
tion and leisure choices of individuals 1and 2. De®ning the private consumption of the
second individual in the same way, we may write the within-period family utility as
FU1C1;L1;X;U2C2;L2;X; 7:13
where U1(C1,L1,X) is the sub-utility for the husband and U2(C2,L2,X) is the sub-utility for
the wife. Where family utility has this weakly separable form, decentralization follows
two-stage budgeting: total household (full) income is allocated among all household
members, and then individuals act as if they are making their labor supply and consump-
tion decisions conditional on this initial stage outlay.
Even if consumption goods are privately consumed, they are typically only measured at
the household level ± so that the individual consumptions are unobserved or ``latent'' to the
economist. However, a single observed (privately-consumed) good ± labor supply in this
case ± per sub-utility is often suf®cient to identify decentralized preferences. This condi-
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51 See Gorman (1958), for example.tion on a single exclusive good per sub-utility corresponds to the identi®cationcondition in
generalizations of weak separability that allow overlapping goods across groups.
So what advantages does the collective approach offer? It effectively relaxes the income
allocation rule among individuals so that this allocation may depend on relative wages and
other variables in a way that re¯ects the bargaining position of individuals within the
family, rather than re¯ecting the marginal conditions underlying the joint optimizing
framework of the traditional unitary approach. Even when individuals within the family
are altruistic and allocations are Pareto Ef®cient, the allocation rule can deviate from the
optimal rule in the traditional model.
7.2.1. A summary of the collective labor supply model model
In this work,
52 each family member either maximizes an ``egoistic'' utility, U1(C,L1,X), or
a ``caring'' utility function, Fj(U1(C1,L1,X), U2(C2,L2,X)), for j  1 and 2. Notice that this
mirrors the separability assumption in Eq. (7.13). That is, the only way L2 enters the (sub-)
utility of individual 1 is through the (sub-)utility of individual 2; there is no direct impact
on the utility of the partner.
Applications of this model assume that the decision process generates Pareto-ef®cient
outcomes, all goods are privately consumed and there is no household production. The
implications of relaxing these latter two assumptions are important and we consider them
below.
The collective framework states the family labor supply problem as follows:
maxuU1 1 1 2 uU2; s:t: C1 1 C2 1 W1L1 1 W2L2  M; 7:14
where u is the utility weight for person 1, given by some non-negative function
u  fW1;W2;M. This is equivalent to a sharing rule, or decentralized solution, in
which individual 1 gets income M 2 wW1;W2;X;M and then allocates according to
the rule
maxU1; s:t: C1 1 W1L1  M 2 wW1;W2;X;M; 7:15
where w(W1, W2, X, M) is de®ned as the sharing rule.
Given Pareto ef®ciency and the standard neoclassical assumptions on individual utili-
ties, the conditions identifying preferences and the sharing rule (up to a linear translation)
simply require one observable and assignable private good ± here assumed to be the
individual's leisure. The intuition behind identi®cation is simple: under the exclusive
good assumption, the spouse's wage can only have an effect through the sharing rule.
Variation of income and the wage then permit consistent estimation of the marginal rate of
substitution in the sharing rule. A researcher can do this for both spouses and, since the
sharing rule must sum to one, recover the partial derivatives of the sharing rule.
Although the standard symmetry, income pooling, and participation conditions are not
implications of this model, one can derive alternative testable restrictions. If separate
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52 The most lucid statement of this argument occurs in the papers on household labor supply by Chiappori
(1988, 1992).income sources are unobservable to the econometrician and both individuals work in the
labormarket(i.e.,therearenocornersolutionsforleisure),theonlyrestrictionsimplied are
those corresponding to the Slutsky conditions. These are expressed in terms of the deriva-
tivesofthelaborsupplyequationswithrespecttothewageandincomevariables.Assuming
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the corresponding income and wage derivatives. Eqs. (7.16) are analogous to the Slutsky
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7:18
Consequently, having estimated unrestricted family labor supply functions in terms of
wagesforeachindividualandfullincome,theresearchercanrecoverindividualpreferences
and the sharing rule.
7.2.2. Household production
The introduction of household production is problematic for estimation of the collective
model since, as we have seen, this model exploits the exclusion restriction on the other
individual's wage to identify the sharing rule under egoistic or caring preferences. Unless
we assume that the household production good is marketable, identi®cation up to an
additive constant is lost.
It is reasonable to assume that for many families, non-market time is spent in the active
production of home produced goods.
53 These may include activities for which a perfect
substitute is directly available in the market, housework or home decoration for example;
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53 See also Apps and Rees (1997, 1998).but they may also include activities for which a perfect substitute is not readily available,
childcare, for example. What is of particular interest is when there is no direct substitute
available and both spouses non-market time enter the production of the home produced
good. For the standard non-separable (unitary) model of household labor supply, this has
little direct impact on the labor supply function ± it simply acts as if it were leisure time.
However, that is not the case in the separable model.
Suppose there is a home-produced good, G, that requires inputs of time by both house-
hold members. Denoting these time inputs by t1 and t2, one can write the production
technology as
G  gt1;t2; 7:19
where we assume that g is a concave function. Time not spent in the labor market can be
used for two purposes, pure leisure or home production. If t1 and t2 are recorded by
individuals in a time-use diary survey,
54 then the characteristics of g(t1, t2) can be recov-
ered. However, since leisure enters household utility in a general way in the family utility
function, and since g(t1, t2) is concave, family utility remains a concave function of non-
market time and consumption. Consequently, the labor supply equations describing hours
of work and labor market participation are observationally equivalent to those for the
model without household production.
An interesting special case occurs when family utility is separable in the non-market
time of each individual. In this case, family utility with household production can be
written
FU1C;L1;G1;X;U2C;L2;G2;X; 7:20
where G1 and G2 are the private consumptions of the home-produced good so that
G1 1 G2  G. (Alternatively, if the home-produced good is a public good such as child-
care, then G itself enters each sub-utility.)
If the consumption of household production is not observed then the presence of G in
each sub-utility does upset the separability assumption. To see this, suppose household
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Then the implicit price, or unit
cost, of household production is simply a function of the two wage rates:
P
*  rW1;W2: 7:21
In the model without G, the weak separability condition is suf®cient for each labor supply
to be written in terms of the own wage and the allocation of full income. Introducing G
implies that P
*, and therefore W1 and W2, enter each labor supply. Consequently, the
household production function is suf®cient to break the separability condition and there-
fore the exclusion restriction on the other household member's wage in the labor supply
equation. In this case, individual utilities are not recoverable. The only case in which this
does not occur is when the household production good, G, is marketable and when the
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54 See Kapteyn and Kooreman (1993), for example.solution is interior rather than at a corner. In this case, one sets P
* equal to the observable
market price for the home produced good which will not depend on individual wages. This
issue becomes more problematic for the collective model described below in which the
exclusion restriction on the other individual's wage is required for identi®cation. Of
course, if the household production technology exhibits constant returns then P
* in
(7.21) depends only on the two wages and the income terms in the sharing rule provide
testable restrictions.
55
7.3. Some empirical ®ndings for the family labor supply model
7.3.1. The unitary model
Recent studies build on the original work of Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974), Rosen
(1978), Wales and Woodland (1976) and Smith (1977). These include Attanasio and
MaCurdy (1997), Blundell and Walker (1982, 1986), Browning et al. (1985), Hausman
and Ruud (1986), Hoynes(1996), Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986), Ransom (1987) and Van
Soest (1995). Perhaps the most important issues raised in these studies are those concern-
ing the degree of substitution between the labor supplied by different family members and
the mixture of continuous hours and discrete participation choices.
Researchers have taken two modeling approaches. The ®rst is to work with the bivariate
censored model and allow continuous choices over hours of work. Ransom (1987), for
example, takes this approach. The second approach is to simplify the hours choices to a set
of discrete alternatives but to allow for ®xed costs and program participation. Hoynes
(1996) is an example of this. In addition to accounting for the discrete or censored nature
of the data in a bivariate framework, researchers who have implemented empirical models
offamily labor supply have also been concerned with choosing the appropriate condition-
ing variables. Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997), for example, adopt a marginal rate of
substitution framework for their analysis while Blundell and Walker (1986) use a
consumption-based measure of non-labor income in a Marshallian model of family
labor supply. Browning et al. (1985) work with a Frisch representation of family labor
supplies and commodity demands (see Section 4 for a detailed discussion of these alter-
native choices of conditioning variables and the interpretation of the resulting elasticities).
Rather than covering all studies in this discussion we have decided to single out a small
number of studies that provide a useful guide to empirical models in the literature.
7.3.2. Continuous hours models with censoring
Ransom (1987) provides an analysis of family hours-of-work decisions using a sample of
1210 intact families drawn from the 1976 PSID. He restricts the sample to families with no
self-employed members and in which the husband is working. Consequently, the only
censoring occurs for female hours of work. This study makes a particularly convenient
starting point for describing structural estimation in family labor supply models. However,
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55 Chiappori (1997) shows identi®cation of the sharing rule up to some function of W1 and W2 in this case.although Ransom accounts for censoring he does not account for the endogeneity of hourly
wages or virtual income. Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997) relax these exogeneity restric-
tions and we discuss their study further below.
To interpret Ransom's results, consider the marginal utility conditions (7.4) and (7.5)
for quadratic utility:
2UL1 1 W1UC  a1 1 a3W1 2 b11H1 2 b33W1W1H1 1 W2H2 1 Y 2 b12H2
1 b132W1H1 1 W2H2 1 Y 1 b23W1H2 7:22
and
2UL2 1 W1UC  a2 1 a3W2 2 b22H2 2 b33W2W1H1 1 W2H2 1 Y 2 b12H2
1 b232W2H2 1 W1H1 1 Y 1 b13W2H1: 7:23
Ransom then allows a1 and a2 to each be a linear function of observable characteristics
and unobservable mean zero normal random variates 11 and 12.
In contrast, Hausman and Ruud, 1986 work directly with quadratic labor supply curves
in their estimation of family labor supply for a sample of 1991 families in the 1976 PSID
based on a similar selection to that of Ransom. This eliminates the need for jacobian terms
but makes the introduction of random preference errors more dif®cult. The Hausman and
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2 1 aW1W2: 7:25
From Roy's identity, hours of work are given by
H1  d1 1 b1Y




H2  d2 1 b2Y





* is de®ned in Eq. (7.25). Hausman and Ruud append additive normal errors to
Eqs. (7.26) and (7.27) and estimation follows from the maximizing of a bivariate censored
likelihood whose contributions are of the form (7.6) and (7.7). They take careful account
of the non-linear surface of the budget constraint induced by the piecewise linear nature of
the tax system. However, as was noted above, one cannot easily interpret this additive
error structure as random preference variation.
The estimates Ransom presents are plausible. He ®nds a small compensated elasticity of
0.04 for men, and a larger one of 0.73 for women. He also ®nds smaller income elasticities
for men, 20.03 versus 20.21 for women. (The uncompensated wage elasticity for men is
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man and Ruud. However, the Ransom model does not perform particularly well in repli-
cating the within-sample distribution offemale hours of work. While actual mean hours of
work for women are 1376 per year, the model predicts only 634. Moreover, although fewer
than 50% of women in the sample are recorded as working, the model predicts that the
majority of women work. Although there are many ways in which the model might be
misspeci®ed, the most likely culprits are the ``Tobit'' assumption on participation that
rules out ®xed costs of work (see Cogan, 1980, 1981) and the use of predicted wages
(although corrected for selectivity) in a non-linear labor supply model. Interestingly, the
Hausman and Ruud speci®cation allows for a ®xed cost parameter for female labor supply
which is found to be signi®cant.
Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997) address endogeneity issues and generalize the form of
censoring in their study of families in the repeated cross-sections of the US Consumers
Expenditure Survey (CEX). They choose log-linear forms for the marginal rate of substi-
tution functions Eqs. (7.8) and (7.9). The authors selected a sample of 20,297 households
from the CEX for the period 1981±1992. This CEX dataset has the dual advantages of
providing consumption data directly and allowing variation over time. Attanasio and
MaCurdy adopt a semi-parametric approach to correct for non-participation, and this
relaxes the normality and Tobit assumptions. Their results imply a slightly negative
male hours elasticity, whereas for women the corresponding elasticity is much lager in
absolute value and implies a strongly upward sloping labor supply curve.
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986) follow a similar approach but do not fully allow for
random preference variation, in their study of the joint labor supply decisions of 315
households from the 1982 CBS survey for the Netherlands. As in Blundell and Walker
(1986) they work directly with a Marshallian demand system and specify a second-order
¯exible form, derived from an Almost Ideal indirect utility function. In contrast, the
Blundell and Walker study uses a Gorman polar form which retains the linearity in full
income. This linearity obviates the need to specify a value for total available hours T.
Kooreman and Kapteyn perform estimation using a censored likelihood in which they
predict wages from a selectivity-adjusted log wage equation. They use education-level
dummies as excluded instruments. Although Kooreman and Kapteyn do not provide
elasticity estimates, they do report small and negative own wage responses for men and
larger and positive own wage responses for women. Cross elasticities show a strong
response of female hours to male wages. These results closely match those of Blundell
and Walker who used a truncated likelihood estimator on a similar sample of 1378 British
families from the 1980 Family Expenditure Survey, in which both husbands and wives
worked. Blundell and Walker report a full set of elasticities by demographic type, and ®nd
small, positive labor supply elasticities for males and larger, positive ones for females.
They also report small but signi®cant positive cross elasticities.
7.3.3. Discrete hours choices and program participation
Van Soest (1995) introduces discrete hours choices in a study of the labor supply and
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for the Netherlands. He models a non-convex budget constraint for each family to expli-
citly account for the Dutch tax and bene®t system. Six ®xed hours intervals are de®ned, for
husbands and for wives, resulting in a total of thirty-six possible discrete states.
56 A
translog direct utility function for leisure hours and full income determines the utilities
associated with each choice. Marginal utilities are, therefore, linear in log leisure hours
and full income and are rendered stochastic by a choice-speci®c extreme-value distributed
error term. Consequently choices follow a multinomial logit rule. Van Soest further
extends this by introducing a jointly normal random parameter variation. He completes
the speci®cation by adding choice-speci®c constants and estimates using a simulated
maximum likelihood estimator.
The estimation results reveal an important role for the random preference terms and the
choice speci®c constants. Moreover, the reported elasticities are quite sensitive to changes
in their speci®cation. The most general speci®cation suggests a small positive hours of
work elasticity of around 0.1 for men and a larger elasticity of around 0.5 for females, with
small, negative cross elasticities. These are reasonably consistent with the results in the
Blundell and Walker study for the UK. However, Van Soest does report smaller income
elasticities which often have signs at odds with theory. This may be attributable to his
unearned income measure which, unlike that used in the Blundell and Walker study, is not
consumption based.
Hoynes (1996) addresses the problem of jointly modeling the discrete work and welfare
participation decisions of a two-worker family, in the context of the unitary labor supply
model for a sample of 1010 observations on two-parent families from the1984 Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). She considers the labor supply impacts of the
AFDC-UP (Aid for Families with Dependent Children ± Unemployed Parent) program in
the US in 1988. This program was available in 26 states in 1988 and provided AFDC
bene®ts to two-parent families with children if the ``principal earner'' in the family worked
less than one hundred hours/month. Hoynes models families as maximizing a standard
Stone±Geary utility function (see Eq. (4.59)) of the form
U  b1logg1 2 H1 1 b2logg2 2 H2 1 bClogC 2 gC 2 hPB; 7:28
where the notation is as in Eq. (7.10) and PB is a 0-1 program participation indicator.
Program bene®ts B in (7.11) are determined by
B  G 2 N 2 tAW1H1 1 W2H2; if B . 0 and Hp , 100; 7:29
with B  0 if the conditions are not met, where G is a government minimum guarantee, tA
is a government set bene®t-reduction rate on earned income, and Hp is hours worked by the
principal earner, either the husband or the wife.
57 Hoynes assumes that families who
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1668
56 See also Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and Aaberge et al. (1995) for
important variations on this type of model that allows ®nite discrete choice sets.
57 The principal earner is determined by program guidelines.choose to receive AFDC-UP (PB  1) also receive food stamps. To avoid the issue of
multiple program choices, (see the discussion of the Keane and Mof®tt study in Section 6)
and to make the problem manageable, she also assumes that only three work decisions are
possible for each spouse: full-time work (40 h per week), part-time work (20 h per week),
or no work. Combined with a 0/1 welfare decision, this yields 18 states over which the
utility function must be maximized.
Hoynes introduces unobserved heterogeneity into the problem via the b and h para-
meters. She models the b's as
bi  expX
0ai 1 1i=SexpX
0ai 1 1i; i  1;2;c; 7:30
where ac  1c ; 0.
58 h is given by
h  Z
0as 1 m 1 e; 7:31
where e , N0;ss
2). To further ease the estimation problem she assumes that 1 and m
have a discrete support over M points (where M  6 in the analysis) such that
Pr11  11k;12  12k;m  mkpk: 7:32
To understand the computational issues involved, consider the implications of this setup
when e  0 for all families. Then, for each of the M points of support, the values of 1 and
m can be plugged directly into the utility function and the optimal choice over the 18
alternatives computed. Summing across the M states using the probability, pk, of each
yields the probability of each work/welfare alternative for each family. Replacing a non-
zero e term complicates this only slightly ± e behaves like the continuous error in a
standard discrete choice model. For high enough e in each state a non-welfare option
will be chosen, whereas a low e implies choice of a welfare option. Thus, within each state
(1, m pair), two possibilities exist, with their probabilities determined by the level of n
required to make ``welfare stigma'' too high for welfare participation. Hoynes uses
predicted wages from separate wage regression for all observations. Hence, the variables
she uses to predict wages are included in the variables X, Z.
Hoynes assumes a measurement error term for each spouse, n1 and n2, such that actual
hours worked, h1 and h2, relate to predicted hours worked, H1 and H2, according to the
functions:
h1  expn1H1 and h2  expn2H2; 7:33





Given the parameter estimates from this estimation procedure, Hoynes carries out
several interesting simulations. First, she considers the impact of increasing the AFDC-
UP guarantee amount, G, by 20%. This leads to an 18% increase in predicted participation
in the program. In the population as a whole it leads to a slight reduction in employment, as
should be expected since this is a pure income effect. However, among welfare recipients
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58 This form satis®es the standard Stone±Geary restrictions that bi $ 0 and
P
bi  1.it leads toan increase in average hours worked, a composition effect caused by the addition
of many working families whose incomes qualify for the program only after the policy
shift. If unaccounted for, such a composition effect could lead researchers to reach incor-
rect conclusions concerning the impact of guarantees on labor supply. Second, Hoynes
considers the impact of lowering the bene®t reduction rate, tA, by 20%. This leads to a 6%
increase in participation and virtually no change in employment, as a tax rate change has
both income and substitution effects. Third, she considers the impact of eliminating the
hP , 100 rule for eligibility. While this greatly increases eligibility, from 10.9% to 15% of
the sample, it has almost no effect on program participation, since those who become
eligible are already working and, thus, would receive small bene®ts which may be over-
whelmed by other welfare costs (h). Finally, she ®nds that eliminating the program
altogether would increase average hours worked of current recipients by 33 h for
women and 46 h for men. However, this would not compensate for the loss of welfare
income, as average family income for this group would still fall by approximately $83/
month.
7.3.4. Bargaining and collective models
There are relatively few empirical studies offamily labor supply outside the unitary model.
The original motivation for these developments came from the original studies by McEl-
roy (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980). A number of more recent studies have used
micro data to evaluate the pooling hypothesis or to recover collective preferences using
exclusive goods, but these studies typically look at private consumption rather than labor
supply. For example, Thomas (1990) ®nds evidence against the pooling hypothesis by
carefully examining household data from Brazil. Browning et al. (1996) use Canadian
household expenditure data to examine the pooling hypothesis and to recover the deriva-
tives of the sharing rule. Clothing in this analysis is the exclusive good providing identi-
®cation.
Recent empirical studies concerning family labor supply include Lundberg (1988),
Apps and Rees (1997), Kapteyn and Kooreman (1990) and Fortin and Lacroix (1997).
Each of these aims to ``test'' the unitary model and to recover some parameters of collec-
tive preferences. Lundberg attempts to see which types of households, distinguished by
demographic composition, come close to satisfying the hypotheses implied by the unitary
model. The other three studies take this a step further by directly specifying and estimating
labor supply equations from a collective speci®cation. Apps and Rees (1996) specify a
model to account for household production. Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) use data on
preferred hours of work to separately identify individual from collective preferences and,
consequently, to identify the utility weight. Fortin and Lacroix (1997) follow closely the
Chiappori framework and allow the utility weight to be a function of individual wages and
unearned incomes. We brie¯y consider the results from each of these studies.
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) specify a Stone±Geary model of individual private
utilities and they estimate the utility weight, which they assume to be independent of
wages and income, as a constant parameter. Using data from the same 1982 Dutch survey
R. Blundell and T. MaCurdy 1670exploited in their 1986 study described above, they ®nd an estimated utility weight within
the unit interval, but rather imprecisely determined.
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The focus of the Apps and Rees study is on household production and they analyze a
sample of 1384 families from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 1985/86 Income Distri-
bution Survey Sample ®le. All families are selected so that the male works and there is at
least one child aged under 15 years. They specify a constant returns technology for house-
hold production so that the unit cost function has the form (7.21). This is then parameter-
ized as a unit Translog function. Individual sub-utilities are given an Almost Ideal form.
Since the sample does not contain information on individual consumptions of home
produced or market goods, they identify the model by setting the individual income shares
to the individual full incomes Wit 1 Mi. This would appear to be a rather restrictive
assumption. Finally, only interior solutions are considered. They ®nd an important role
for exchange within the family with the female specializing in home production activity.
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) consider a sample of 4496 couples drawn from the 1986
Canadian Census. They follow the Chiappori framework closely and allow the utility
weight to be a function of individual wages and unearned incomes. They specify the
resulting sharing rule as a linear function of wages and individual unearned incomes,
while they allow indirect utilities to be quadratic in own wages and individual unearned
income allocations. For comparison, they specify a unitary model with a quadratic indirect
utility in the two wages and total unearned income. Both speci®cations result in non-linear
labor supply equations. For estimation, they use the sample of two working couples with
instrumental variable procedures applied for the wage and income variables. Instruments
were age and education polynomials, immigration dummies and regional dummies.
Fortin and Lacroix provide results for two age subgroups. For the majority of groups
they reject the pooling hypothesis. The collective model restrictions are only rejected for
the case in which preschool children are present, while symmetry is rejected across all
groups. These results are interesting and, if con®rmed across speci®cations accounting for
endogenous participation in work and unobserved heterogeneity, they would challenge the
standard family labor supply model. The results also suggest extensions to the collective
model for families with young children where ``home production'' and public goods are
likely to be of central importance.
One potentially important drawback of these models is their inability to allow for both
preference heterogeneity and non-participation. This is common in modern speci®cations
of the unitary family labor supply model as we have seen in the earlier discussion of this
section. To properly assess the collective framework as an alternative empirical model,
these developments are essential. This is the motivation for the Blundell et al. (1998a)
study which considers the full non-parametric identi®cation of the collective model with
participation and hours choices. A general identi®cation result is presented which is then
extended to cover the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity. For the heterogeneous
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data from the preferred hours question in the Dutch survey.case a parametric form for preferences and the sharing rule is assumed. This result allows
the empirical implementation of the collective model of family labor supply to be placed
on an equal footing with the traditional model.
8. Structural dynamic models
This section explores extensions of the standard multiperiod model, introduced in Section
4, to allow for important dynamic features of labor supply behavior. The ®rst considers the
problem of participation, which plays a fundamental role in understanding all aspects of
lifecycle behavior. Empirical models incorporating participation are obviously important
for the analysis of female labor supply and retirement decisions. However, even in the
simple case of continuous hours decisions examined in Section 4, we could not specify
relations useful for policy simulations without assuming when a person works during the
lifetime, for speci®cations depend on past, current, and future wages. If a person plans not
to work in a period, then the wage for that period does not enter as a determinant of hours-
of-work choices in other periods. To characterize the factors governing when individuals
work signi®cantly complicates empirical multiperiod models of labor supply, and the use
of these models in simulations of policy scenarios. However, development of these more-
elaborate models is essential to learn what is needed to account for many policy features.
Given the scarcity of research on this topic, intertemporal modelswith non-participation or
corners and saving offers many research opportunities.
The second extension considers two lifecycle models in which individuals can affect
their wage growth through current investment activities: learning-by-doing models in
which current work experience enters directly into the determination of future wages,
and conventional human capital models in which workers endogenously choose schooling
and training separately from work experience to enhance their future wages. Both of these
developments imply that future events enter the optimal decision rule for hours of work
and participation decisions in a more complex way.
Finally, the third extension relaxes the intertemporal separability assumption on prefer-
ences underlying the standard labor supply framework, implying that past levels of hours
and consumption directly impact the marginal utility of work. Non-separabilities occur
through primarily two routes: a habit persistence model, or a dynamic extension of the
home production model in which inputs of time are used to produce future consumption.
8.1. The standard intertemporal labor supply model with participation
This section begins with an overview of an intertemporal labor supply model with parti-
cipation which will serve as a framework for discussing the additional dynamic re®ne-
ments in later subsections. Although decisions over continuous hours choices and
consumption retain the simple marginal rate of substitution and Euler condition formula-
tion described in Section 4, the participation no longer ®ts this simple framework. To
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presume that individuals can only choose between working and not working in a period.
8.1.1. Economic formulation




where Pt is a zero-one dummy variable equaling unity if the individual participates in
period t, Vt is the period-t value function, At represents beginning-period assets, Wt denotes
period-t earnings from participation, and Zt designates all non-wage variables relevant for
lifecycle decision making that are not controlled by the decision maker. The elements of Zt
may be stochastic, with some uncertain in the future to the consumer. Decisions over time
are linked through the asset accumulation constraint
At11  1 1 rtAt 2 Ct 1 WtPt 1 Yt; 8:2
where rt is the return on assets, and Yt is a component of Zt representing income not
attributable to earning or returns on assets. Eq. (8.2) assumes perfect capital markets.
The formulation for the value function follows from ®rst principles in dynamic econom-
ics. Let U(Pt,Ct,Zt) be the utility function for period t, which need not depend on all or any
elements of Zt; we include Zt as an argument, rather than some subset of this vector, to save































t111 1 rAt 2 Ct 1 Yt;Wt11;Zt11
 
;
with the operators Et designating the consumer's expectation about the variables Wt11 and
Zt11 conditional on information It at time t, which includes Wt and Zt. The term k is a
discount rate. The ®rst-order condition of (8.4) with respect to Ct yields the Euler condition
(4.28), which continues to relate the marginal utilities of consumption in adjacent periods
even in this model with participation.







U1;Ct;Zt 1 kEtProbPt11  1 j ItV
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U0;Ct;Zt 1 kEtProbPt11  1 j ItV
1
t11 1 ProbPt11  0 j ItV
0
t11;
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U0;Ct;Zt s:t: Ct  At 1 Yt;
Solving recursively using backward induction yields formulations for each period's value
functions and optimal choices.
8.1.2. Empirical formulation
An empirical model characterizes how the values of P1,P2,¼,Pt vary across a population,
relating these participation decisions to economic factors relevant in the past, now, or in
the future. Creating the likelihood function for the Pt's requires specifying the densities
describing the joint distributions of the Wt's and Zt's, and identifying the partitions of Wt's
and Zt's associated with making particular decisions.
Consider, ®rst, decisions in the ®nal period. De®ne the sets:










For combinations of Wt and Zt falling in the set Qt1, the individual chooses Pt  1; and
when Wt;Zt [ Qt0 this person does not work in period T. The sets Qt1 and Qt0 are
functions of all decisions and variables observed in previous periods.
Now considering period t 2 1, de®ne the sets:
Q
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The individual works when Wt21;Zt21 [ Qt211, and does not work otherwise. Once
again, the sets Qt211 and Qt210 depend on decisions and variables observed in periods
t 2 2,t 2 3,¼,1.
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exogenous or ®xed and known. The joint density g(´) need not be the distribution that
individuals use to account for the uncertainty they perceive about the future; g(´) describes
the stochastic properties of the variables unobserved by the econometrician.
The sets Q jP are usually quite complicated to calculate. A popular simplifying assump-
tion is to presume that individuals cannot save. In this case, At  0 and Ct  Wt 1 Yt in
Eqs. (8.5) and (8.7). With these assumptions we see that
V
P
t  UPt;PtWt 1 Yt;Zt 1 kEtmaxV
P
t11; 8:11
where the second term on the right-hand side of this expression does not depend at all on
Pt. This formulation greatly simpli®es computation of both the value functions and the sets
QjP. To simplify computation further, researchers also often assume that the variables Wt
and Zt are serially (and sometimes contemporaneously) independent.
8.1.3. Multiple values of hours
We can extend the above model beyond the simple decision to participate by admitting a
limited set of hours choices. The approach shares many of the attributes of the computa-
tional-simpli®cation procedure described in Section 6.7, with the complication that we
must infer the value function appropriate for evaluating options. To illustrate this approach
in a lifecycle context, suppose a worker may choose among full-time work, part-time
work, and no work in each period, with each option implying a prescribed number of
hours. This ®nite set of hours choices yields a relatively small set of discrete states, say J
states in each period, over which the lifetime utility function must be maximized. Let Pjt
designate a zero-one dummy variable equaling unity if an individual selects option j hours
in period t, and let Wjt denote the earnings received from this option.
































One can express Vt
j in a way similar to Eq. (8.5) which assists in computing value functions




UPjt;Ct;Zt s:t: Ct  At 1 Wjt 1 Yt: 8:13
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functions and optimal choices.
Developing the likelihood function for the Pjt's requires partitioning the sample space of
Wjt's and Zt's corresponding to the particular decisions. Within period t, the decisions Pjt
are mutually-exclusive and exhaustive. For notational convenience, suppose Wt now
denotes a vector including all of the Wjt's as elements. De®ne the sets




t for k  1;¼;J;k ± j}: 8:14
When Wt;Zt [ Qtj, the individual chooses Pjt  1. The set Qtj are functions of all
decisions and variables observed in periods t 2 1;t 2 2;¼;1.
The likelihood function for this more general case is given by Eq. (8.10), with the sets
Qtj now replacing the setsQtPt. With this modi®cation, lP1P2¼Ptrepresents the probability
of observing the event (Pj1,Pj2,¼,Pjt).
Allowing for continuous choices in a lifecycle model involves insurmountable compu-
tational burden when participation is an issue, unless one relies on very strong behavioral
and stochastic assumptions. In effect, this amounts to expanding the set J to a large number
of values. Even in the simple case considering only participation, the above discussion
shows that the entire lifecycle problem must be solved to characterize decisions in any
period. The two-stage budgeting and Euler-condition approaches utilized in Section 4 are
of little use in simplifying the estimation problem. Other behavioral features of lifecycle
models diminish the usefulness of these approaches as well by invalidating the separability
properties needed by them, even when participation is not a source of violation.
8.2. Learning by doing and human capital
Saving and the accumulation of assets is just one way that past labor supply choices can
affect today's decisions. In learning-by-doing models, past work experience has a direct
effect on the determination of market wages. A similar mechanism operates in human
capital models. Past labor market decisions have an impact not just through the level of
accumulated assets but also through the wage. These considerations signi®cantly change
the nature of the optimal labor supply decisions. For example, learning by doing intro-
duces a trade-off between the increase in utility that can be achieved by reducing current
work effort and the increase in future productivity that can be achieved from learning on
the job. This implies that the current wage is no longer the appropriate measure of the
return to working. An additional ``dynamic rent'' term must be included to account for
increased future wages resulting from the accumulation of experience capital while work-
ing. Hence, the methods of Section 6, which are designed to deal with non-linearities in
current wages arising from tax and transfer policies, are not directly useful here.
These dynamic generalizations of the standard model also imply that individuals who
would have otherwise chosen to leave work may now choose to stay in employment. This
property is also exhibited in search models that allow state dependence through asymme-
try in layoff and job arrival rates. In this situation individuals may choose to remain in
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to employment are high. For example, mothers of young children may choose to stay in
employment simply to exploit the higher probability of subsequently being in work when
children reach school age.
In the following we separate our discussion of these models into models with participa-
tion and those with continuous hours choices.
8.2.1. Learning by doing
8.2.1.1. Learning by doing with participation The learning-by-doing model posits that
wages grow with experience. Individuals in these models do not decide whether or not to
engage in human capital investment, the simple state of being in employment generates
returns in its own right. The wage, Wt, is now determined as a function of experience
capital, Kt. Experience capital in turn depends positively on past participation through a
dynamic equation of the form
Kt11  GKt;Pt: 8:15
Wages depend positively on Kt according to the function
Wt  WtKt;ht; 8:16
where ht represents the unobservable component of wages as in Eq. (6.34). This implies
that work not only brings immediate returns, but also increases future wages by adding to
experience. For simplicity, we assume that the only uncertainty in the model enters
through the wage error ht.
The value functions in the period-t participation decision, corresponding to Eq. (8.4)




t11;ht11;Xt11, where Xt represents the elements of Zt11
that remain after removing the Kt11
P and ht11 variables; now Xt incorporates all non-wage
variables relevant for lifecycle decision making that are not controlled by the decision
maker. This is done to explicitly acknowledge the dependence of Kt11 on Pt, and also to
separate out the source of uncertainty ht11.
The solution to the individual's participation problem follows closely that outlined in
Section 8.1. In period t, individuals choose participation to maximize utility as described
by Eq. (8.4) but acknowledging the impact of Pt on Kt11 in Vt11
P . Since the only uncertainty
enters through h, the participation decision de®nes a ``reservation value'' for the wage
error ht
*, which in turn de®nes the sets (8.8). This reservation value depends on the value
of Kt and thus, to solve the problem a solution must be found for each of the t possible
values of accumulated work experience. The de®nition of ht
* for all periods and all
possible value of Kt captures all of the economics of the problem. In each period, the
individual realizes a wage shock and makes a work decision to maximize utility given
accumulated experience. Accumulated experience impacts the decision both by increasing
wages and by impacting the disutility of work. The impact of current work decisions on
future utility is accounted for by the EVt11 terms ± working today changes the value of h
*
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Given the value of h
* for all periods and all possible values of Kt, estimation is straight-
forward.
Following Eq. (8.12) this model can be extended to allow for additional discrete states,
for example, part-time and full-time participation. Particular functional forms for G(´) may
be also chosen to allow for interactions between Kt, participation and hours of work. We
return to a discussion of speci®c parameterizations in the review of empirical studies in
Section 8.4.
8.2.1.2. Learning by doing with continuous hours choices Often in a learning-by-doing
model, the level of hours of work, rather than participation alone, determines wage growth.
To introduce learning by doing in a modelwith continuous hours choices, we abstract from
the participation decision and replace Eq. (8.15) with
Kt11  GHt;Kt; 8:17
where Ht is hours of work in period t, and G is an increasing function of Ht. Choices over
hours and consumption are made by maximizing equation
VAt;Wt;Kt;ht;Xtmax
Ct;Lt
UCt;Lt;Xt 1 kEtVAt11;Wt11;Kt11;ht11Xt11: 8:18
Notice that the value function in period t is made a function of the beginning of period t
experience capital Kt as well as the ®nancial capital At and the maximization takes place
subject to the accumulation equations for experience capital and asset capital. The Euler
equation for consumption continues to hold. However, the ®rst order conditions for the
allocation of time generalize to account for the role of experience capital. Assuming an
interior solution for this continuous hours problem we have
ULCt;Lt;XtltWt 1 kEt{Gt112G=2Ht}; 8:19
Gt  lt2W=2KtHt 1 kEt{Gt112G=2Kt}; 8:20
where lt  2Vt=2At  2Ut=2Ct and Gt  2Vt=2Kt.
The basic change from the standard hours of work model discussed in Section 4, is that
the value of work is no longer simply the wage, but now includes the return to experience.
This return depends on all future work decisions through the term Gt11 which measures the
return to human capital. As such, standard hours of work equations of the sort we have
been considering are inappropriate, in that they relate work to current wage which is no
longer relevant on its own. All future wages and implied work decisions must also be
included in determining the value of work.
8.2.2. Human capital
8.2.2.1. Human capital models with participation Consider an individual who, in each
period, can now choose between participation in work, Pt, and participation in human
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*. The wage, Wt, is determined as a function of human capital, Kt,
according to the function, Wt  WtKt;ht where Kt depends on past investment decisions.




The problem is, in principle, more complicated now because the individual must choose
among three activities. However, this problem can be solved applying the multiple values
of hours formulation outlined in Section 8.1.3. This is done simply by reinterpreting the
discrete hours choices as options over the four states characterized by the four possible
values combinations of Pt and Pt
*. There is the added complication that the wage is state
dependent, but this is readily handled within Eqs. (8.12) and (8.13) given the de®nitions of
the value functions Vt
j. Typically, the applications make the additional assumption of no
savings to take attain computational simpli®cations. We discuss particular speci®cations
in our review of the empirical applications at the end of this section.
8.2.2.2. Human capital models with continuous hours choices In the continuous hours-
of-work problem individuals choose how much time in each period to spend in three
activities: leisure Lt, hours of work Ht, and human capital investment St. Their choice
problem is to choose Lt and Ct,
VAt;Wt;Kt;ht;Xtmax
Ct;Lt
UCt;Lt;Xt 1 kEtVAt11;Wt11;Kt11;ht11;Xt11 8:22
subject to the human capital equations Kt11  GKt;St, the asset accumulation conditions
and Lt 1 Ht 1 St  T. This results in two additional conditions:
ULCt;Lt;XtkEt{Gt112G=2St}; 8:23
Gt  ltHt2Wt=2Kt 1 kEt{Gt112G=2Kt}: 8:24
Given these expressions, the marginal utility of leisure still equals l times the wage rate,
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure still equals W, and the
Euler equation for consumption continues to hold.
Since time must be allocated among 3 activities, this problem becomes more compli-
cated. Eq. (8.23) indicates that the return to training must also equal the return to leisure
which equals the return to work. The return to schooling depends on the marginal value of
a unit of human capital, G, and Eq. (8.24) gives a Euler equation for its time path. So,
levels of both leisure and training must be selected to equate their marginal values with l
times the wage ± these two choices together imply the number of hours worked. However,
if hours of work can be measured separately from hours of training then the labor supply
equation can be estimated directly since the standard marginal conditions for the choice of
working hours remain valid.
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Habit persistence nulli®es the intertemporal separability property for preferences through
the dependence of current utility on past labor supply and consumption choices. In the
framework introduced in Section 8.1, we can think of these past choices entering Zt. For
example, period-t utility may be written as UtPt;Ct;Pt21;Ct21;Xt. In this formulation we
have divided Zt into one set of elements controlled by the individual's previous behavior,
namely Pt21 and Ct21, and a second set designated as Xt. that are not in¯uenced by the
decision maker. Typically this is set up as a household production model in which past
non-market (leisure) time and past consumption in¯uence today's utility. Consequently,
one may wish to add further lags of participation and consumption. Our review of empiri-
cal applications considers such speci®cations.
The problem for the consumer is analogous to that described in Eq. (8.4), but now
recognizing that Zt11 is a function of current consumption and current participation. The
backward recursion follows the same form as Eqs. (8.6) and (8.7). With the wage innova-
tion ht being the only source of uncertainty, the estimation is the same as in the learning-
by-doing model.
This analogy with the learning-by-doing model also holds in the continuous hours
choice framework without participation. In this case Ut(Ct,Lt) is replaced by
UtCt;Lt;Ct21;Lt21;Xt. Further lags may be included without changing the basic intuition
underlying this model. The optimization problem in that case becomes
VAt;Ct21;Lt21;Xtmax
Ct;Lt
UCt;Lt;Ct21;Lt21;Xt 1 kEtVAt11;Ct;Lt;Xt11: 8:25
The ®rst-order conditions for an interior solution for leisure becomes
ULCt;Lt;Ct21;Lt21;Xt 1 kEt{ULCt11;Lt11;Ct;Lt;Xt11}
 kEt{UcCt11;Lt11;Ct;Lt;Xt111 1 rWt}: 8:26
A similar relation exists for consumption. As in the learning-by-doing model the value of
work is no longer simply the wage. Now it includes the dynamic rent in terms of the impact
on future marginal utility.
8.4. Review of empirical results
8.4.1. The basic intertemporal labor supply model
There are many applications of the basic intertemporal labor supply model. These are
generally extensions of the Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981) studies.
60
For example, Browning et al. (1985) work directly with Frisch labor supply equations (see
Section 4.4.3) and use a Psuedo cohort approach on the time series of repeated cross
sections on consumption and family labor supply available in the British Family Expen-
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60 See also Altonji (1982, 1986).diture Survey. They do not allow for non-participation. Blundell et al. (1993) incorporate
corner solutions in their study of intertemporal hours of work decisions among married
women in the UK. They work directly with the marginal conditions (4.6) and (4.20). The
within-period consumption-leisure choices are modeled using an Almost Ideal form for
preferences. The Euler equation is then used to identify a Box-Cox monotonic transforma-
tion of within-period utilities (as also adopted in MaCurdy (1983)). Their results point to
intertemporal (Frisch) labor supply elasticities for married women in the 0.5±1 range
depending on demographic characteristics ± women with younger children having the
bigger elasticities. As expected, estimated Marshallian elasticities are quite a bit smaller,
in the 0.2±0.5 range. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is
approximately 0.6 which suggests a moderate degree of risk aversion.
8.4.2. Learning-by-doing models
Shaw (1989) estimates a learning-by-doing model in her study of the continuous hours
choices of a similar sample of men from the PSID. She selects 526 men in the 18±64 year
age range during the period 1967±1980. As in the Hotz et al. (1988) study, a Translog
direct utility is chosen but this is speci®ed in terms of current non-market time and
consumption. There are no habit terms. However, in contrast to that earlier study, the
stock of experience enters the wage equation. A quadratic speci®cation is used for the
capital accumulation function (8.17) to re¯ect the possibly concave nature of the lifecycle
earnings pro®le. This is then used to de®ne an estimable dynamic wage equation by
assuming Wt  rtKt where rt is the rental rate of experience capital. This rental rate is
assumed constant across individuals in any particular year. Shaw again ®nds strong
evidence of non-separability ± this time entering through the wage experience relationship
rather than through the utility function. She ®nds a large positive effect which implies that
a temporary 25% increase in hours of work increases wages by 12.8% starting from the
initial mean values. The Shaw study is restricted to men and does not consider the problem
of non-participation.
This is tackled in the Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) study which estimates a discrete
model using a sample of 318 women from the NLS of mature women survey. They specify
within-period utility to have the form (8.27). To simplify the problem, they assume that
there is no saving or borrowing, so the within-period budget constraint reduces to
Ct  WtPt 1 Yt: 8:28
Wages are assumed to be log linear in schooling, experience capital and the unobservable
h, with ht , iidN0;s
2
h. Under these assumptions, the sample likelihood is given by
61
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61 Obviously, the reservation wage cannot be bigger than the smallest wage observed for each individual of a














* is derived from the structural utility maximization framework outlined in
previous sections. Hence, the within-period problem is a standard Tobit formulation.
Because the errors are serially uncorrelated, these within-period Tobit likelihood functions
are simply multiplied together to yield the overall likelihood function.
The sample of women used in the Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) study were aged between
39 and 44 in 1967 and have at least four consecutive years of data on labor force participa-
tion beginning in 1966. The basic ®ndings of the model are best summarized by the
simulations the authors conduct, manipulating the value of each variable in the model
and observing predicted work effort. First, they ®nd that at any age, the probability of work
increases with experience. Hence the positive impact of experience on wages overcomes
the fact that the disutility of work increases with experience. Second, for any experience
level, work effort decreases with age ± as age advances there are less future gains available
from increasing experience and, thus, the value of work declines. This explanation for
declining work with age is missed by any static model. Third, work effort decreases with
husband's earnings and increases with schooling. Finally, increasing the slope of the wage/
experience pro®le substantially increases work effort over the lifetime. Again, this effect
would be missed by any static labor supply model.
At this point, it is important to reiterate the extreme simplifying assumptions that have
been made to make the problem manageable. First, a 0/1 work decision has been assumed.
Second, individuals cannot save or borrow. These two assumptions together reduce the
choice problem to a simple work, no-work decision, and limit the dynamic elements of the
problem to the accumulation of human capital. Third, no unobserved heterogeneity is
admitted in the utility function. The only error term in the model is the wage error, h,
which is assumed serially uncorrelated and normally distributed. As we have seen, this
reduces the dynamic problem to a series of standard Tobit problems and eliminates any
concerns about initial conditions.
Altug and Miller (1990) combine certain aspects of both of these approaches in their
study of labor supply and consumption. They use the Euler equation for consumption and
the continuous hours information to recover some of the preference parameters. Utility is
assumed explicitly additive in consumption and leisure but current-period utility is
allowed to depend on past labor supply choices. Wages also have a multiplicative form
in aggregate shocks, individual heterogeneity and a term capturing the effect of past labor
supply choices. A log-differenced wage equation can, therefore, be estimated across
individuals without adjustments for selection. To identify their model they are obliged
to make certain additional assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity. First, they assume
that, conditional on participation, there is no unobserved heterogeneity in hours of work.
Second, they assume Pareto ef®cient allocations across all individuals in the economy.
This latter assumption implies that the marginal utility of consumption is simply the
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and recovered directly from the value function comparison. The forward looking terms in
this comparison are simpli®ed using the idea of Hotz and Miller (1993) which assumes
suf®cient stationarity to replace future value comparisons with current observed transition
rates.
Estimation takes place using a sample of 2169 women from the PSID for 1973±1985.
Consumption is restricted to food consumption. They ®nd an important effect of past labor
supply on wages. They also report important non-separabilities over time in utility.
Current and past labor supplies are found to be substitutes.
8.4.3. Some extensions
This dynamic model has been extended in a number of papers to include endogenous
fertility and marital decisions. For example, drawing on the earlier work of Heckman and
Willis (1975) and Mof®tt (1983), Hotz et al. (1988) develop a semi-reduced form repre-
sentation of fertility and labor supply decision rules. Francesconni (1995) places this
model in the Eckstein and Wolpin framework which is extended to allow endogenous
fertility. Van Der Klaauw (1996) also presents an extension of this framework to allow for
endogenous marital decisions, although he maintains the exogeneity of fertility.
Separability in the decision rule can also be relaxed through the introduction of
asymmetric job layoff and arrival rates. This is the model presented in Blundell et al.
(1997, 1998c) who developed earlier work on discouraged workers by Blundell et al.
(1987) to allow for active search, layoffs and saving in a model of labor market
transitions. Estimation is shown to be possible without recourse to the full dynamic
programming solution using the information in the consumption Euler equation, labor
market transition rates and the consumption policy function. However, strong restric-
tions are placed on the distribution of unobservable preference heterogeneity and on the
distribution of wages.
8.4.4. Habit persistence models
The habit persistence model as discussed in Section 8.3 was investigated extensively in
Hotz et al. (1988) although, as in the Shaw study, they do not consider non-participation.
Their study further assumes that within-period utility over Ct and Kt in Eq. (8.26) is
described by a Translog direct utility and they do not allow for learning by doing. Habits
enter utility in the form
Kt  Lt 1 aCt; 8:30
where Ct is the habit stock of leisure
Ct  1 2 uCt21 1 Lt21: 8:31
The parameter a represents the substitution between current ``leisure'' and past leisure
capital in the production of Kt. Notice that when the depreciation parameter, u, in the
de®nition of Ct is unity then it is only last period's leisure (or labor supply) that matters for
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62 Allowing u to be less than unity generalizes the ®rst-
order conditions slightly since now all future utilities depend on Lt through the stock term
Ct.
This speci®cation results in two stochastic dynamic estimating equations which are
estimated by generalized method of moments. Their application is to the hours and
consumption choices of working men from the PSID panel for the period 1967±1978
(speci®cally 482 white household heads aged between 23 and 52). These two groups
are subsequently split into a younger and older group. Although there is some evidence
of misspeci®cation in the consumption Euler equation, there is reasonably strong evidence
of non-separable preferences and the parameters a and 1-u turn out to be precisely
estimated at around 0.6 and 0.65, respectively, for the group of younger males who
were aged 23±36 in 1967. For the sample of older men the a parameter is somewhat
higher and the 1 2 u parameter slightly lower.
9. Closing comments
The aim of this chapter has been to critically review existing approaches to modeling labor
supply and to identify important gaps in the literature that could be addressed in future
research. We began with a look at the kind of policy reform proposals that labor supply
models are now required to address and the set of labor market facts that labor supply
models are designed to interpret. In the sections that followed, we developed a unifying
framework and provided a brief assessment of each modeling approach, reviewing rele-
vant empirical studies at the end of each section. In this concluding section, we ask: Have
the recent advances in labor supply research, reviewed in this chapter, placed us in a better
position to answer the policy reform questions raised in Section 2 and enabled us to
provide a more reliable interpretation of the trends in participation and hours described
in Section 3?
It is certainly true that this chapter has documented some signi®cant advances in labor
supply research since the original Handbook chapters on labor supply were written in the
®rst half of the 1980s. Even relative to the important appraisal of the area by Heckman
(1993), the marked changes in tax and welfare policies highlighted in Section 2 have
forced labor supply research to increasingly acknowledge the importance of the extensive
margin and discreteness in observed behavior. Likewise, the renewed focus on human
capital in the policy debate has created the need for new generalizations in intertemporal
models. We have also noted the innovations in our understanding of interactions between
individuals within households concerning their labor supply decisions, brought about by
the collective approach to family labor supply.
However, we have also identi®ed some signi®cant gaps in our knowledge which make it
dif®cult to assert con®dently that we are in a position to examine reliably many of the
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62 See, for example, the Johnson and Pencavel (1984) speci®cation.important current policy reform proposals or to assess accurately the main determinants of
participation and hours-of-work changes. This, in turn, explains why labor supply remains
an active and productive area for research. What are these gaps in our current knowledge?
Perhaps the overriding dif®culty remains with modeling participation. This is key in any
analysis of welfare reform. Even in the simplest dynamic model without ®xed costs, we
have seen that the reservation wage depends on the whole future of wages and other
unobservables. Estimation of behavioral parameters and simulation of policy reforms is,
therefore, considerably complicated.
Some studies have attempted to restrict the margins for intertemporal decisions so as to
focus on the discrete participation decision. Although these studies have provided impor-
tant insights into modeling techniques and enhanced our understanding of behavior, it is
dif®cult to believe that they provide suf®ciently good approximations to actual behavior to
give robust policy guidance. For example, we have argued that saving decisions should be
modeled alongside labor supply decisions. Studies that model saving and labor supply
allowing for discrete behavior are few and far between and no robust view of how these
interactions work is currently available.
Some analysts have been content to measure the overall impact of past policy reforms
on either participation or hours of work using a difference-in-differences or natural experi-
ment approach. However, even where the stringent assumptions required for consistent
estimation of interpretable parameters are satis®ed, the estimated parameters do not
provide suf®cient information for extrapolation or simulation. We have argued that simu-
lation of tax and welfare proposals cannot be completed without a structural model. Here a
gap in the literature is revealed. Structural models allowing for discrete choices over labor-
force and welfare participation that acknowledge dynamic decisionmaking are still not
available in the empirical literature. A central part of this survey has been to assemble the
building blocks necessary for such an analysis.
In a similar spirit, developments of the family labor supply model that allow for
collective behavior must also be placed in an intertemporal context. Much evidence
suggests that the strong pooling assumptions underlying the traditional family labor
supply model are untenable, which is worrying for any analysis of the impact of
welfare reform on family labor supply. However, only very recently have the simplest
collective labor supply models been extended to allow for discrete choice and unob-
served heterogeneity, both necessary ingredients of any empirical study. Moreover,
allowing for the possibility of household production in these models requires more
detailed data on time use.
Structural models that allow for the interactions between family members and the non-
convexities in the incentive structure facing individual workers typically place strong
requirements on the individual's and the economist's knowledge of budget constraints
and the distribution of unobservables. We have seen that it is often the desire for ¯exibility
along these dimensions that motivates empirical studies that adopt the difference-in-differ-
ences approach. Even simple structural models often do not account for correlation
between unobservable individual effects in labor supply and the wage and income vari-
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wage and income variable themselves. Since structural models are required for many
purposes for which labor supply analysis is undertaken, precisely how much these
measurement issues matter for different datasets and different modeling approaches should
remain an active area for research.
We have devoted much attention to the speci®cation of labor supply models that
account for non-convexities in the budget constraint, induced by high welfare with-
drawal rates and ®xed costs of work. This is no coincidence; the evaluation of the labor
supply responses to welfare policy reforms remains the most signi®cant recent contri-
bution of standard labor supply models. We have already pointed out the need for
further research that places this analysis in a dynamic setting. We have also noted the
importance of research designed to assess the robustness of alternative approximations
to the shape of the budget constraint and the packaging of hours choices into discrete
bundles.
There remain a number of big issues that we have not touched on in this chapter but that
are important for labor supply analysis. Many of these issues are discussed elsewhere in
this Handbook. Among the most important is the modeling of the retirement decision. In a
general sense, this is implicitly covered in our discussion of participation, but to properly
understand the retirement decision requires careful treatment of the speci®c institutional
structure of retirement programs and the way in which they interact with disability
schemes and rules for earning after retirement (see the forthcoming volume by Gruber
and Wise (1998) for a useful selection of country speci®c studies of the retirement beha-
vior and the structure of social security systems). Another issue relates to the process of
job search and job matching.
We should also acknowledge the potential importance of general equilibrium effects
from tax and transfer programs. These make it even more dif®cult to think of groups of
individuals wholly unaffected by reforms, as is required in the difference-in-differences
approach, and imply different welfare calculations from those from models that assume
gross wages and prices are unaffected by transfer and tax reforms.
Finally, we reiterate the main theme of our review: to formalize the assumptions that are
required for interpretation of elasticities recovered from alternative modeling approaches
and data sources. We hope that this has satis®ed the twin goals of making clear precisely
what is being estimated in any speci®c study and making it possible to compare estimates
across studies.
Appendix A. Speci®cations of within-period preferences
This appendix brie¯y reviews some popular within-period (or contemporaneous or static)
labor supply speci®cations.
63 Speci®cation (4.30), used to illustrate our discussion in
Section 4, corresponds to a within-period labor supply model of the form
64
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Here we suppress the t subscript and allow the single quantity, r, to represent observed and
unobserved heterogeneity. Speci®cation (A.1) is one of a number of popular alternative
three-parameter speci®cations that allow a single parameter for each of the wage, income
effects and heterogeneity terms. Such models place strong restrictions on preferences and
modern research on consumer behavior strives to relax these restrictions using more
¯exible representations.
One important restriction on preferences in within-period labor supply models is on the
sign of the wage response. In theory there is no requirement for the wage response to be the
same sign over all hours choices and, although it is required to be positive at the participa-
tion margin where the income effect is zero, it can become negative as hours increase. The
precise shape of the hours ± wage relationship is also likely to vary with income and
demographic composition. A second restriction is on the income response, which deter-
mines the extent to which leisure is a normal good and whether it is a luxury or necessity.
Most evidence from consumer behavior suggests that this varies widely across different
goods and different types of consumers. Models that are linear in income (quasi-homo-
thetic preferences) as in (4.30
0), or that imply constant elasticities as in Eq. (4.30) are
typically rejected.
65
Restrictions on within-period preferences are usefully summarized by the speci®cation
of the indirect or direct utility function. The additivity between wage and income, implicit
in (A.1), and the constancy of the wage elasticity for all hours choices, are re¯ected in the









Many alternative three-parameter speci®cations of this kind are popular in empirical
applications. The relationship among these speci®cations and the preference restrictions
they imply are helpful in comparing studies. Here we list a number of them and provide a
brief commentary.
Linear labor supply:
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63 See Stern (1986) for a comprehensive review of these and more non-linear parametric static labor supply
speci®cations and their implied indirect and direct utility functions.
64 To provide a within-period interpretation of these preferences in a two-stage budgeting context, we would
replace Y by the consumption-based measure, Y
C
65 The assumption of quasi-homothetic preferences provides a very poor approximation in empirical work on
consumer behavior. More data-coherent speci®cations require terms not only in Mt but also in Mtln(Mt) and even
higher-order interactions.Although popular, the linear model imposes the same sign on the wage response through-
out and implies quasi-homothetic preferences.
Semi-log labor supply:












The semi-log model allows some non-linear curvature in wage effects so that the wage
elasticity declines with hours but its sign is positive throughout and it is still linear in
income. This formulation is attractive where non-participation is an issue and where there
may be measurement error or endogeneity in wages and income. The log linearity in wage
allows proportional taxes to enter linearly and is also a popular speci®cation for reduced
forms for gross hourly wages.
Semi-log labor supply (generalization 1):
H  alnW 1 uY
* 1 r A:7
with Y
*  WH 1 Y 2 aW1 2 exp2H=a.There is no easy form for the indirect utility
with this generalization of the semi-log model but it is interesting for a number of reasons.
First, it can be rewritten as a speci®cation for the log marginal rate of substitution function
which is linear in H and Y
*. Therefore, it produces a particularly simple form for the
reservation wage. Second, it permits negative wage responses as hours increase. As H
tends to zero, it approaches the standard semi-log model (A.6).
Semi-log labor supply (generalization 2):













This generalization has the attraction of allowing a change in sign for the wage elasticity as
Y is reduced, which would typically correspond to an increase in labor supply. It also
facilitates the introduction of higher-order terms in lnW. However, this speci®cation
retains the assumption of linearity in Y and introduces an awkward non-linearity in W.
Stone±Geary (LES) labor supply:
The direct utility is probably the most familiar characterization:
uH;C ulngH 2 H 1 1 2 ulnC 2 gC A:10
with labor supply
WH  1 2 ugHW 2 uY 1 ugC: A:11
The Stone±Geary speci®cation, although popular in early work on household behavior,
has been used less frequently in recent years. It can allow negative wage responses but it
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the log marginal rate of substitution is additive in consumption and hours. It is also quasi-
homothetic. Notice, however, that it is equivalent to the second generalization of the
semilog model (A.8) with lnW replaced by 1/W.
CES labor supply:
This is a useful generalization of the LES labor supply and corresponds to choosing a
direct utility of the form
uH;C ugH 2 H
2m 1 1 2 uC 2 gC
2m
21=m: A:12
It also implies an additive log marginal rate of substitution function and, therefore, explicit
additivity between consumption and labor supply. However, it generalizes the substitution
patterns between consumption and hours, and allows negative wage responses.
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